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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays that explore the interaction between various
discount rates and the macroeconomy.
The ﬁrst essay studies the cross-section of discount rates, speciﬁcally, the term structure
of interest rates. When physical capital is discounted like a bond with a similar duration,
a high term spread is associated with low average duration for investment. I document a
strong negative correlation between the term spread and the duration of investment, im-
plying an important role for the cost of capital in determining the composition of aggregate
investment. The results are robust to including a variety of controls. Consumer durable
goods purchases display similar behavior.
The second essay develops a new utility speciﬁcation that incorporates Campbell–
Cochrane–type habits into the Epstein–Zin class of preferences. It is a model in which
risk premia change over time. In a simple calibration of a real business cycle model with
EZ-habit preferences, the model generates a strongly countercyclical equity premium, sub-
stantial equity return predictability, and a stable riskless interest rate, as in the data. More-
over, conditional on the average level of risk aversion, time-variation in risk aversion in-
creases the volatility and mean return of equities. On the real side, the model matches
the short and long-term variances of output, consumption, and investment growth. As an
additional empirical test, I measure implied risk aversion and ﬁnd that it has an R² of over
50 percent for 5-year stock returns in post-war data.
The third essay develops a New-Keynesian model in which households have Epstein–
Zin preferences with time-varying risk aversion and the central bank has a time-varying
inﬂation target. The model matches the dynamics of nominal bond prices in the US econ-
omy well: the ﬁtting errors for individual bond yields are roughly as large as those ob-
iiitained from a non-structural three-factor model, and two thirds smaller than in models
with constant risk aversion or a constant inﬂation target.
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vii1. INVESTMENT AND THE COST OF CAPITAL IN THE CROSS-SECTION: THE TERM
SPREAD PREDICTS THE DURATION OF INVESTMENT
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the cross-section of investment. While there is an enormous amount
of work studying the aggregate level of investment and the determinants of ﬁrm-level
investment, there is essentially no analysis of the determinants of investment in different
types of assets. This paper begins that task by analyzing the distribution of investment
across assets according to their depreciation rates. I show that when interest rates for long-
duration assets are higher than those for short-duration assets, aggregate investment shifts
relatively towards high-depreciation assets.
Theresponseofinvestmenttothecostofcapitalisakeymechanisminmacroeconomics
and ﬁnance. It is central to production-based asset pricing theories (e.g. Cochrane 1991,
1996); a primary feedback mechanism in standard general-equilibrium models; one of the
key drivers for the response of the economy to monetary policy shocks; the source of the
classical crowding-out effect of government spending; and an important determinant of
the size of distortions from taxes. This paper considers a novel method for uncovering an
empirical relationship between investment and the cost of capital.
There is a long literature that studies the effect of the cost of capital on investment. Sim-
ple methods have, in general, failed to ﬁnd important effects.1 Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
ﬁnd that nonresidential investment seems to respond only weakly to shocks to the Federal
funds rate.2 The discount rate is also a determinant of Tobin’s Q, but estimates of the im-
pact of Q on investment tend to be small (Summers, 1981; Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent,
1 See Chirinko, 1993, for an extensive review.
2 However, in recent unpublished papers, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2008) and Guiso et al. (2002) ﬁnd a
relationship in micro data between investment and interest rates.
12009, give a recent review). The primary contribution of this paper is to show that interest
rates affect what assets ﬁrms invest in at the aggregate level. Furthermore, the effect is rel-
evant at the cyclical frequency: it is neither centered around discrete (and somewhat rare)
policy changes, such as tax changes, or dependent on very long-term effects.3
The basic idea here is to forecast the cross-section of investment using the cross-section
of interest rates, instead of forecasting the level of investment with the level of interest
rates. Long-term assets are discounted with long-term interest rates, and short-term assets
with short rates. When long rates are higher than short rates—the term spread is high—a
cost-of-capital effect implies investment should shift towards short-duration assets. The
negative relationship holds strongly in the data: it explains roughly one third of the cross-
sectional variation in investment by duration, and the effect holds both within and across
industries.
Standard regressions of aggregate investment on the level of interest rates have the
fundamental identiﬁcation problem that periods of high interest rates may also be periods
when investment demand is high, so the correlation between investment and interest rates
could be zero or even positive. By studying the cross-section, I abstract from aggregate
shocks, hopefully reducing this endogeneity problem. The strong empirical results suggest
that in fact endogeneity is less of an issue in the cross-section.
The data is simple to construct. I obtain nominal investment by asset and year from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. I study an index of average duration deﬁned as the average
the of the assets’ economic life-spans, weighted by their share in aggregate investment
in each year.4 Figure 1.1 shows that this index of average duration is highly negatively
correlated with the spread between interest rates on ten and one-year nominal Treasury
bonds (note that the axis for average duration is reversed for the sake of clarity). When
interest rates are relatively high for long-duration assets, investment shifts towards short-
duration assets, creating a strong negative correlation between average duration and the
3 Caballero (1994) and Schaller (2006) use cointegration methods to show that in the long run the cost of
capital is meaningfully related to the size of the capital stock (and hence the level of investment). A number
of researchers have also focused on high-frequency changes in taxes which produce large movements in the
cost of capital and investment (Hassett and Hubbard, 2002, provide an extensive review).
4 Speciﬁcally, "lifespan" is measured as a Macaulay duration using data on economic depreciation rates.
2term spread.
A negative raw correlation between investment and interest rates suggests that the cost
of capital has an important role in determining the cross-sectional distribution of invest-
ment, but there are alternative mechanisms that could produce this result. I therefore build
a simple Q-theory model to help elucidate the possible sources of bias in the basic result in
ﬁgure 1.1 and try to account for them in subsequent regressions. I control for the level of
productivity and expected productivity growth in a variety of ways and ﬁnd that they do
not eliminate the basic effect. More importantly, I ﬁnd that the term spread–average du-
ration relationship is not driven by changes in demand across industries. When the term
spread is high, investment shifts towards low-duration assets within individual industries,
in addition to shifting from industries that use more long-duration assets to ones that use
more short-duration assets.
In addition to contributing to the literature on the determinants of the level of invest-
ment, this paper is related to the recent literature on production-based asset pricing with
projects that have differing characteristics (e.g. Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999, and Gomes,
Kogan, and Yogo, 2009). While those papers show that variation in the types of capital
owned by ﬁrms can lead to differences in their stock prices, I ﬁnd that variation in the
cross-section of asset prices can affect the types of investment that ﬁrms undertake.
The ﬁndings here are also relevant to understanding the relationship between interest
rates and debt issues. The ﬁnal section of the paper provides novel evidence that ﬁrms
match the maturity of their debt issues to their physical investment, consistent previous
evidence in the ﬁnance literature (e.g. Stohs and Mauer, 1996). My ﬁndings suggest that
the timing of debt issues to the term spread documented by Baker, Greenwood, and Wur-
gler (2003) could be explained by the dynamics of physical investment and the fact that
ﬁrms match the maturity of their debt to their assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and
section 1.3 reports the main result. Next, I outline in section 1.4 a simple model that jus-
tiﬁes the regression of the average duration of investment on the term spread. Section 1.5
controls for a number of possible biases suggested by the investment model and shows
that the term spread is the single most powerful predictor of the average duration of in-
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4vestment. In section 1.6 I show that the relationship between duration and the term spread
also appears in purchases of consumer durable goods. Section 1.7 examines the relation-
ship between the type of debt that ﬁrms sell and the duration of their assets. I ﬁnd a posi-
tive relationship (consistent with maturity-matching theories), which gives added support
for the idea that long-term interest rates are the relevant cost of capital for long-duration
assets and short rates for short-term assets. Finally, section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Data
To study the relationship between investment and the cost of capital in the cross-
section, we need a relevant measure of the cost of capital that differs across assets. The du-
ration of assets is a natural source of variation because it is easy to quantify for both phys-
ical assets (through their depreciation rates) and bonds (through maturities). Of course,
the cost of capital depends on more than simply the level of interest rates. The equity pre-
mium is large and variable (e.g. Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). The advantage of focusing
on interest rates here is that we can directly observe the cost of capital for assets of differ-
ent durations. While there have been studies of the term structure of equity (Lettau and
Wachter, 2007), there is no simple way to actually measure the term structure of expected
returns on equity, let alone the variation in the slope of that term structure.
I obtain data on Treasury yields measured at year-end from the Federal Reserve. Trea-
sury data has the advantage of including bonds with a large variety of maturities over a
long period of time. However, ﬁrms do not in general borrow at the Treasury yield. I there-
fore also study the spread between yields on 3-month commercial paper and the Moody’s
seasoned Baa corporate bond yield (from Global Financial Data and the Federal Reserve,
respectively). The Moody’s index is meant to measure bonds with remaining maturities
near 30 years. The main results focus on the Treasury yield spread.5
A potential concern is that the relevant discount rate for investment is the real inter-
est rate, not the nominal rate. One method for obtaining the real interest rate would be
5 Ideally, we would measure the true cost of capital for each asset, including the cost of capital for equity, in
particular. While there is research on the term structure for equity (Lettau and Wachter, 2007), it is not obvious
how to construct an equity cost of capital for each asset simply by looking at its depreciation rate.
5to subtract an inﬂation forecast from the nominal rate. In general, random-walk inﬂation
forecasts are competitive with more sophisticated methods (Atkeson and Ohanian, 2001).
With a random-walk forecast, the nominal term spread and the spread obtained after sub-
tracting expected inﬂation will be identical, which suggests that there is little to be gained
by forecasting inﬂation here.6
Another option is to look at yields on inﬂation-protected bonds. The time series of
inﬂation-protected bonds in the United States is relatively short, but inﬂation protected
bonds have been sold in the United Kingdom since the 1980’s. Figure 1.2 plots the 10/5
year term spread in the UK for both nominal and inﬂation-protected bonds since 1985.
Over the sample, the two series move together closely, even through the ﬁnancial crisis.
Their variances differ, but they are over 70 percent correlated. This result suggests that
by studying the nominal term spread, we will obtain results that are similar to what we
would obtain with the unobservable real term spread.
Data on capital stocks and investment come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s
(BEA) ﬁxed asset tables. The main results focus on aggregate investment by asset, but
the BEA also reports data at the assetindustry level. Data on depreciation rates is from
Fraumeni (1997), the source for current depreciation rates used by the BEA.7 The BEA uses
geometric (declining balance) depreciation for nearly all assets.8 Depreciation rates are
estimated primarily from data on service lives and sales of vintage assets. Given the resale
value of an asset for each age along with a service life, one can estimate an approximate
geometric depreciation rate.9 These depreciation rates are closer to economic depreciation
than the straight-line method used for accounting purposes by many ﬁrms (Hulten and
Wykoff, 1981).
I use 36 asset classes from the BEA tables, excluding household and government as-
6 Furthermore, we would need to estimate a 10-year inﬂation forecast, which would be difﬁcult even if
inﬂation were relatively easy to forecast at short horizons. Another option would be to use survey data on
inﬂation forecasts, but this would substantially limit the available time series.
7 Her depreciation rates closely match depreciation obtained by simply diving BEA reported depreciation
by the capital stock.
8 Missiles and nuclear fuel rods, for example, are modeled with straight-line depreciation.
9 The BEA’s current estimates are a combination of data from a variety of studies on resale values reviewed
in Fraumeni, 1997.
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7sets and educational, health, and religion-related structures. The majority of the analysis
focuses on equipment investment. The investment literature generally ﬁnds that models
have substantial trouble explaining structures investment (Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel,
1995). This may be partly caused by the fact that nonresidential building projects take four-
teen months to complete on average (Edge, 2000).10 The main results below go through
when structures are included, but the relationships are far less clear. I therefore leave
the analysis of structures to future work so as not to distract from a complete analysis of
equipment investment.
For each asset class, the BEA reports total stocks (on a current-cost basis) and invest-
ment for the private nonresidential economy. The asset classes accounting for the most
nominal investment in 2007 were software (16 percent of total investment), petroleum
and natural gas exploration and wells (8 percent), communication equipment (7 percent),
and computers and peripheral equipment (6 percent). Except for oil and gas, these assets
all have high depreciation rates, and substantial investment is necessary just to keep the
stocks at constant levels.
For an asset with geometric depreciation rate di, if we assume that productivity is con-
stant and there is a ﬁxed discount rate r, Macaulay’s duration, Di, will be
Di =
¥
å
j=1
j
(1  di)
j 1
(1+ r)
j =
1+ r
r + di
(1.1)
When measuring durations I ﬁx r = 0.03.11 Table 1.1 lists the assets used in this study
along with their depreciation rates and durations. Software, computers, and ofﬁce and
accounting equipment have the highest depreciation rates, all above 20 percent per year.
Types of heavy industrial machinery tend to have lower depreciation rates, as low as 5
percent.
Finally, for the purpose of summarizing the cross-section of investment, I deﬁne an
10 See Edge (2000) for an empirical model of residential and nonresidential structures investment that takes
into account building lags.
11 Allowing for a constant rate of productivity growth would be the equivalent of choosing a lower value of
r. The results are not sensitive to the choice of r.
8Table 1.1: Assets, depreciation rates, and durations
Depreciation 
rate (percent)
Duration 
(years)
Asset
   Information processing equipment and software
0.25 3.73       Computers and peripheral equipment
0.40 2.37       Software
0.14 6.11       Communication equipment
0.14 6.24       Medical equipment and instruments
0.14 6.24       Nonmedical instruments
0.18 4.90       Photocopy and related equipment
0.31 3.01       Office and accounting equipment
   Industrial equipment
0.09 8.46       Fabricated metal products
0.05 12.62       Engines and turbines
0.12 6.75       Metalworking machinery
0.10 7.74       Special industry machinery, n.e.c.
0.11 7.51       General industrial, including materials handling, equipment
0.05 12.88       Electrical transmission, distribution, and industrial apparatus
   Transportation equipment
0.15 5.72       Trucks, buses, and truck trailers
0.22 4.12       Autos
0.12 7.10       Aircraft
0.06 11.31       Ships and boats
0.06 11.59       Railroad equipment
   Other equipment
0.14 6.15       Furniture and fixtures
0.12 6.87       Agricultural machinery
0.16 5.51       Construction machinery
0.15 5.72       Mining and oilfield machinery
0.16 5.42       Service industry machinery
0.18 4.83       Electrical equipment, n.e.c.
0.15 5.81       Other nonresidential equipment
   Structures
0.02 18.83       Office, including medical buildings
0.02 19.73       Commercial
0.03 16.89       Manufacturing
0.02 19.18       Electric
0.02 19.18       Other power
0.02 19.18       Communication
0.08 9.80       Petroleum and natural gas
0.05 13.73       Mining
0.02 19.62       Other buildings
0.03 17.91       Railroads
0.02 19.11       Farm
Note: Depreciation rates are otained from the BEA.  Duration is measured as 1.03/(0.03+δ).
9index measuring the average duration of investment,
¯ Dt  å
i
Iit
åi Iit
Di (1.2)
¯ Dt is simply a weighted average of the durations of the assets, where the weights are the
assets’ shares in aggregate nominal investment. When investment shifts relatively towards
short-duration assets, e.g. computers or software, ¯ Dt falls. Furthermore, ¯ Dt is constructed
sothatitisnotmechanicallyrelatedtothelevelofinvestment. Thereisnoparticularreason
why there need be a positive or negative relationship between the level of investment (or
the state of the business cycle) and ¯ Dt.12
Figure 1.3 plots ¯ Dt for 1948–2008. As might be expected, average duration has been
fallingovertime. Thefastestrateofdeclineappearsinthelate1980’s, andtheseriesﬂattens
out after 1994, actually rising substantially between 2006 and 2008. We should not expect
transitory changes in the term spread to explain the long-term changes in the duration of
investment. Long run changes are driven by technological shifts, e.g. the introduction of
computers, software, andotherelectronicequipment. Instead, thetermspreadwillexplain
the year-to-year variation in ¯ Dt.13
Table 1.1 shows that computers have a depreciation rate of 25 percent, and software
40 percent. Their combined share of nominal investment rises from 7.4 percent in 1978
to 32.7 percent in 2008. Figure 1.3 also includes a version of ¯ Dt that excludes investment
in computers and software, and we can see that if not for computers and software, there
is no decline in the average duration of investment over time. Over the sample, though,
the correlation of the ﬁrst differences of the two versions of ¯ Dt is over 90 percent. For the
main regressions, I detrend all of the variables using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with
a smoothing parameter of 25. I obtain similar results when I use a polynomial trend or
take ﬁrst differences (see table 1.2 for results in ﬁrst differences).
12 Rather than using an index of average duration, which involves a discount rate, we could also simply
use an index of the average depreciation rate of investment. All of the results below go through with this
alternative measure.
13 Tevlin and Whelan (2003) give a more extensive discussion of the recent decrease in the duration of the
capital stock.
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111.3 Results
Figure 1.1 plots HP-detrended ¯ Dt and the 10/1 year term spread at the end of the
previous year (with the axis for ¯ Dt reversed). The negative relationship is immediately
apparent. The term spread and average duration have a correlation of -54 percent. Gray
bars indicate NBER-dated recessions. In most recessions, the term spread rises due to the
Fed cutting interest rates, and the duration of investment falls. Duration is often high
just prior to recessions, e.g. 1970, 1990, 2001, and 2007, when the yield curve is inverted.
Looking more closely, we can see that over time the term spread has become more volatile
while ¯ Dt has become somewhat less volatile. This is a common ﬁnding: the real economy
has become less volatile (the great moderation), while Federal Reserve policy has become
more aggressive, causing higher volatility in interest rates.
Table 1.2 reports results of regressions of ¯ Dt on the ﬁrst lag of the term spread. All
of the variables in table 1.2 are standardized to have unit variance so that the regression
coefﬁcients indicate how a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables
affects ¯ Dt in terms of its own standard deviation. The units of ¯ Dt have no deep economic
meaning on their own.
As expected, in the ﬁrst column we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the
term spread and an R2 of 0.30. This is a high value; Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1995),
when forecasting the level of aggregate investment using models with as many as 11 lags
of quarterly data, obtain at best an R2 of 0.34. With a single variable, I am able to get an
R2 nearly as high for ¯ Dt. Column two uses the term spread on corporate bonds instead of
Treasuries and ﬁnds a nearly identical coefﬁcient and R2.
The third column of table 1.2 controls for the lagged level of ¯ Dt. The coefﬁcient is
only marginally signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient on the term spread is essentially unchanged.
Column 4 shows that leading values of the term spread have no explanatory power for
average duration, which is consistent with the theory that ﬁrms are responding to the cost
of capital, rather than there being some underlying variable that causes the term spread
and ¯ D to generally move together.
Finally, the ﬁfth column runs the basic regression using investment in all assets instead
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13of equipment alone. The results still go through. The symmetrical regression using only
structures investment is unenlightening because there is not enough variation in duration
within structures to provide reasonable statistical power.
To test for a break in the relationship between ¯ Dt and the term spread, I use the sup-F
test (also known as the Quandt likelihood ratio test). We might expect that the break in this
relationship would have appeared following the great moderation, when monetary policy
became more aggressive and the economy less volatile. The F-test for a break, though, is
maximized in 1958. Looking at ﬁgure 1.1, it is clear that after 1958 the volatility of ¯ Dt fell
and the volatility of the term spread rose. The F-statistic for a break is never above the
critical value reported in Andrews (1993) except for in 1958 and 1959. The highest value
outside those two years is 4.56 in 1992, well below the 10 percent critical value of 5.00.
There is thus evidence for a structural break, but not where we might have thought. For
the period since 1960, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between ¯ Dt and
the term spread has been stable.
1.4 Model
With the basic result in hand, it is useful to build a simple and stylized model to help
understand where this correlation might come from. It is tempting to immediately jump
to the conclusion that there is variation in the cost of capital (i.e. shocks to the supply of
investment goods), which drives the result in ﬁgure 1.1. The model helps identify what
other factors might induce a similar correlation.
I consider a standard inﬁnite-horizon setup with a few simpliﬁcations for analytic
tractability. Firms face a linear production function in each type of capital, where the cur-
rent level of productivity for asset i is Bit. That is, revenue is equal to
å
i
BitKit (1.3)
where Kit is the stock of asset i at date t. Note that this revenue function ignores comple-
mentarities between types of assets. In general, if a decline in the term spread is expected
to shift investment towards long-duration assets, complementarity across assets will at-
14tenuate this effect (in the limit of a Leontief production function, ﬁrms would never vary
the composition of the capital stock).
I follow Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Jermann (1998) in specifying the update process
for capital as
Kit+1 = (1  di)fi (Iit 1) + fi (Iit) (1.4)
The update process for capital assumes that capital only operates for two periods for the
sake of analytic simplicity. Each asset depreciates by the factor (1  di) between its ﬁrst
and second period of operation, and is subsequently obsolete. fi incorporates adjustment
costs in investment so that a unit of investment may create less than one unit of capital. fi
takes the form
fi (Iit) =
h1i
1  1/g
I
1 1/g
it + h2i (1.5)
fi has the useful property that the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s Q will
equal the constant g.14 The parameters h1i and h2i determine the level of investment and
the size of the adjustment costs paid and are allowed to vary across assets.15
Denoting the discount rate between dates t and t + 1 as rt+1, the ﬁrm maximizes the
discounted value of its revenue net of investment costs,
Pt = max
Iit
¥
å
j=0
å
i
h
exp

 å
j
k=1rt+k

EtBit+jKit+j   Iit+j
i
(1.6)
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available at date t.
All proﬁts are discounted at the riskless rate rt.
For productivity growth, I assume that different assets may have different current lev-
els of productivity, but expected productivity growth in the future is the same for all assets,
14 This functional form has the drawback that it is not necessarily consistent with negative investment. How-
ever, asset-level investment is always positive in the data, so this is not a practical concern here.
15 These two parameters allow us to choose a steady state level of investment xi where Qi = 1 and fi (xi) =
xi and f0
i (xi) = 1. That is, they allow us to choose a point where the ﬁrm pays no adjustment costs overall
and on the margin.
15Et log
 
Bi,t+j/Bi,t+j 1

= mt+j. Taking the ﬁrst-order condition for Iit gives
1
f0
i (Iit)
= exp(mt+1   rt+1) Bit + exp(mt+1 + mt+2   rt+1   rt+2) Bit (1  di) (1.7)
Theappendixshowsthat, usingaﬁrst-orderapproximation, wecanderiveanapproximate
expression for the index of average duration, ¯ Dt,
¯ Dt  d0 + gN 1å
i

\ log(Bit)

Di + F(mt+2   rt+2) (1.8)
where d0 is a constant, N is the number of assets, \ log(Bit)  log(Bit)   N 1 åi logBit
is the deviation of the productivity of asset i from the period average, and F is a strictly
increasing function.16
We can rewrite the term mt+2   rt+2 as
mt+2   rt+2 = (mt+1 + mt+2)
| {z }
Total prod. growth
  (rt+1 + rt+2)
| {z }
Total discount rate
+ (mt+2   mt+1)
| {z }
Productivity spread
  (rt+2   rt+1)
| {z }
Term spread
(1.9)
The ﬁrst line is total productivity growth and the total discount rate between periods t
and t + 2. The term (rt+2   rt+1) is the relevant concept of the term spread, and I refer to
(mt+2   mt+1) as the productivity growth spread.
The previous section considered a simple regression of ¯ Dt on the term spread,
(rt+2   rt+1). Holding all else equal (including total expected productivity growth and
the total discount rate), equation (1.8) conﬁrms the simple intuition that this relationship
should be negative. Equation (1.8) shows, however, that there are at least four poten-
tial omitted variables in this regression: total expected productivity growth and discount
rates between t and t + 2 (mt+1 + mt+2 and rt+1 + rt+2); the productivity growth spread,
(mt+2   mt+1), and the levels of idiosyncratic productivity, N 1 åi

\ log(Bit)

Di.
16 Speciﬁcally, F(x) =  
exp(x)
1+exp(x)(1 ¯ d)N 1 åi ˆ diDi where ¯ d  N 1 åi di and ˆ di  di   ¯ d. Note that since Di is
decreasing in di, F is strictly increasing.
16First, holding the term spread and the productivity spread ﬁxed, an increase in pro-
ductivity growth (mt+1 + mt+2) or a decrease in discount rates (rt+1 + rt+2) will tilt the
distribution of investment towards long-duration assets. This effect is the primary fea-
ture of duration: long-duration assets gain more value from a decline in interest rates or
an increase in expected productivity growth than do short-duration assets. To the extent
that the term spread is correlated with long-term average productivity growth and interest
rates, then, a regression of the average duration of investment on the term spread will be
biased.
Speciﬁcally, we could spuriously ﬁnd a negative relationship between the term spread
and ¯ Dt if expected long-term productivity growth is low in periods when the term spread
is high. The term spread is countercyclical, so this would correspond to a situation in
which expected long-term productivity growth (mt+1 + mt+2) is low during recessions. I
will try to control for these effects by controlling for the level of aggregate investment and
various other indicators of the state of the business cycle.
The second source of bias is that the productivity spread (mt+2   mt+1) could be corre-
lated with the term spread. In particular, if productivity growth is expected to slow down
in the same periods that the term spread is high, we would ﬁnd a spurious negative re-
lationship between average duration and the term spread. In this case, recessions would
have to be periods in which productivity growth is expected to decelerate in the future,
which seems unlikely given that recessions are periods when growth is already slow in
the ﬁrst place (by deﬁnition).
Finally, the levels of productivity across assets could be related to duration, affecting
¯ Dt through the N 1 åi

\ log(Bit)

Di term, which can be thought of as the covariance be-
tween duration and productivity across assets. If this covariance changes over time and is
systematically related to the level of the term spread, then omitting it from the regression
would bias the coefﬁcient on the term spread.
Over long horizons, investment and productivity shift substantially across different
assets. The most notable of these changes is the long-run decline in prices and increase
17in investment in computers and software (Tevlin and Whelan, 2003).17 The model would
interpret this phenomenon as an increase in Bit for low-duration assets, which drives ¯ Dt
downward. A simple way to control for those movements is to detrend ¯ Dt.
Short-run movements in idiosyncratic productivity are more difﬁcult to account for,
though. If changes in the term spread are correlated with shifts in productivity that favor
certain assets, then the regression of ¯ Dt on the term spread will be biased. In the empirical
analysis below, I discuss and control for some speciﬁc mechanisms, most importantly in-
dustrydemandshifts, thatcoulddrivehigh-frequencymovementsin N 1 åi

\ log(Bit)

Di.
Instead of running a regression of average duration on investment, it would be nice
to estimate a more fundamental parameter, such as the coefﬁcient on marginal Q, which
tells us about the size of adjustment costs in investment. One way to do that would be to
calculate Tobin’s Q for each asset individually, as in Abel and Blanchard (1986), using the
fullterm structureof interestrates. The problemis thatwedo notactually directlymeasure
the marginal product of any individual asset at any point in time. Moreover, we do not
measure anything like the true discount rate for each asset. Rather, the term spread in
this paper is measured using Treasury yields and is taken as an indicator of differences in
discount rates across assets. A deeper problem is that Abel and Blanchard’s method would
also require forecasting inﬂation at very long horizons, when the literature generally ﬁnds
that inﬂation is difﬁcult to forecast even at quarterly and annual horizons (e.g. Atkeson
and Ohanian, 2001).18
17 See also Caballero, 1994, and Schaller, 2006, for studies of the relationship between investment and the
cost of capital in the long-run.
18 Euler equation estimation is also an option. In a pair of papers, Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1995, 1996)
study the effectiveness and internal consistency of Euler equation models for investment. They obtain param-
eter estimates that are somewhat difﬁcult to reconcile with economic theory, ﬁnd that supposedly "structural"
parameters are unstable over time, and that the models have little forecasting power. There are also legitimate
concerns about the validity and relevance of the instruments used in these models (especially when extended
to asset-level data).
I attempted to estimate an Euler equation using the panel of data on asset-level investment. Between two-
stage least squares, LIML, and GMM methods, there were substantial differences in results indicating that
the model is misspeciﬁed or there are problems with the instruments. I also replicated some of the troubling
results found by Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel. Furthermore, Euler equations are clearly difﬁcult to estimate
even with quarterly data, and I only have annual data on asset-level investment.
The Euler-equation method is also more restrictive than the methods used in this paper because it is difﬁcult
or impossible to incorporate all of the controls that I consider. Euler equations are useful for estimating speciﬁc
parameters in tightly theorized models. The regressions used here are meant to test a broader range of possible
explanationsforthecorrelationbetweenaveragedurationandthetermspreadandtomeasuretheexplanatory
18What the regression of average duration on the term spread is useful for is testing
whether the term spread drives investment in the direction that we would expect and
how much explanatory power the term spread has for the cross-section of investment. A
high R2 in a regression of average duration on the term spread is evidence that the cross-
section of interest rates is an important determinant of the cross-sectional distribution of
investment.
1.5 Alternative explanations
The working hypothesis is that the negative relationship between average duration
and the term spread is a simple cost-of-capital effect. The model in the previous section
shows that there are a number of other factors that could cause us to ﬁnd the correlation we
observe in ﬁgure 1.1. This section considers a range of possible alternative explanations.
I ﬁnd that the correlation is driven to some extent by these other factors, but that the cost
of capital retains a substantial amount of explanatory power and is generally the most
powerful variable for explaining average duration.
1.5.1 Correlations by asset and industry
One possible explanation for the correlation between the term spread and ¯ D is that
demand for the products of different industries depends on the term spread. For exam-
ple, suppose when the term spread is high consumers demand fewer durable goods (the
term spread tends to be countercyclical, as are durables purchases; Yogo, 2006). If durable
goods industries tend to use relatively more long-duration capital than services providers
(for example, a car manufacturer may use more heavy machinery than a barber shop), then
we would see investment shift towards low-duration assets. In the terms of the model, this
is a story about the covariance term åi D(di)

log(Bi0)   N 1åi log(Bi0)

. The correlation
between ¯ D and the term spread then would be driven by consumer demand (and hence
the variation in the marginal product across assets) instead of the cost of capital. We can
power of the term spread. I therefore leave the Euler equation analysis of this panel dataset for future work.
19test this hypothesis by decomposing ¯ D into components driven by within-industry reallo-
cation and changes in the composition of investment across industries.
As noted above, the BEA not only reports data on aggregate investment; it also gives
levels of investment at the assetindustry level. Denoting the ﬁrst difference of ¯ Dt as D ¯ Dt,
we can decompose D ¯ Dt following van Ark and Inklaar (2006) using the industry-level data
as
D ¯ Dt = å
j

1
2

Ij,t
¯ It
 
Ij,t 1
¯ It 1

  ¯ Dj,t + ¯ Dj,t 1


+å
j

1
2

Ij,t
¯ It
+
Ij,t 1
¯ It 1
  ¯ Dj,t   ¯ Dj,t 1

(1.10)
where ¯ Dj,t  åi
Ij,i,t
¯ Ij,t Di is the average duration of industry j at time t. The ﬁrst part of
equation(1.10)canbethoughtofasacross-industryreallocationeffect. Itsumsthechanges
in the industry investment shares weighting by their average depreciation rates at dates
t and t   1. The second term is the within-industry reallocation term. It represents the
effects of industries changing their mix of investment among different assets. I refer to the
two effects as the between and within-industry effects, respectively.
The ﬁnal three columns of table 1.2 report results from ﬁrst-differenced regressions
of D ¯ D and its decomposition (1.10) on the change in the term spread. D ¯ D and DTS are
standardized to have unit variance as in the remainder of the table. The three columns
report results from regressions with different dependent variables. The ﬁrst column uses
D ¯ D. The coefﬁcient on the term spread is similar to though somewhat smaller than the
coefﬁcient in column 1. In other words, the relationship between ¯ D and the term spread
is somewhat weaker in high frequency data, which is perhaps not surprising considering
the effects of planning, ordering, and building lags. The coefﬁcients in columns 7 and 8
by deﬁnition sum to the coefﬁcient in column 6. The within-industry coefﬁcient is twice
the size of the between-industry coefﬁcient; in other words, two thirds of the aggregate
effect comes from reallocation within industries. The hypothesis that industry demand is
correlated with the term spread seems to be true, but it explains only a minority of the
variation in average duration over time.
20To analyze how the relationship in ﬁgure 1.1 and table 1.2 differs across assets, I run a
regression of each asset’s share of aggregate investment on the term spread.19 Speciﬁcally,
for each asset we run the regression
Iit
åi Iit
= ai + biTSt + #it (1.11)
It is straightforward to show that if bi is negatively related to each asset’s duration, then
there will be a negative relationship between the term spread and ¯ Dt. This is a way of ask-
ing whether the relationship we observe at the aggregate level is pervasive across assets,
or is driven by a few outlier assets.
Figure 1.4 plots the coefﬁcients bi against duration. The black boxes are for equipment,
grey diamonds structures. Regression lines are included for the sample of all assets and
for equipment only. The correlations between bi and Di are -0.42 and -0.31 for equipment
only and all assets, respectively. Looking across equipment, the relationship between the
composition of investment and the term spread is broadly based not driven by a few out-
liers.
The plot includes labels for the assets that make up the largest part of investment over
the last 15 years. Numbers in parentheses represent their percentage shares over that pe-
riod. Within equipment, auto purchases as a share of total investment are far more pos-
itively correlated with the term spread than any other asset, though they represent a rel-
atively small part of aggregate investment. Software is the single largest component of
investment and it is well above the best ﬁt line. Communication equipment and comput-
ers are next in the rankings and are somewhat closer to the regression line.
Structures do not match the results for equipment very well. While the shares of struc-
tures are generally negatively related to the term spread, they are not as negative as we
would think from just looking at equipment. Electric-power plants, in particular, are a
large positive outlier. As noted above, the fact that building lags average over a year (a
time that does not take into account the time required for planning) is likely to distort the
19 To control for long-term changes in the composition of investment I ﬁrst detrend the dependent variable
and the term spread using the HP ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 25 as above.
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22regressions for structures.
1.5.2 The business cycle, volatility, and other explanations
Table 1.3 explores a number of other mechanisms that could cause the observed cor-
relation beyond changes in demand across industries. Columns 1 and 2 control for the
business cycle with the lagged detrended unemployment rate and level of output. In both
cases the coefﬁcient on the term spread is smaller but still statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. This is perhaps not surprising: even if the term spread does represent a true
cost-of-capital effect, it is also a proxy for the business cycle. Controlling for other business
cycle indicators will probably lower its coefﬁcient. Including the current value and longer
lags of unemployment and output do not change the results of the regressions.
Another obvious question is whether there is a mechanical relationship between aver-
age duration and the level of investment. Suppose a ﬁrm has equal stocks of two assets,
one with a depreciation rate of 1 percent, the other 10 percent. In a maintenance phase
with no net capital growth, there will be 10 times as much investment in the high depreci-
ation as the low depreciation asset. However, in an expansion phase, assuming both assets
are expanded equally, investment will shift towards being equally balanced between the
two assets. If the term spread is correlated with the level of investment, it might also
then be correlated with average duration. Column 3 tests that hypothesis by including
detrended aggregate equipment investment. Puzzlingly, unlike the example just given,
when investment is high, duration actually tends to be low. However, the coefﬁcient on
the term spread is still large and signiﬁcant. The term spread thus has explanatory power
beyond its indication of either the business cycle of overall level of investment. Column 4
shows that if we include all three aggregate indicators, unemployment, GDP, and invest-
ment, the coefﬁcient on the term spread is the highest, and has the highest t-statistic, of
any of the variables (implying that the marginal R2 of the term spread is higher than any
of the business-cycle indicators).
Abeletal. (1996), amongmanyothers, studytheeffectsofirreversibilityoninvestment.
With irreversibility, when idiosyncratic uncertainty is high, ﬁrms may be less willing to
23T
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24invest in long-duration assets. Intuitively, if it is more difﬁcult to sell a long-duration
asset (e.g. a large wind turbine) because it is more costly to disassemble than a short-
duration investment, then there is option value to delaying investment which is increasing
in uncertainty.20 Campbell et al. (2001) and Bloom (2009) ﬁnd that when the volatility of
returns on the aggregate stock market is high, so is idiosyncratic ﬁrm volatility. If the term
spread is partially driven by aggregate volatility (a ﬁnding of Bloom, 2009, and implied by
many term structure models, e.g. Longstaff and Schwartz, 1992), and volatility drives ¯ D,
then we would ﬁnd a spurious correlation between the term spread and ¯ D.
I use two measures of cross-sectional volatility that are also used in Bloom (2009): the
period-by-period cross-sectional standard deviations of ﬁrm quarterly proﬁt growth and
stock returns, including controls for 3-digit SIC industries.21 Column 5 of table 1.3 reports
results of a regression of ¯ D on the volatility indexes. Both measures of volatility are posi-
tively correlated with the next year’s term spread, which is consistent with Bloom’s (2009)
results. He ﬁnds that volatility shocks lead to economic contractions and reductions in the
short rate. Table 1.3 shows that conditional on the term spread and the state of the busi-
ness cycle, high stock return volatility (though not proﬁt growth volatility) in the follow-
ing year is associated with low duration investment. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that long-duration investment involves a bigger commitment for ﬁrms than short-duration
investment. That is, the hypothesis that high volatility interacts with ﬁxed costs of adjust-
ment to decrease investment seems to apply more strongly to long than short-term assets.
Note, though, that even when controlling for volatility, the term spread remains signiﬁcant
and has a large coefﬁcient.
Anotheralternativehypothesisisthatthetermspreaddoesnotreﬂectthecostofcapital
but is simply an indicator of the stance of monetary policy. When the Federal Reserve
contracts the money supply, this may inhibit bank lending, as in Kashyap and Stein (2000).
If banks are more likely to ﬁnance projects of a certain duration (either high or low), then
the term spread might simply be correlated with movements in ¯ D because it is correlated
20 House and Shapiro, 2008, discuss the relationship between real option-type effects and asset duration.
21 The original data was retrieved from Compustat and CRSP. I obtained the data used here from Nick
Bloom’s website.
25with bank lending standards. One way to test this hypothesis is to try to directly measure
bank lending standards. The Federal Reserve has administered a Survey of Senior Loan
Ofﬁcers since 1967 (with a gap between 1983 and 1989) that asks banks about the level of
their lending standards.22 Column 6 includes the tightness index from this survey in the
regression. The coefﬁcient on the term spread remains signiﬁcant. When bank lending
standards are relatively tight (a high value of the index), average duration is low. This is
perhapssurprising, sincebanksareusuallythoughtofasﬁnancingshort-durationprojects,
while ﬁrms go to credit markets for longer-term ﬁnancing. One possible explanation is
that lending standards tend to be high when other factors are driving ﬁrms towards short-
duration investment. In particular, standards might be high in times of high uncertainty.
The appendix includes further robustness tests. When all of the controls are included
simultaneously, thetermspreadistheonlysigniﬁcantvariableandithasmoreexplanatory
power than any of the other variables individually.
Lettau and Wachter (2007) argue that the differences in returns between high and low
book/market (B/M) stocks can be explained by differences in the duration of their cash
ﬂows (see also Hansen, Heaton, and Li, 2008). A high value spread is associated with
a high valuation for growth stocks, or long-duration assets, which implies investment
in long-duration assets should be high. Since stock prices represent claims on capital,
whereas Treasury bonds are claims on currency, we might expect that the value spread
would have more predictive power than the term spread. Column 7 of table 1.3 reports
the results of a regression including the value spread. I measure the value spread here as
the ratio of the book to market ratios for the top and bottom third of stocks sorted by book
to market (as reported on Kenneth French’s website).23 The coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative: the opposite of what the duration theory of the value spread would predict. One
possible explanation for this result is that ﬁrms with growth stocks tend to have lower-
duration assets—e.g. technology ﬁrms—so when their values are high average duration
22 I obtain data from Lown and Morgan, 2006.
23 Speciﬁcally, French reports value spreads for small and large stocks, split at the median of market capital-
ization. I average these two value spreads. Furthermore, I detrend the value spread using the HP ﬁlter with a
smoothing parameter of 100.
26falls. To many readers, that may have been the obvious result all along. Nevertheless, it
runs against Lettau and Wachter’s theory.
1.6 Consumer durables
If the term spread truly represents a cost of capital effect then we would expect house-
hold purchases of durable goods to respond to it in a manner similar to nonresidential
investment. Households face some of the same choices as ﬁrms when deciding what types
of durable goods to purchase. In particular, long-lasting durable goods may have ﬁnanc-
ing arrangements with longer terms than those of shorter duration assets.24
Denoting the duration of durable good of type i as Ci and purchases as Pi, I deﬁne the
average duration of consumer durables purchases as
¯ Ct  åi CiPit
åi Pit
(1.12)
Table 1.4 lists the assets available from the BEA, along with their depreciation rates and
durations. The two assets with the lowest depreciation rates are luggage and furniture at
13 percent. Computer software and motor vehicle parts have the highest rates at 76 and
90 percent, respectively. The assets are mostly clustered in a small range of depreciation
rates, though: three fourths have depreciation rates between 16 and 25 percent.
Figure 1.5 plots HP-detrended ¯ Ct against the detrended term spread. As in ﬁgure 1.1,
the axis for ¯ Ct is reversed so that a negative correlation in the data is an easier-to-read posi-
tive correlation in the ﬁgure. For most of the sample, there is a strong negative correlation,
just as we observe for nonresidential investment. In a regression similar to those in table
1.2, consumer durables on the lagged term spread, the coefﬁcient is -0.31 with a p-value of
0.008. There is thus a signiﬁcant relationship over the full sample, though the correlation is
somewhat weaker than what we observe for nonresidential investment. The correlation is
clearest between 1965 and 1991. For nonresidential investment the correlation is more con-
sistent over time, which explains why the QLR test in section 1.3 indicated a break point
24 Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2008) show that auto loan terms tend to be between three and ﬁve
years, while home loans may be as long as 30 years.
27Table 1.4: Consumer durables, depreciation rates, and durations
Depreciation 
rate (percent)
Duration 
(years)
Asset
   Motor vehicles and parts
0.28 3.27       Autos
0.25 3.70       Light trucks
0.90 1.11       Motor vechicle parts & accessories
   Furnishings and household equipment
0.13 6.63       Furniture
0.18 4.90       Clocks, lamps, lighting fix & other 
0.18 4.91       Carpets and other floor coverings
0.18 4.89       Window coverings
0.16 5.37       Household appliances
0.18 4.90       Glassware, tableware, & household uten
0.18 4.90       Tools & equipment for house & garden
   Recreational goods and Vehicles
0.20 4.45       Video & audio equipment
0.18 4.92       Photographic equipment
0.44 2.21       Personal computers and peripheral equip
0.76 1.31       Computer software & accessories
0.18 4.91       Calcs, typewrtrs, & oth info proc equip
0.18 4.91       Sporting equip, supplies, guns, & ammo
0.18 4.91       Motorcycles
0.18 4.92       Bicycles & accessories
0.18 4.90       Pleasure boats
0.18 4.91       Pleasure aircraft
0.26 3.52       Other recreational vehicles
0.18 4.91       Recreational books
0.20 4.46       Musical instruments
   Other durable goods
0.16 5.36       Jewelry & watches
0.32 2.95       Therapeutic appliances & equip
0.18 4.91       Educational books
0.13 6.63       Luggage & similar personal items
0.18 4.88       Telephone & facsimile equipment
Note: Depreciation rates are otained from the BEA.  Duration is measured as 1.03/(0.03+δ).
28only in the very beginning of the sample.
The relationship between ¯ Ct and the term spread seems to abruptly break down after
1991. If we run a QLR test as before, we can reject the hypothesis of no break at the 1
percent level. The F-statistic is maximized in 1991, only one year different from the local
maximum that is obtained in the F-statistic for nonresidential investment.25 The fact that
these two break tests are maximized around the same time suggests that the breakdown
in the consumer durables plot is not due to a factor that is speciﬁc to consumers.
One possible consumer-speciﬁc explanation is that there was some sort of change in
consumer credit markets around 1991. Perhaps easier access to credit cards made con-
sumers less dependent on long-term ﬁnancing for some durables purchases, which made
them less sensitive to long-term credit conditions. The Flow of Funds accounts measure
total credit card balances and household net worth. The ratio of consumer credit debt to
net worth rises from 1.0 to 3.8 percent between 1945 and 1965, but then stays ﬂat subse-
quently. While there were certainly changes in consumer credit markets following 1965,
the total quantity of credit has remained in this sense stable.
1.7 The ﬁrm-level mechanism
To augment the analysis above, this section studies two aspects of ﬁrm-level invest-
ment. I begin by asking whether ﬁrms that invest in long-duration assets also tend to sell
long-term debt. Next, I look at whether industries with larger cash holdings are more
sensitive to the term spread. The data answer both these questions in the afﬁrmative, but
when we include a full set of industry and year dummies the results go away, possibly
because of insufﬁcient statistical power. The ﬁrst result indicates that when ﬁrms go to
debt markets, the interest rate that they face depends on the duration of the investment
they plan on undertaking. The second result shows that ﬁrms that are more likely to have
to go to debt markets seem to vary the composition of their investment more strongly in
response to interest rates.
25 Note, again, that the local maximum for nonresidential investment is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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301.7.1 The maturity of assets and debt
The link between the term spread and the cost of capital will be most clear to managers
if investment in long-duration assets is ﬁnanced with long-duration debt. If, for example,
ﬁrms always borrow at the same maturity and simply roll over their debt, then they might
only pay attention to the interest rate for the maturity at which they borrow, instead of the
full term structure.
Baker, Greenwood, andWurgler(BGW,2003)ﬁndthatﬁrmstimethedebtmarketwhen
they sell bonds. In particular, when the term spread is high ﬁrms sell short-term debt.
BGW argue that ﬁrms do this because when the term spread is high, the prices of short-
term bonds are expected to fall in the future. Firms are selling expensive or overpriced
debt, which BGW claim represents arbitrage.
But if it is true that ﬁrms try to match the maturity of their debt to the maturity of their
investments, thentheresultsintheprevioussectionscouldexplaintheBGWresult. Match-
ing the maturity of debt to assets reduces potential deadweight losses from bankruptcy
(see, e.g., Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Graham and Harvey (2002) report evidence from sur-
veys that maturity matching is the single most important determinant of debt maturity
choice.26
Section 1.3 showed that when short-term yields are low, ﬁrms invest in short-duration
assets. If the maturity-matching hypothesis is correct then those ﬁrms should also sell
short-duration debt. That matches the Baker et al. result: low short yields are associ-
ated with short-duration investment, which is associated with sales of short-duration debt.
BGW claim that ﬁrms are arbitraging debt markets; I claim they are managing risk through
maturity-matching. The key to completing the argument is showing that ﬁrms actually do
try to match the duration of their debt to that of their assets. In this section I provide
evidence in support of this proposition.27
26 See also Barclay and Smith, 1995, and Guedes and Opler, 1996, among many others.
27 Baker at al. tried measuring the duration of assets with a similar strategy to mine. However, rather than
using industry depreciation reported by the BEA, they used the amount of depreciation reported to the IRS
by individual ﬁrms. Presumably this data was substantially more noisy than the BEA data, which caused
them to ﬁnd inconclusive results. Moreover, accounting depreciation is in general not the same as economic
depreciation. The majority of ﬁrms use straight line depreciation, rather than the declining balance method
found to better match the resale value of assets (Hulten and Wykoff, 1981).
31I obtain data from two sources. Data on capital stocks come from the BEA’s detailed
ﬁxed asset tables as before.28 I continue to measure average duration within industry j as
¯ Djt =
åi DiIijt
åi Iijt
(1.13)
where i indexes assets, j indexes industries, and I is investment
I obtain data on corporate debt from Compustat. Following Baker et al. (2003) and
Greenwood et al. (2009), the long-term share in a given industry and year is the sum of
all outstanding long-term debt reported by ﬁrms in that industry divided by all long and
short-term debt.29 I estimate issuance of long-term debt as the change in the level of long-
term debt, and short-term issuance as simply the level of short-term debt (since short-term
debt has, by deﬁnition, a maturity of less than one year). The long-term issuance share is
then just the ratio of long-term issuance to total issuance.30
An important issue here is that Compustat only covers publicly traded ﬁrms, whereas
the BEA’s ﬁxed-asset data covers all ﬁrms. To the extent that private ﬁrms have limited
access to long-term credit markets, this will bias the level of the long-term share up-
wards.31 It is less clear, though, that selection should cause us to spuriously ﬁnd that
high-depreciation industries have a low long-term share. The selection would need to oc-
cur in such a way that ﬁrms in high-depreciation industries are more likely to go public
but are no more likely to have access to long-term credit markets.
Table 1.5 reports regressions of the long-term level and issuance shares on industry
average duration. The ﬁrst two columns use the level share, the second two the issue share.
Columns 2 and 4 include industry ﬁxed effects. Each regression includes year dummies
and the standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries. Columns 1 and 3
28 The BEA has its own industry classiﬁcation which is slightly different from NAICS. I use industries that
roughly correspond to a 2-digit NAICS classiﬁcation, but I combine some industries to ensure that I have
sufﬁcient ﬁrm observations to get good ﬁnancial data. I end up with 22 industries
29 I measure long term debt as the sum of items 9 (long term borrowing) and 44 (long term debt about to
retire), and short term debt as item 9 plus item 34 (current liabilities) minus long term debt.
30 I drop ﬁrm observations if the level of long term debt drops by more than one half (as this amount of
retirement is implausible). Industry-year observations are dropped if they have a negative level of long term
debt issuance.
31 Forexample, TitmanandWessels, 1988, ﬁndthatsmallﬁrmsarelesslikelytouselong-termdebtﬁnancing.
32show that there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between long-term debt levels and
issuance and the depreciation rate of assets in an industry. However, columns 2 and 4
show that when we include industry dummies the effect goes away. That is, there is not
evidence that when an industry shifts towards higher-depreciation assets, it also changes
the composition of its debt.
One reason I do not ﬁnd within industry effects in table 1.5 could be that the data is not
sufﬁciently precise. The median number of ﬁrms that is used to create the industryyear
observations is only 148, and the 25th percentile is 30. Moreover, the measure of the du-
ration of debt is extremely rough. Firms could easily be changing the maturity of their
long-term issues, rather than substituting between long and short-term issues.32
1.7.2 Cash reserves and investment
If ﬁrms match the maturities of assets and debt, as suggested by table 1.5, then when
they borrow to ﬁnance investment, shifts in the term spread directly feed into their cost of
capital, and presumably their investment decisions. However, when ﬁrms ﬁnance invest-
ment internally, we might think they simply use a rule-of-thumb method for the cost of
capital, ignoring the term structure of interest rates (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2002).
I study this question by looking at how investment differs across industries with dif-
ferent cash holdings. I study the following regression
¯ Dj,t = aj + b1TSt 1 + b2CHj,t + b3TSt 1  CHj,t + #j,t (1.14)
where, as before, TSt is the term spread and CHj,t is a measure of cash holdings in industry
j at time t. The coefﬁcient b3 measures the effect of cash holdings on the response of an
industry’s average duration of investment to the term spread. Under the hypothesis that
ﬁrms that can ﬁnance investment internally respond less to the term spread, we should
observe a positive value for b3.
I use two measures of an industry’s ability to ﬁnance investment internally: its total
32 While there is data with more detail on the duration of corporate debt, it does not have a long enough
time series to be useful for ﬁnding the aggregate effects that I am looking for here.
33Table 1.5: Regressions of the long-term corporate level and issues shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Levels Levels Issues Issues
Duration 0.013 *** -0.008 0.021 ** -0.008
[0.005] [0.006] [0.11] [0.012]
Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
N 1,040 1,040 1,023 1,023
Note: The long term level share is the share of total corporate debt accounted for by long term (>1 year 
maturity) debt. The issues share is the share of issues accounted for by long term debt.  Duration is the 
average duration rate of the industry's capital stock. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errors reported in brackets are corrected for clustering within industries. Annual data for 22 industries, 
1950–2008.
34current cash holdings and its cash ﬂows (income before extraordinary items), both scaled
by current property, plants, and equipment (PPE).33 One of the measures for CHj,t is a
ﬂow, while the other is a stock. If industries differ in the amount of cash that they prefer to
hold at any given time, then cash ﬂows might be more relevant for their ability to ﬁnance
investment internally. On the other hand, cash reserves could be saved precisely for use
in future investment, and hence represent a source of funds for investment.34 I test both
possibilities.
As above, I obtain data from Compustat and detrend ¯ Dj,t and TSt with the HP ﬁlter. I
subtract industry means from the measure of cash holdings, CHj,t, so that the coefﬁcient
on the interaction term, b3, represents the change in the response of ¯ Dj,t to the term spread
depending on the difference between the industry’s current cash holdings and the sample
average for that industry.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 1.6 report estimates of equation (1.14). Column 1 shows
that cash ﬂows seem to have no signiﬁcant relationship with the response of ¯ Dj,t to the
term spread. In column 2 we see, though, that cash holdings have a strong effect. For an
industry with its sample average of level of cash holdings, the response of ¯ D falls by 0.15
standard deviations for every one standard deviation increase in the term spread. For an
industry with cash holdings one standard deviation above their mean, this response falls
to only 0.08 standard deviations. This result ﬁts with the hypothesis that when ﬁrms are
forced to ﬁnance investment in credit markets they are more sensitive to the cost of capital.
Columns 3 and 4 are the same as columns 1 and 2 except that I generate a variable
d CHj,t, by regressing CHj,t on a set of year and industry dummies. d CHj,t thus measures the
deviationofanindustry’scashholdingsrelativetobothitssampleaverageandtheaverage
for the year. This controls for general trends in cash holdings over time. The coefﬁcients
on the interaction terms are no longer signiﬁcant. As before, this may simply be a power
issue. Note that the standard error on the interaction term is substantially larger in column
33 The results are unchanged if we use free cash ﬂow instead of income.
34 SeeOpleretal., 1999, forananalysisofthedeterminantsofcashholdingsandtheiruseforinvestment, and
the large literature following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, on the relationship between investment
and cash ﬂows.
35Table 1.6: Interaction of the term spread with industry cash holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term spread (t-1) -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 ***
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Cash flows (t-1) 0.03 0.08 **
[0.02] [0.03]
Cash holdings (t-1) 0.03 * 0.07
[0.02] [0.06]
TS(t-1)xCF(t-1) -0.02 0.03
[0.03] [0.02]
TS(t-1)xCH(t-1) 0.07 ** -0.03
[0.03] [0.06]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
N 770 806 770 806
Note: Regressions of the average duration of investment by industry on the term spread interacted 
with measures of cash holdings. Cash data is obtained from Compustat. TS is the term spread. CF is 
cash flows. CH is cash holdings. All variables are measured at the end of the year All regressions 
include industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry.
364 than column 2. We in fact cannot reject that the two coefﬁcients are equal.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper shows that there is a strong relationship in aggregate data between invest-
ment and the cost of capital. I ﬁnd that the term spread can explain a third of the variation
of the cross section of investment. While this relationship does not quantify the magni-
tude of internal adjustment costs facing ﬁrms, it does show that the cost of capital is a
major factor driving the variation in the type of investment that ﬁrms do. The composition
of investment changes meaningfully over the business cycle, and a substantial portion of
these changes can be explained by the term spread alone.
The results are robust to including a variety of controls, including multiple indicators
of the state of the business cycle. None of the controls eliminate the coefﬁcient on the term
spread. Moreover, when we include all of the controls at once, the term spread is the only
variable that remains signiﬁcant. Of all of the variables I study, the term spread is the most
robust and powerful explanator of the distribution of investment. The dimension of in-
vestment studied here has not been examined before. The results extend also to consumer
durables purchases: households tend to buy less-durable durables when the yield curve is
steep.
Cochrane (2011) gives an extensive review of the literature on return predictability and
variation in the price of risk, arguing that shifts in discount rates are part of "the central
organizing question of asset pricing research." As Treasury bonds have (nominally) risk-
less payoffs, shifts in the term spread are purely driven by discount rates. The ﬁnding that
the term spread determines the composition of investment is thus connected to Cochrane’s
organizing question by showing its relevance for the aggregate economy, and not just ﬁ-
nancial markets.
There are many other cross-sectional sources of variation in the cost of capital beyond
differences in asset lives. Tax policies, e.g. R&D tax credits and bonus depreciation, distort
the cost of capital, as will changes in the price of risk. The ﬁnding here that shifts in the
term structure of interest rates affect the composition suggests that tax policy can succeed
37distorting investment choices. Similarly, to the extent that the price of risk varies over time,
an interesting question is whether a high price of risk causes businesses to shift relatively
towards low-risk/low-reward projects.
382. A MODEL OF TIME-VARYING RISK PREMIA WITH HABITS AND PRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
Stock prices are more volatile than can be explained by movements in expected divi-
dends. Moreover, excess returns on the aggregate stock market are predictable over time.
The two phenomena are connected: changes in the discount rates applied to future divi-
dends can induce excess volatility in asset prices. This paper develops a new preference
speciﬁcation with time-varying risk aversion that generates realistically predictable and
volatilestockreturns. Whencombinedwithaproductionframework, themodelcanmatch
the short and long-run volatilities of output, consumption, and investment growth and at
the same time generate a high and volatile price of risk. Simulated stock-return forecast-
ing regressions are consistent with empirical results, and the model also delivers a new
method for forecasting stock returns. The structural estimate of risk aversion has an R2 for
5-year stock returns in the post-war period of over 50 percent.
The standard model of time-varying risk aversion is the habit speciﬁcation of Camp-
bell and Cochrane (1999).1 In their model, when an agent’s consumption falls close to
her habit, her risk aversion rises. Using aggregate consumption data, they ﬁnd that their
implied risk aversion measure can explain a large proportion of the movements in the
price-dividend ratio on the stock market. Campbell and Cochrane study an endowment
economy, though, so they never test whether their utility function generates a realistic
consumption process in equilibrium. In fact, Lettau and Uhlig (2000) and Rudebusch and
Swanson (2008) ﬁnd that Campbell–Cochrane preferences imply that consumers smooth
1 A partial selection of other early papers studying habit formation is Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990),
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Jermann (1998).
For other papers that study return predictability in a production setting, see Gourio (2010), Campanale,
Castro, and Clementi (2010), and Guvenen (2009), though note that the latter two papers do not match the
degree of predictability observed in the data.
39consumption growth extremely and implausibly strongly following technology shocks in
standard general-equilibrium models.
This paper embeds the intuition behind Campbell and Cochrane (1999)—that persis-
tent external habits can induce time-varying risk aversion—into the framework devel-
oped by Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989), and Weil (1989). The Epstein–
Zin speciﬁcation allows us to model risk aversion and intertemporal substitution sepa-
rately, while the Campbell–Cochrane intuition motivates time-variation in risk aversion.
In particular, consumers are modeled as having a time-varying external habit, which is
a benchmark to which they compare their own lifetime utility. When lifetime utility is
farther above the benchmark, risk aversion over proportional shocks to future welfare is
lower. By explicitly separating variation in risk aversion from intertemporal substitution,
the Epstein–Zin framework eliminates the problems that arise when standard Campbell–
Cochrane preferences are used in a production setting. I refer to the new preference speci-
ﬁcation as the EZ-habit model for its combination of these two frameworks.2
The simple real business cycle (RBC) model with ﬁxed labor supply provides a trans-
parent laboratory in which to study the effects of time-variation in risk aversion on the
macroeconomy in general equilibrium. I ﬁnd that the dynamics of real variables and real
interest rates under the EZ-habit speciﬁcation are highly similar to a model with Epstein–
Zin utility and constant relative risk aversion.3 The model can match both the short and
long-run variances of output, investment, and consumption.
Since consumption and wealth are cointegrated under balanced growth, their long-run
variances must be the same. But empirically, the short-run (quarterly) variance of con-
sumption growth is much smaller than the variance of changes in wealth. To match both
the long and short-run moments, a model must have either mean-reversion in wealth or
strong persistence in consumption growth. A number of recent asset-pricing papers (e.g.
Bansal and Yaron, 2004, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer, 2010) have gone the route of choos-
2 Melino and Yang (2003) study a utility speciﬁcation that is highly similar to mine in reduced form. How-
ever, they do not discuss the inclusion of a habit, and they do not insert the preferences into a production
setting.
3 For other recent studies of asset pricing in production economies, see Danthine, Donaldson and Mehra
(1992), Rouwenhorst (1995), Tallarini (2000), and Cochrane (2005).
40ing very strong persistence for consumption growth. In Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer’s
(2010) analysis of asset prices in the RBC model, for example, innovations to the perma-
nent component of consumption have a standard deviation of 8 percent per year, which is
at odds with the data. The EZ-habit model, on the other hand, implies that consumption is
roughly a random walk—the short and long-run variances are nearly equal—but wealth is
mean-reverting: declines in risk aversion raise current asset prices and lower expected re-
turns. Whereas other papers in the production-based asset-pricing literature do not check
the ﬁt of their models to the long-run variance of consumption and output, I show that the
EZ-habit model can match this moment along with the short-run variances.
In addition to matching macro moments, the EZ-habit model improves the ﬁt of the
RBC model to ﬁnancial moments. Previous habit-based models designed to generate high
or volatile risk premia tended to have implausibly volatile interest rates, a ﬂaw not found
here.4 The reasonable behavior of interest rates is an important innovation of this paper;
the EZ-habit model is able to have stable interest rates but still generate substantial asset
price volatility because it has variation in discount rates on risky assets that is driven by
variation in risk aversion.5 Movements in discount rates imply that asset returns should
be predictable, and extensive tests show that the degree of predictability in the model
is similar to what is observed in the data. Variation in risk aversion not only raises the
volatility of asset returns, I ﬁnd that it also makes the equity premium roughly 1/3 larger
on average than it would be otherwise. Countercyclical movements in risk aversion thus
increase both the quantity and price of risk in ﬁnancial markets: good times seem even
better and bad times worse.
There are numerous empirical methods of forecasting stock returns, but the majority
of them are not based on equilibrium theories. For example, regressions of stock returns
on price-dividend ratios are motivated simply by an identity that links the price-dividend
ratio to future returns and dividend growth. Under the EZ-habit model, though, it turns
4 See Jermann (1998); Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001); Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2010); and
Miao and Wang (2010).
5 See LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981), and Grossman and Shiller (1981), for early studies of excess
volatility in asset prices and the relationship between return predictability and volatility.
41out to be possible to directly measure risk aversion. As is standard in the habit literature,
I assume that positive innovations to household welfare reduce risk aversion. So if we
can measure welfare, we can also measure risk aversion. Under Epstein–Zin preferences
with a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, welfare is a function of current
household wealth and consumption. And this result holds generally; it is not dependent
on the RBC model I analyze. Using data on consumption and wealth, I construct an em-
pirical estimate of risk aversion and show that it is a strong forecaster of aggregate stock
returns: it outperforms the price-dividend ratio, Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001) measure
of the consumption-wealth ratio, and Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) excess consump-
tion ratio. This result differentiates my paper from models of time-varying disaster risk
because it does not rely on an unobservable latent process to drive risk premia.6
The model also can match forecasting results for consumption growth. Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001) ﬁnd little ability to forecast consumption growth using their measure of
the consumption-wealth ratio. Campbell and Shiller (1988) obtain similar results for the
stock market. As in the empirical data, it is essentially impossible to forecast consumption
growth in the EZ-habit model using the consumption-wealth ratio, but forecasts of risk
premia are highly effective.
An alternative way to forecast consumption growth is with interest rates. Hall (1988)
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), in trying to estimate the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS), essentially ask whether consumption growth can be forecasted with inter-
est rates. They ﬁnd little forecasting power, suggesting the representative household has a
small or even zero EIS. In this paper, the EIS is set to 1.5, but I still replicate the regression
results from Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989). The EZ-habit model explains
the failure of those regressions through a time-varying precautionary-saving effect. When
risk aversion is high, households want to save more to protect themselves against future
shocks, which drives interest rates downward. This effect biases standard Euler-equation
estimation based on models with constant relative risk aversion.
After testing the model’s ﬁt to macro and asset pricing moments and the predictions for
6 See Gourio (2010), and Wachter (2010), for recent models with time-varying disaster risk.
42the EIS regressions and return forecasting, I consider two extensions to the model. First,
I examine the effect of time-varying risk aversion on labor supply. Following positive
technology shocks, risk aversion falls, raising consumption (through a decline in precau-
tionary saving demand). This effect also lowers the response of labor supply to technology
shocks. Intuitively, intratemporal optimization means that when households are willing
to spend more money to raise consumption, they are also willing to sacriﬁce in terms of
opportunity costs to raise leisure. Endogenous labor supply has little effect on risk premia
in the economy, though. The reason is simply that under Epstein–Zin preferences with a
high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the volatility of the stochastic discount fac-
tor is driven mainly by the permanent component of consumption; so even if households
smooth consumption growth by varying labor supply, the total amount of risk in the econ-
omy is essentially unchanged.
The second extension is a log-linearization of the model using methods similar to
Campbell (1994) and Lettau (2003). Unlike standard perturbation methods, the log-linear-
ization used here does not impose certainty equivalence, so we can obtain expressions
that take into account potentially time-varying risk premia even in the ﬁrst-order approx-
imation. I am able to derive explicit expressions for the Sharpe ratio in the model as a
function of current risk aversion and the underlying parameters of the model and ﬁnd
that the results are highly similar to those from accurate numerical solutions. Much of the
previous production-based asset-pricing literature has focused on simulations to study the
implications of various models, so this paper introduces an important methodological con-
tribution in extending and simplifying the analytic results of Campbell (1994) and Lettau
(2003). Further, in the case where risk aversion is constant, I give an analytic characteriza-
tion of how endogenous consumption smoothing generates long-run risks in a production
setting (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer, 2010). The log-linearization
thus provides an analytic explanation for results that were previously supported only with
simulation-based evidence.
The log-linear solution returns a stochastic discount factor (SDF) that takes on the es-
sentially afﬁne form that is widely used in the empirical asset-pricing literature. This is
possibly the ﬁrst paper to derive an essentially afﬁne SDF with a time-varying price of risk
43from a production-based model. It thus connects the standard modeling framework in
macroeconomics with one of the most widely used asset-pricing speciﬁcations in empiri-
cal ﬁnance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the preference speciﬁcation
and lays out the economic environment. Section 2.3 calibrates a production economy and
compares its behavior to the data. Section 4 tests the empirical implications of the model
for return forecasting, and section 2.5 studies extensions to the basic framework. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Household preferences
For households with a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), Epstein–
Zin (1989) utility can be expressed as
Vt =

(1  exp( b))C
1 r
t + exp( b)
h
G 1
t (Et [Gt (Vt+1)])
i1 r1/(1 r)
(2.1)
for some function Gt, where Ct is household consumption and Et is the expectation op-
erator conditional on information available at date t.7 The term G 1
t (Et [Gt (Vt+1)]) is a
certainty equivalent. When there is no uncertainty about Vt+1, G 1
t (Et [Gt (Vt+1)]) = Vt+1.
The usual choice for Gt (going back to Weil, 1989, and Epstein and Zin, 1991) is power
utility,
GPower
t (Vt+1) = V1 a
t+1 (2.2)
Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion for a household
with preferences of the form (2.1) is equal to the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion for Gt,
while the EIS is equal to 1/r.
7 The preferences can be further generalized to study alternative time aggregators, instead of the constant
elasticity of substitution form.
44Now consider a habit-formation utility function for G,
GHabit
t (Vt+1; Ht) = (Vt+1   Ht)
1 a (2.3)
Value functions involving GHabit
t are related to those using GPower
t in the same way that
usual habit speciﬁcations, e.g. Constantinides (1991), are related to time-separable power
utility. Rather than caring only about the absolute level of their continuation value, GHabit
t
says that households care about the spread between tomorrow’s value and a benchmark
Ht. Since the utility function adds a habit to Epstein–Zin, I refer to it as the EZ-habit spec-
iﬁcation.8 I refer to the version of Vt using GPower
t for the certainty equivalent as canonical
Epstein–Zin in deference to its popularity in the literature.
The coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion for GHabit
t is equal to a
Vt+1
Vt+1 Ht. As the spread
between value and habit rises, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion falls. Intuitively,
when the continuation value falls close to its benchmark, proportional shocks to Vt+1 loom
much larger than when the household has a cushion between its continuation value and
Ht.
In principle it is possible to analyze a model with GHabit
t , but it has three important
drawbacks. First, if the support of the shocks to Vt+1 is sufﬁciently wide, there is a non-
zero probability that Vt+1 will fall below Ht, leaving the certainty equivalent undeﬁned.9
Second because GHabit
t is not log-linear in Vt+1, obtaining simple analytic results with it is
difﬁcult or impossible. Third, because GHabit
t is not log-linear, standard arguments for the
existence of a representative agent do not apply.10
8 Other papers, for example Rudebusch and Swanson (2010) and Yang (2008), incorporate consumption
habits into Epstein–Zin preferences. That is, the C
1 r
t term is replaced by (Ct   Xt)
1 r where Xt is the habit.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) show that in general equilibrium this does not lead to a time-varying Sharpe
ratio because households endogenously smooth consumption to reduce their overall risk exposure. That said,
the speciﬁcation in Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) is meant to generate smooth consumption growth rather
than a high risk premium. In principle, there is no reason that this type of habit formation could not be added
to the EZ-habits model to help generate smoother consumption (e.g. to help explain the excess smoothness
puzzle of Campbell and Deaton, 1989). Dew-Becker (2011) studies preferences with both time-varying risk
aversion and consumption habits in a medium-scale DSGE model.
9 This issue also arises in other habit speciﬁcations. When models are solved with standard perturbation
methods, the problem is simply ignored. I use a more precise global numerical solution technique that forces
me to grapple with the problem.
10 A representative agent may exist, but their preferences need not actually look like the preferences of any
45For the remainder of the paper I therefore replace GHabit
t with the alternative
GTV
t (Vt+1) = V
1 at
t+1
at = a
Vt
Vt   Ht
(2.4)
G
TV( 1)
t
 
EtGTV
t (Vt+1)

(where TV stands for time-varying) is a second-order approxima-
tion to
G
Habit( 1)
t
 
EtGHabit
t (Vt+1)

around the non-stochastic version of the model.11 Moreover,
the appendix shows that in the continuous-time limit (i.e. under stochastic differential
utility), preferences with GTV
t are exactly equivalent to preferences using GHabit
t .12 GTV
is locally equivalent to GHabit in terms of risk preferences, but it solves the problems of
integrability inside the certainty equivalent and the existence of a representative agent.
As in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), I assume that households take the excess value
ratio, Vt
Vt Ht, and hence the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, at, as external to their own
decisions. The ﬁnal step, then, is to specify a dynamic process for risk aversion. I assume
a simple log-linear process, which we will ﬁnd to be highly tractable,
at+1 = fat + (1  f) ¯ a + l

DvA
t+1   EtDvA
t+1

(2.5)
where vA
t is the log of Vt for the representative agent. Intuitively, when value unexpect-
edly rises, it moves away from the habit and risk aversion falls, so l < 0. Movements
in the habit, and hence risk aversion, depend on aggregate value so that they are not af-
fected by an individual household’s decisions. The AR(1) speciﬁcation for risk aversion
is approximately equivalent to a speciﬁcation where log Ht is a geometrically weighted
particular agent. Ideally, if every agent has identical preferences, the representative agent will also have those
preferences.
11 More precisely, the second-order approximation also assumes no growth. Adding a constant growth rate
m to V would change the result to at = a
(1+m)Vt
(1+m)Vt Ht. The remainder of the analysis is identical.
12 Melino and Yang (2003) study a utility function with the same form as GTV, but they take at as a latent
variable and give no theoretical motivation for its variation. This paper is original for proposing inserting
habits into the certainty-equivalent part of Epstein–Zin preferences to motivate movements in at.
46moving average of past values of vA
t .13
The appendix shows how to derive the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (the
stochastic discount factor, or SDF) for the general form of Epstein–Zin preferences in (2.1).
In the case of GTV, we end up with the expression,
Mt+1 
¶Vt/¶Ct+1
¶Vt/¶Ct
= exp( b)
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
C
 r
t+1
C
 r
t
(2.6)
with the only difference from the SDF under canonical Epstein–Zin preferences being the
subscript on at. The SDF is a critical piece of the model since its volatility determines
the price of risk in the economy.14 As usual, changes in expected consumption growth or
volatility will affect the SDF through their effects on Vt+1. Changes in at+1 (or Ht+1) will
also affect the SDF in the same way. Speciﬁcally, when the habit rises and households are
more risk averse, they penalize consumption uncertainty more, driving Vt+1 down. High
risk-aversion states thus have high Arrow–Debreu prices.
It is also straightforward to derive the standard result that
Wt = V
1 r
t C
r
t /(1  exp( b)) (2.7)
where Wt is the equilibrium price of a claim on the household’s consumption stream,
whichIrefertoastheaggregatewealthportfolio. Thisformulaholdsregardlessofwhether
risk aversion varies over time. Intuitively, the market price of the consumption stream is
equal to the utility value that a household places on it, Vt, divided by the marginal utility
of consumption, V
r
t C
 r
t (1  exp( b)). This leads to the familiar result from Epstein and
Zin (1991),
Mt+1 = exp( b)
1 at
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
 r
1 at
1 r
R
r at
1 r
w,t+1 (2.8)
where Rw,t+1 is the return on the wealth portfolio.
13 It is straightforward to derive the actual process that Ht must follow in order for risk aversion to follow
the process in (2.5).
14 Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) show that the maximum Sharpe ratio (expected excess return divided by
standard deviation) attained by any asset in the economy is equal to the standard deviation of the SDF divided
by its mean.
472.2.2 Discussion
The model is motivated as an extension of habit-based preferences. Rather than con-
sumers having a habit level of consumption that they target, I assume they have a habit
level of value. Since equation (2.7) shows that there is a direct link between value and
wealth, we could also think of the model as saying that households have a benchmark
level of wealth. The house-money effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990) has a somewhat
similar intuition. They ﬁnd that when subjects in lab experiments have recently gained
money in betting games, they play more aggressively.15
Abel (1990) interprets habits in consumption as a "keeping up with the Joneses" effect.
That intuition extends to the EZ-habit model. What households try to keep up with in
this model, though, is fundamentally different. For example, consider a college senior
who is trying to decide between following her friends into consulting or getting a law
degree. With the J.D., she knows that in the short run her consumption will be lower than
that of her friends, but in the long run she will likely be better off. In a model with an
external consumption habit, three years of consumption below that of her friends looks
painful. But when the habit appears as a function of value, the student is comfortable
giving up consumption in the short run as long as she knows she will do well compared
to her friends in the long run. Since the habit appears only in the risk aggregator, an agent
with EZ-habit preferences is willing to substitute consumption over time in a way that an
agent with standard habit-forming preferences is not. For the same reason, the EZ-habit
model is not inconsistent with the mixed evidence on the effects of classic consumption
habits at the micro level (e.g. Dynan, 2000, and Ravina, 2007).
There are a number of papers that use investment choices to measure variation in risk
aversion. Carroll (2002) ﬁnds that households with higher wealth tend to tilt their invest-
ment portfolios towards more risky assets. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), though, argue
that there is little evidence that changes in wealth affect portfolio choices in household
data. Rather, they ﬁnd that inertia is the dominant characteristic of household portfolio
15 Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) embed the house-money effect in a full asset-pricing model. See
Gertner (1993) and Post et al. (2008) for evidence on the house-money effect from game shows.
48choice. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009), after controlling for the inertia studied by
Brunnermeier and Nagel, ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant relationship between innovations
to wealth and the riskiness of a household’s portfolio.16 Furthermore, they show that
weakness in the instruments for wealth shocks can cause a researcher to erroneously ﬁnd
that wealth does not affect risk-taking. Calvet and Sodini (2010) show that higher past
income, controlling for current wealth and genetic differences in risk attitudes, is also neg-
atively related to the share of household portfolios invested in risky assets. On net, with
the notable exception of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), the empirical literature supports
the idea that increases in wealth reduce risk aversion.
2.2.3 Production
Aggregate output is a function of the capital stock, Kt, and productivity At
Yt = A
1 g
t K
g
t (2.9)
In section 2.5.3 I add endogenous labor supply and show that it does not substantially
change the dynamics of the model. The production function (2.9) can be thought of Cobb–
Douglas with labor supply held ﬁxed at unity.
The aggregate resource constraint is
Kt+1 = (1  d)Kt +Yt   Ct
where d is the depreciation rate of capital.
16 See also Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010), who ﬁnd that income, both its raw level and instrumented
for with exogenous shocks, has a negative impact on loss aversion, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011)
who ﬁnd that following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, households both reduced the risky shares of their portfolios
and became more averse to gambles in survey questions.
49For the benchmark calibration, productivity follows a random walk in logs,17
log At+1 = log At + m + sa#t+1 (2.10)
#t+1  N (0,1)
The drawback of using random-walk technology is that it is difﬁcult to generate the
degree of volatility for output and investment that is observed in the data.18 I therefore
also consider a dual-shock version of the model that can match both the short and long-
run variances of output,
At = ¯ AtXt (2.11)
log ¯ At+1 = log ¯ At + m + sa#t+1 (2.12)
logXt+1 = fx logXt + sx#x,t+1 (2.13)
#t+1,#x,t+1  i.i.d. N (0,1) (2.14)
¯ At here is the permanent component of output, while Xt can be interpreted as a simple
method of trying to capture forces that drive short-run ﬂuctuations in output and con-
sumption, e.g. shocks to monetary policy or energy prices. I refer to the version of the
model with random-walk technology as the benchmark model, while the model with per-
manent and temporary technology shocks is the dual-shock model.
17 An alternative is a trend-stationary process for productivity. Alvarez and Jermann (2005) argue that per-
manent shocks to the level of productivity (more generally, to the level of state prices) are necessary to explain
asset-pricing facts. Also, in models with Epstein–Zin preferences, because the SDF depends not only on cur-
rent consumption but also on the level of the value function itself, an I(1) process for productivity tends to
increase the volatility of the SDF compared to models with trend-stationary productivity, which helps explain
the equity premium. Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) ﬁnd that in order to match the empirical equity
premium in a model with trend-stationary productivity, their model needs an implausibly small EIS (0.05).
With difference-stationary productivity they are able to choose a more reasonable value (1.5).
18 In particular, without a mean-reverting component, it is impossible for the model to replicate the result
from Cochrane (1994) that the long-run variance of output is smaller than the unconditional variance. In the
RBC model, output does not overshoot its long-run trend following a permanent increase in technology: it
does not have a mean-reverting component to its dynamics. Because they rely only on permanent shocks in
the RBC model, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) have to set the annual standard deviation of technology
shocks to an implausibly high 8.2 percent per year to match the unconditional standard deviation of output
growth.
502.3 Calibration and simulation
I solve the model with projection methods, which entails ﬁtting a polynomial approxi-
mation to the decision rule and searching for coefﬁcients so that the equilibrium conditions
hold exactly at certain speciﬁed points in the state space.19 The Euler equation errors in the
simulations imply households misprice a claim on capital by uniformly less than 1/100th
of 1 basis point (i.e. one part in one million) over the range of the state space that the
simulations visit, and the median simulated error is an order of magnitude smaller.
The model is parameterized to match quarterly data. Table 2.1 lists the parameter val-
ues and the target moments. Many of the parameters, e.g. the exponent on capital in the
production function, take standard values. I discuss here the parameters that are unique
to this paper or do not have standard and agreed-upon values.
I set r = 2/3 as in Bansal and Yaron (2004), for an EIS of 1.5. Bansal and Yaron note that
an EIS greater than 1 is necessary for increases in volatility to lower asset prices (speciﬁ-
cally, the wealth-consumption ratio) in an endowment economy. In a production economy
this result does not hold exactly (because consumption is endogenous), but it is approxi-
mately true. Similarly, an EIS greater than 1 ensures that increases in risk aversion increase
the expected return on the wealth portfolio and lower its current price.20 Many stud-
ies attempting to estimate the EIS have obtained values much smaller than 1 (Hall, 1988;
Campbell and Mankiw, 1989). An important test of the model will be whether it can match
that result even though the calibrated EIS is larger than 1.
I choose the variance of permanent innovations to technology to match the long-run
variance of consumption growth in the data. Since technology and consumption are coin-
tegrated in the model, the long-run variance of consumption growth is equal to the vari-
ance of the permanent technology shocks. I estimate the empirical long-run variance (i.e.
the spectral density at frequency zero) of consumption growth with a third-order univari-
19 See Caldara et al. (2009) for a good description of the method as applied to models with recursive utility.
When solving the RBC model with Epstein–Zin preferences, they ﬁnd that projection methods are orders of
magnitude more accurate than the perturbation methods used in the majority of the macro literature.
20 Intuitively, an increase in risk aversion or volatility has two effects – it lowers the risk-free rate and raises
the excess return on the wealth portfolio. Which of these effects dominates depends on the EIS.
51Table 2.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Target
γ 0.33 Capital income share
β 0.9975 2% annual real risk free rate
δ 0.02 8% annual depreciation (BEA data)
  0.005 2% annual output growth
φ 0.94 Persistence of price/dividend ratio
ρ 0.67 A priori (see text)
σa 0.0088 Long run standard deviation of consumption growth
mean(αt) 14 Mean Sharpe ratio (0.32 annualized)
stdev(αt) 6.2 Stock return predictability
σx 0.012 Variance of output growth
φx 0.9 Variance of output growth
Note: Parameters used for the structural models. In table 2, the CRRA model uses with stdev(α)=0; the 
benchmark EZ habit model (column 3) sets σx=0.
52ate AR model (where the lag length was selected with the Bayesian information criterion)
and obtain a value of 0.00882. That is, the quarterly innovations to the permanent com-
ponent of consumption have a standard deviation of 0.88 percent.21 For the dual-shock
model, I select the parameters sx and fx to match the short-run volatility of consumption
and output growth. The parameters imply that the temporary component of technology
has an unconditional standard deviation of 2.7 percent.22
The persistence of risk aversion, f, is set to match the empirical persistence of the price-
dividend ratio for the aggregate stock market, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The
mean and volatility of risk aversion (¯ a and, implicitly, l) are chosen to match the average
Sharpe ratio for the stock market in the post-war sample and the degree of predictability
observed using the price-dividend ratio to forecast stock returns. Mean risk aversion is 14
and the standard deviation is set to 6.2.23
2.3.1 Comparisons across models
Table 2.2 reports basic moments from the three models. The ﬁrst column gives the
moments from the data while the second column gives results from the canonical Epstein–
Zin model with constant relative risk aversion (EZ-CRRA). Columns 3 and 4 give results
for the EZ-habit model under the benchmark calibration and with temporary technology
shocks added.
The ﬁrst row simply shows that all three models are calibrated to match the long-
run variance of consumption exactly, which, under balanced growth, means they also
match the long-run variances of output and investment growth. Rows 2 through 4 give
the standard deviations of quarterly output, consumption, and investment growth. Both
21 By choosing a smaller value for the long-run varaince than the long-run risks literature, I only make the
task of matching the equity premium harder. I also make the model consistent with the point estimate of the
long-run variance of consumption, rather than choosing a value in the upper end of the conﬁdence interval.
Empirically, I measure consumption as real per-capita nondurable and service consumption from the BEA.
22 Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate that the 1-quarter autocorrelation of stationary technology shocks is
0.95. On the other hand, the 1-quarter autocorrelation of detrended real GDP is 0.85. I take fx = 0.90 as the
midpoint between these two values.
23 When at < 0, I still use the standard Euler equation even though the household’s optimization problem is
convex. In the simulations, at < 0 only 1.5 percent of the time. Treating households as if they are risk-neutral
in periods when at < 0 (i.e. censoring at at zero) has no discernible effect on the results.
53Table 2.2: Comparison of preference speciﬁcations
1 2 3 4
Model: Data EZ CRRA EZ habit Dual shock
Real moments:
1 Long run SD(dC,dY,dI) (%) 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
2 StdDev(dY) (%) 0.99 0.59 0.59 1.03
3 StdDev(dC) (%) 0.46 0.28 0.47 0.56
4 StdDev(dI) (%) 2.65 1.11 0.83 2.37
5 corr(dC(t),Rf(t 1))  0.09 0.28 0.07 0.08
Financial moments:
6 Mean SR (annualized) 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.32
7 Std. dev. SR 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.22
8 p value SR std. dev. N/A 0.16 0.50 0.42
9 Mean Rw (annualized %) 6.78 1.04 4.17 4.15
10 StdDev(Rw) (annualized %) 21.19 4.71 13.30 12.98
11 Mean Rf (annualized %) 0.91 2.20 2.04 1.94
12 StdDev(Rf) (annualized %) 1.16 0.21 0.25 0.26
Note: Column 2 gives results under Epstein–Zin preferences with constant relative risk aversion, column 3 uses 
EZ habit preferences and random walk technology, and column 4 EZ habit preferences with the dual shock 
specification. All models are calibrated as in table 1. All variables are measured using quarterly values. dI is 
investment growth, dY output growth, and dC consumption growth. Rf is the risk free rate (measured empirically 
as the nominal 3 month yield minus an inflation forecast), and Rw is the annualized return on a levered 
consumption claim (with a leverage ratio of 2.74). The long run SD is the square root of the spectral density at 
frequency zero multiplied by 2π. SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio; the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio is 
measured by the standard deviation of the fitted values in forecasts of one quarter ahead returns in 228 quarter 
simulated samples divided by the unconditional standard deviation of returns. Row 7 reports the median of the 
standard deviations of the Sharpe ratio in the simulated samples. Row 8 reports the fraction of simulated samples 
in which the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio is as large as in the data. 
54the EZ-CRRA and single-shock EZ-habit models have volatilities for output and invest-
ment growth that are well below the empirical values. The dual-shock model rectiﬁes this
problem, matching both the short-run and long-run variances well. Both versions of the
EZ-habit model match the empirical variance of consumption growth.
Row 5 reports the correlation between the risk-free rate and the next period’s consump-
tiongrowth. Empirically, therealrisk-freerateismeasuredasthe3-monthnominalinterest
rate minus an inﬂation forecast.24 In the EZ-CRRA model, the risk-free rate has a substan-
tial amount of forecasting power for consumption growth, while in the data interest rates
and consumption growth seem essentially unrelated. The two EZ-habit calibrations come
much closer to matching that fact.
Rows 1 through 5 show that the EZ-habit model can capture the basic unconditional
moments of output, consumption, and investment. Rows 6 through 12 of table 2.2 sum-
marize the ﬁnancial side of the model. We can begin by looking at a measure of the price
of risk. The Sharpe ratio on an asset is the ratio of its expected excess return over the risk-
free rate divided by its standard deviation, so it measures the risk–return tradeoff. Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991) show that the maximum Sharpe ratio obtained by any asset in the
economy is equal to the standard deviation of the SDF divided by its mean. Recall that all
three calibrations have the same average coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. The Hansen–
Jagannathan bound and the mean Sharpe ratio for the consumption claim are roughly 1/3
higher in the two EZ-habit models than the EZ-CRRA case. The reason for this is that
the household’s value, Vt, a component of the SDF (equation 2.6), is more volatile in the
EZ-habit models. In all the models, a technology shock permanently raises expected con-
sumption and hence Vt. In the EZ-habit case, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion also
falls. Households become less averse to future uncertainty, so Vt rises even more. Counter-
cyclical variation in risk aversion thus makes good times even better and bad times even
worse, raising the volatility of the SDF. This effect allows the model to explain the equity
premium (or at least the Sharpe ratio on equities) with a lower coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion than we would need in the EZ-CRRA model.
24 Expected inﬂation is measured as a forecast of quarterly inﬂation based on lagged levels of inﬂation and
the nominal risk-free interest rate.
55To test whether the models can match the degree of predictability for stock returns
that is observed in the data, I regress simulated quarterly excess returns on the consump-
tion claim on its lagged price-dividend ratio. I then estimate the standard deviation of
the conditional Sharpe ratio as the standard deviation of the ﬁtted returns divided by the
unconditional standard deviation of returns (i.e. assuming a constant volatility). Row 7 re-
ports the median standard deviation from 5,000 simulations of 228 quarters of data, while
row 8 reports the proportion of the simulations that have a standard deviation as high as
observed empirically (0.22).25
Incolumn2, wecanseethatthereisactuallyanontrivialamountofimpliedpredictabil-
ity on average in the EZ-CRRA model due to small-sample overﬁtting, but only 16 percent
of the simulations match the variability observed in the data. For the EZ-habit model,
the predictability observed in the data is calibrated to be exactly the median value in the
simulations.
Rows 9 and 10 report the mean and standard deviation of the excess return on a levered
consumptionclaiminthemodel. Forcomparabilitytopastresults, IfollowAbel(1999)and
Gourio (2010) in assuming a leverage ratio of 2.74 (i.e. the asset pays a dividend of C2.74
t ).
The two EZ-habit models are able to generate means and volatilities for returns that are
far closer to the equity return observed in the data than the EZ-CRRA model can. Part
of the reason for this success is that consumption growth, and hence dividend growth, is
more volatile in the EZ-habit models than in the EZ-CRRA case, and part of the reason is
that discount rates are more volatile. Following a positive technology shock, not only do
dividends rise, but discount rates fall, thus making the returns on the wealth portfolio and
the levered consumption claim more volatile.26
Rows 11 and 12 show that the means and standard deviations of the real risk-free rate
in the three models are all reasonably close to the data. The volatility of interest rates is
similar across all three models, and somewhat lower than in the data. The real risk-free
25 The ﬁtted Sharpe ratio is measured empirically by forecasting the CRSP value-weighted aggregate excess
return with the aggregate price/dividend ratio.
26 LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) argue that dividends do not seem sufﬁciently volatile to explain
the volatility of stock prices. Grossman and Shiller (1981) suggest that variation in discount rates can explain
this puzzle.
56rate is measured empirically as the nominal 3-month Treasury yield minus a forecast of
inﬂation. Errors in the inﬂation forecast will make the estimated real risk-free rate more
volatile than the true real risk-free rate, which explains some of the divergence between
the empirical and simulated volatilities.
A common problem in early attempts to generate a high equity premium (e.g. Con-
stantinides, 1990; Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001, and Jermann, 1998), is a highly
volatile risk-free rate. The EZ-habit speciﬁcation replaces movements in discount rates
coming from the risk-free rate with movements coming from risk premia.
To summarize, table 2.2 shows that the EZ-habit model can match a broad array of
features of the economy—the short and long-run variances of output growth, the relative
volatilities of investment and consumption growth, and the mean and standard deviation
of the Sharpe ratio on equities. The model also helps generate a larger premium on a
levered consumption claim, closing roughly half the gap in the equity premium between
the EZ-CRRA model and the data. Finally, the behavior of the risk-free rate is reasonably
similar to the data, unlike previous general-equilibrium attempts at generating a high and
volatile Sharpe ratio.
2.3.2 Predictability in the simulated model
2.3.2.1 The magnitude of return predictability
Figure 2.1 plots R2s from univariate regressions of excess aggregate stock returns over
various horizons on the log price-dividend ratio on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio
(e.g. Campbell and Shiller, 1988, among many others), Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001)
measure of the consumption-wealth ratio, cay, Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) excess
consumption ratio, and an estimate of risk aversion derived from the EZ-habit model in
section 2.4. For the four different variables used in the empirical sample, the R2s gener-
ally rise as the sample length grows, and estimated risk aversion outperforms cay, excess
consumption, and the price-dividend ratio.
The gray line labeled "Simulated mean" gives the mean R2 from 5000 regressions of ex-
cess returns on a consumption claim on the price-dividend ratio (equivalently, the wealth-
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58consumption ratio) over 228-quarter spans in the benchmark simulation of the single-
shock model (the same length as the empirical sample). The upper gray line gives the 95th
percentile of the simulations. As in the data, the simulated R2s rise as the horizon length-
ens. The model compares favorably with the price-dividend and excess-consumption ra-
tios, with the simulated mean tracking the empirical values closely (the median follows
almost the same path). The empirical R2s for cay are at or below the 95th percentile in the
simulations. The only variable that the simulations cannot match is estimated risk aver-
sion, but raising the volatility of risk aversion in the calibration would solve this problem.
The R2s generated here are substantially higher than those obtained in production
models such as Campanale, Castro, and Clementi’s (2010) model of time-varying ﬁrst-
order risk aversion and Guvenen (2009) and De Graeve et al.’s (2010) studies of limited
participation. The population R2s are also essentially identical to those found by Wachter
(2010) and Gourio (2010) in endowment-economy and production-based models, respec-
tively, with time-varying disaster risk.
The top panel of table 2.3 reports the percentage of simulated samples in which the
simulated R2 is as high as we observe in the data for cay and the price-dividend ratio
(results for excess consumption are similar to the price-dividend ratio), and where a high
price-dividend ratio forecasts low returns. The table reports values for horizons of one
quarter and one through ﬁve years. The EZ-CRRA model matches empirical R2s for cay
less than 5 percent of the time at horizons shorter than 16 quarters, but can match the R2s
for the price-dividend ratio 15 to 25 percent of the time. The habit model substantially
raises the likelihood of the simulations of matching the data, by a factor of three or more
at every horizon, and it never matches less than 5 percent of the time except for cay at the
one-quarter horizon.
As an alternative to the R2, I also consider the test statistic suggested by Kiefer, Vogel-
sang, and Bunzel (KVB, 2000) based on Newey–West standard errors with the lag window
equal to the sample size. At various horizons, I calculate the t-statistic on the coefﬁcient
in a regression of stock returns on the price-dividend ratio in the simulated samples. The
bottom panel of table 2.3 repeats the analysis from the top half, but with the KVB test
statistics. In every case, the habit model matches the empirical t-statistics at least ﬁve per-
59Table 2.3: Proportion of simulated samples that match empirical statistics
Forecasting R2
Model:
Predictor: cay P/D cay P/D
Horizon 1 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.52
(quarters) 4 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.52
8 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.51
12 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.56
16 0.04 0.20 0.26 0.62
20 0.10 0.25 0.45 0.69
KVB t-statistics
Model:
Predictor: cay P/D cay P/D
Horizon 1 0.10 0.05 0.38 0.22
(quarters) 4 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.35
8 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.35
12 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.39
16 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.38
20 0.06 0.20 0.19 0.47
Note: The top panel reports, for each predictor, the proportion of simulated 228-
quarter samples in which the R
2 in a return-forecasting regression is at least as large as 
observed in the data and where the predictive relationship has the correct sign. The 
bottom panel reports the proportion of simulated samples that generate Kiefer-
Vogelsang-Bunzel t-statistics for each variable that are as large as in the data and have 
the same sign.  The EZ-habit model is the benchmark (single-shock) model. cay is the 
consumption/wealth ratio from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). P/D is the 
price/dividend ratio from CRSP. All simulated regressions use as the predictor the 
wealth/consumption ratio (equivalently, the price/dividend ratio on a claim to 
aggregate consumption) and the dependent variable is the excess return on a 
consumption claim. The regressions are run at horizons listed in the left-hand column. 
Bold numbers are less than 0.05, bold italics less than 0.01.
EZ-CRRA
EZ-CRRA
EZ-habit
EZ-habit
60cent of the time. The EZ-CRRA model again has trouble matching the results for cay, and
only replicates the statistics for the price-dividend ratio in 5 to 20 percent of the samples,
compared to 20 to 50 percent of the samples for the habit model.
2.3.2.2 Other return predictors
Table 2.4 reports the simulated correlation between ﬁve-year excess returns on the ag-
gregate wealth portfolio and a variety of return predictors. The ﬁrst row gives the cor-
relation for actual risk aversion, which we would expect would be highest of all of the
variables. The second row shows that the predictive power of the price-dividend ratio is
nearly as high as that of at in the benchmark model, but somewhat lower in the dual-shock
calibration (though still not as much lower as in the data).
Fama and Schwert (1977) and Campbell (1987) ﬁnd that short term interest rates nega-
tively predict future stock returns.27 In table 2.4, I do not replicate the result that the real
interest rate negatively forecasts returns, but the risk-free rate minus its 4-quarter moving
average (denoted RREL as in Campbell, 1987), does weakly negatively forecast returns. Ta-
ble 2.4 shows that the correlation of the ﬁve-year excess stock return with the real risk-free
rate and RREL is substantially negative and nearly as large as that of ˆ a. In the model, two
effects cause interest rates to forecast stock returns. First, positive technology shocks raise
interest rates and lower risk aversion. Second, even if risk aversion were driven by shocks
unrelated to technology, interest rates might still forecast stock returns since a decline in
risk aversion lowers the precautionary saving effect, raising interest rates. Intuitively, there
is a ﬂight-to-quality effect in interest rates, linking them to expected stock returns.
Table 2.4 reports the mean and standard deviation of the real term spread for the EZ-
habit model. For the sake of simplicity, I follow the literature in modeling long-term debt
as an asset that has a constant probability of paying its principal of one unit of the con-
sumption good and retiring.28 If the bond does not retire and pay out, the holder retains
27 Campbell (1991) subtracts the 12-month moving average of the nominal risk-free rate from itself as a way
to detrend the short term interest rate, since the nominal rate may be nonstationary if there are changes in
trend inﬂation. Detrending in that way should be unnecessary in the model since interest rates are stationary,
but I still check this variable.
28 See, e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) and Miao and Wang (2010).
61Table 2.4: Various return predictors
Data EZ CRRA EZ habit Dual shock
Five year excess stock return correlations:
αt 0.69 0.05 0.31 0.27
Real interest rate 0.09  0.05  0.30  0.23
RREL  0.09  0.03  0.22  0.17
Term spread 0.20 0.05 0.29 0.10
P/D  0.39  0.05  0.30  0.23
Term spread summary statistics:
Mean 1.43  0.14  0.23  0.26
Std. dev. 1.17 0.11 0.07 0.14
Note: The bottom two rows are the mean and standard deviation of the spread between the yield on a ten 
year equivalent bond and a one quarter riskless bond (measured in the data using nominal Treasuries). 
The remaining rows give population correlations between various variables and five year stock retuns. For 
the simulations, population values are reported. RREL is the gap between the risk free rate and its four 
quarter moving average; P/D is the price/dividend ratio. In the simulations, P/D is measured as the 
wealth/consumption ratio. ἃ is the value of risk aversion in the model, and estimated in the data as in 
section 4.
62the bond for another period. I assume that the quarterly probability of payout is 1-0.91/4
so that the expected maturity of the bond is ten years. The term spread is the yield to ma-
turity on this bond minus the one-quarter riskless yield. The term spread in the model is
on average negative, whereas the nominal Treasury yield curve is almost always upward-
sloping in the data. The reason we have a negative term spread in the model is that in
good times the marginal product of capital, and hence the risk-free rate, is above average.
So in good times, short-term bonds have low prices, and hence they are a hedge and have
a negative risk premium.
Fama and French (1989) show that the term spread forecasts stock returns. Interest-
ingly, table2.4showsthateventhoughthetermspreadisnegativeonaverageinthemodel,
it still positively predicts future stock returns as in the data. This essentially comes through
an expectations-hypothesis effect. In periods when the risk premium is low, the risk-free
rate is high and expected to fall. To the extent that long-term yields are just averages of ex-
pected future short yields, long yields will rise less than short yields. So in periods when
risk aversion is low, the term spread falls, and the term spread thus positively predicts
stock returns.
In the model, the equity premium is a nearly a constant multiple of at.29 The variables
that forecast returns in table 2.4 are all correlated with at, but imperfectly. For example,
the price-dividend ratio also depends on expected consumption growth and interest rates.
The fourth column of table 2.4 shows that the dual-shock model can qualitatively, if not
quantitatively, match the empirical result in column 1 that estimated risk aversion is a
more powerful forecaster of excess stock returns than any of the other variables, since it is
uncontaminated by factors like expected consumption growth.
2.3.2.3 Consumption growth predictability
The aggregate price-dividend and wealth-consumption ratios may be driven by either
movements in expected dividend (consumption) growth or movements in discount rates.
For the aggregate stock market, Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Cochrane (2008) ﬁnd that
29 This result is exact in the log-linear approximation.
63theprice-dividendratiohasatbestweakforecastingpowerfordividendgrowth. Similarly,
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) ﬁnd that the wealth-consumption ratio has little forecasting
power for consumption growth.
Figure 2.2 shows that the EZ-habit model is consistent with those results. First, to get
a general sense of the dynamic properties of consumption growth, the top panel of ﬁgure
2.2 plots the autocorrelations of consumption growth against their empirical counterparts.
The shaded region is the 95-percent conﬁdence interval for the empirical estimates using
the Newey–West method with a lag window of 12 quarters. In the model, the autocorre-
lations are near zero at all horizons. The data suggests that the ﬁrst three autocorrelations
are positive, which the model does not match. At longer lag lengths, though, there is no
evidence for persistence in consumption growth, consistent with the model.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 2.2 simulates 228-quarter samples as in ﬁgure 1 and calcu-
latescorrelationsbetweenconsumptiongrowthbetweendates t and t+k andtheconsumption-
wealth ratio at date t. What we see is that while many of the simulated correlations are far
from zero, the mean sample correlation between the wealth-consumption ratio and future
consumption growth is nearly zero. The ﬁgure also plots empirical correlations between
cay and future consumption growth at various horizons, and they are similar to the simu-
lated mean. Figure 2.2 thus shows that the EZ-habit model not only matches the short and
long-run variances of consumption growth, but it also replicates relevant features of the
dynamics of consumption.
2.3.3 Impulse response functions
Figure 2.3 plots impulse response functions (IRFs) in the EZ-CRRA and benchmark EZ-
habit models for four variables: consumption, household value, the risk-free rate, and the
Sharpe ratio on the consumption claim. The lines give log deviations from steady-state,
except for the risk-free rate, for which I report the absolute change in annualized percent-
age points. The shock is a unit standard deviation (88 basis-point) permanent increase in
the level of technology, which will lead to an identical long-run increase in consumption,
capital, and output.
64Figure 2.2: Consumption predictability
Note: The top panel reports the empirical autocorrelation function for consumption. The gray shaded region is the 95% 
confidence interval using Newey–West standard errors with a lag window of 12 quarters. The bottom panel reports the 
correlation of consumption growth between periods t and t+x with the wealth-consumption ratio (cay) at date t, where x is 
reported in quarters on the horizontal axis. The solid lines give the mean and 5th and 95th percentiles of the same correlation 
in simulated 228-quarter samples. 
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66The top-left panel shows the response of household value. For the EZ-CRRA model,
value immediately jumps to a point just below its new steady state, and then slowly rises
as households accumulate capital. For the EZ-habit model, though, value actually over-
shoots its new steady state. The reason is that the positive shock to productivity drives
risk aversion down. When households are less risk-averse, they place a higher value on
their future consumption stream because they penalize uncertainty less strongly. This ef-
fect helps increase the volatility of the SDF (equation 2.6), raising the Hansen–Jagannathan
bound. The top-right panel shows that on the impact of a shock, the Sharpe ratio in the
EZ-habit model falls by 12.5 percent (as a fraction of its mean), and then gradually rises
again, with a half-life of 12 quarters.
The bottom-left panel shows the dynamics of the risk-free rate. The initial response
is essentially identical for the two models. The reason for this is that the risk premium
on an unlevered claim on capital is very small in the model, so the return on capital is
roughly equal to the risk-free rate. Since the size of the capital stock is essentially ﬁxed in
the short-run, an increase in productivity directly increases the return on capital and hence
the risk-free rate.
The ﬁnal panel of ﬁgure 2.3 shows the response of consumption in the two models.
The EZ-habit model shows a larger initial response of consumption, with lower expected
consumption growth going forward. To see why this is, we can write consumption growth
in equilibrium as
EtDct+1 = ¯ c + r 1rf,t+1 + at  vol (2.15)
where rf,t+1 is the risk-free interest rate between dates t and t+1, vol represents a measure
of the total volatility in the model, and ¯ c is a constant. at vol represents the precautionary
saving effect and is a function of the current level of risk aversion and the variances of
the shocks in the model. The standard interpretation in an endowment economy is that
conditional on consumption growth, a strong precautionary saving motive leads to a low
risk-free rate. In a production setting, though, it is the risk-free rate that is held roughly
ﬁxed since it is tied to the marginal product of capital, which is hard to change quickly
through investment. Conditional on the risk-free rate, then, a small precautionary saving
67motiveleadstolowerexpectedconsumptiongrowth(moreconsumptiontoday, savingless
for tomorrow). In the EZ-habit model, a positive technology shock lowers risk aversion,
and hence consumption rises more than in the canonical EZ case. This effect also serves to
increase the volatility of the SDF, just as the higher response of value does.
Given the results in ﬁgure 2.3, it is straightforward to see what would happen in this
economy if there were a pure shock to the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. Since the
risk-free rate is tied to the marginal product of capital, it would not move on the impact
of a shock. The only effect on real variables of a pure decline in risk aversion then is that
households would want a smaller buffer stock of savings, so they would raise consump-
tion and lower investment: shocks to risk aversion look like simple demand shocks.
2.3.4 Estimating the EIS from interest rate regressions
The value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is controversial. Regressions
based on aggregate consumption and asset returns often ﬁnd a very small EIS (Hall, 1988;
Campbell and Mankiw, 1989). Campbell (2003) reviews the literature and estimates the EIS
using a variety of speciﬁcations and data from a broad range of countries, ﬁnding values
generally less than 0.5 and often less than 0.2.30 This result is in conﬂict with the calibration
used here and in other recent production-based asset pricing studies (Kaltenbrunner and
Lochstoer, 2010; Gourio, 2010), which assume that the EIS is greater than 1. The question is
whether the EZ-habit model generates small EIS estimates in regressions similar to those
estimated in Campbell (2003).
The standard aggregate EIS regressions start from a model in which the risk-free rate
takes the form
rf,t+1 = b0 + rEtDct+1 (2.16)
where rf,t+1 is the riskless interest rate between periods t and t + 1. b0 is a parameter
depending on the discount rate and underlying volatility in the model (which are taken
30 Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) ﬁnds an EIS less than unity in micro data. On the other hand, Vissing-Jorgenson
and Attanasio (2003) and Gruber (2006) obtain larger estimates using micro data, both above unity. Gruber
(2006) is particularly well-identiﬁed, using variation in the capital income tax rate as the source of exogenous
differences in the after-tax interest rate earned by households.
68to be constant). This relationship is straightforward to derive in an endowment economy
with homoskedastic consumption growth and where households have a constant EIS and
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. It is also obtained in a log-linearization of the standard
RBC model with homoskedastic technology shocks.
Inprinciple, theEIScanbeestimatedfromaregressionofinterestratesonconsumption
growth or vice versa. However, since the reduced-form relationship between consumption
growth and interest rates is nearly zero in the EZ-habit model, in some of the simulations
regressing EtDct+1 on rf,t+1 produces explosive estimates for r 1 (since we have to invert
the coefﬁcient estimate). Moreover, consumption in the EZ-habit model nearly follows a
random walk, so it is essentially unpredictable and there are serious weak-instruments
problems in an IV regression of interest rates on consumption growth. I therefore focus on
the regression of consumption growth on interest rates,
EtDct+1 = b0
0 + r 1rf,t+1 (2.17)
In the simulations of the model in section 2.3, we have the ability to directly measure
EtDct+1. The ﬁrst row of table 2.5 reports the population estimate of r 1 in regression (2.17)
under the EZ-CRRA and EZ-habit models. In the EZ-CRRA case, the regression identiﬁes
r 1 exactly. On the other hand, the estimate of r 1 is biased substantially downwards in
the EZ-habit speciﬁcations.
The bias comes from the fact that the time-varying precautionary saving effect (equa-
tion2.15)isomittedfromtheregression. Sinceprecautionarysavingiscorrelatedwithboth
expected consumption growth and interest rates, omitting it biases the simple IS-curve re-
gression usually used to identify the EIS. An alternative way to see the source of the bias
is to go back to the IRFs in ﬁgure 2.3. In both models the risk-free rate rises by the same
amount following a shock. In the EZ-habit speciﬁcation, though, because of the decline
in precautionary saving, expected consumption growth is lower following a shock than in
the EZ-CRRA case. That means that the estimate of r 1 will fall.31
31 In Bansal and Yaron (2004), time-variation in the volatility of shocks in principle causes EIS regressions to
be biased. However, Beeler and Campbell (2010) show that their calibration generates almost no actual bias—
the median sample EIS estimates are well above 1. This paper thus represents an improvement in being able
69Table 2.5: Regressions estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Model: Data EZ CRRA EZ habit Dual shock
1 Population, infeasible (Et[ ct+1]) N/A 1.50 0.64 0.78
2 Population N/A 1.50 0.56 0.71
3 Small sample 0.14 1.16 0.03 0.35
4     [2.5%, 97.5%] N/A [0.03, 1.79] [ 1.98, 1.02] [ 1.32, 1.34]
5 Population, RRA control N/A N/A 1.50 1.50
6 Small sample, RRA control 0.18 N/A 0.07 0.94
7     [2.5%, 97.5%] N/A N/A [ 3.08, 3.11] [ 1.07, 2.78]
Note: Values reported are the coefficient from regressions of consumption growth or expected consumption 
growth on the risk free rate. The dependent variable in row 1 is expected consumption growth (computed 
numerically in the simulations); all other rows use actual consumption growth. The small sample regressions are 
based on 228 quarters of data, and median coefficient estimates are reported; 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles are 
reported in brackets. The RRA control is actual risk aversion in the simulations and estimated risk aversion 
(section 4) in the empirical regressions. 
70The regression in the ﬁrst row of table 2.5 is in some sense ideal, but it is not the re-
gression that we are actually able to run in the data since EtDct+1 is unobservable.32 Rows
2 through 4 report results for estimates of r 1 from regressions of actual consumption
growth, Dct+1, on the risk-free rate, rf,t+1. Row 2 gives the population estimates, while
rows 3 and 4 give the median and 95-percent range of the estimates from 228-quarter sim-
ulations. With constant relative risk aversion, the population regression in row 2 estimates
the EIS exactly. The median estimate from the small-sample regressions in row 3 is 1.16.
The 95-percent range is wide, and it only just barely contains the estimate from the data.
So it is in principle possible for the EZ-CRRA model to generate an estimate of the EIS as
small as what we observe in the data, but the probability is small (less than 10 percent).
In the EZ-habit models, the bias is far larger. The population estimate in the single-
shock case is 0.56, and the median sample estimate is 0.03. For the dual shock model,
the estimates are only slightly better—0.71 in population and a median of 0.35 in small
samples. The reason for this slight improvement is that the temporary shocks have little
effectonriskaversion, sotheyinducevariationinconsumptionandtherisk-freeratethatis
closer to the usual EZ-CRRA case. The upper end of the 95 percent range for the simulated
estimates is well below the true value of the EIS.
The ﬁrst four rows of table 2.5 show that in general, regressions of interest rates on
expected consumption growth are not a very good way to estimate the EIS, and in the EZ-
habit model they are biased and inconsistent. It is worth noting, though, that if we could
observe at, we could completely eliminate the bias in the EIS regressions. Empirically, this
suggests that regressions designed to estimate the EIS could be improved by including a
control for risk aversion, such as the price-dividend ratio on the stock market. The ﬁnal
three rows of table 2.5 try to estimate the EIS including a control for risk aversion. In the
data, I use a measure of risk aversion derived from the EZ-habit model below in section
to generate a substantial bias in aggregate regressions without large movements in the conditional volatility
of consumption.
32 In principle, the real risk-free rate, rf,t+1, is also unobservable in the data. As above, I form rf,t+1 as the
difference between the nominal 3-month interest rate and a forecast of inﬂation based on lagged inﬂation and
nominal interest rates. Errors in the estimate of the true real-risk-free rate would bias the estimate of r 1
towards zero. Instrumental-variables methods can theoretically eliminate this bias.
712.4, denoted ˆ at. The empirical estimate of the EIS is essentially unchanged from when
ˆ at is not included. In population, when at is included in the simulated regressions, the
EIS is estimated exactly. In small-sample regressions, though, the estimate of the EIS in
the model is still biased downward. In the single-shock model, the median estimate is
0.07. and in the dual-shock model 0.94. Row 7 shows, though, that the 2.5 percentile of
the small-sample estimates is -3.08 in the dual shock model, while the 97.5 percentile is
3.11. So even though the median estimate in the dual-shock model is not enormously
biased, the empirical value of 0.18 is well within the simulated range. In the end, while
controlling for risk aversion should, in principle, allow us to estimate the EIS consistently,
in small samples the regressions still do not seem to provide useful estimates because of
weak-identiﬁcation problems.
As an alternative to these regressions, the EIS could be consistently estimated if we
had an instrument for the risk-free rate that was uncorrelated with risk aversion. Standard
aggregate instruments like lagged interest rates and consumption growth (e.g. Campbell,
2003) will certainly not be valid instruments under the EZ-habit model since the precau-
tionary saving effect is persistent. Household-level instruments would work better if my
model is correct in treating risk aversion as being driven by aggregate factors.33 The EZ-
habit model thus has the ability to explain the divergence between micro and macro esti-
mates of the EIS if the micro instruments are valid and the macro instruments invalid.
2.4 Empirical return forecasting
This section shows how the model suggests we can directly estimate the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion in the data, and then demonstrates that the estimate is a powerful
predictor of stock returns. Second, I present novel evidence that technology growth fore-
casts stock returns, just as it does in the production model. The results differentiate the EZ-
habit paper from models with time-varying disaster risk. Gourio (2010) predicts that when
33 Gruber (2005) discusses precisely these issues and tries to resolve them by using household-speciﬁc vari-
ation in tax rates as an instrument for consumption growth. Dynan (1993) explicitly controls for the precau-
tionary savings effect at the household level by predicting the conditional volatility of consumption, but she
does not deal with the possibility that risk aversion varies over time.
72there are changes in the probability of a large disaster occurring, price-dividend ratios will
forecast returns, which is also true in the EZ-habit model. The EZ-habit model also pre-
dicts, though, that technology and estimated risk aversion will forecast stock returns, and
that estimated risk aversion will be the single most powerful forecaster of returns, which
would not be true in the time-varying disaster model or models based on other forms of
time-varying volatility (e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004, Bloom, 2009, or Fernandez-Villaverde
et al., 2011).
2.4.1 Estimating risk aversion
If risk aversion follows the AR(1) process given in (2.5), then we can measure current
risk aversion if we simply observe the history of aggregate value, vA
t . For a given value
of the EIS and observed data on wealth and consumption, it is possible to calculate vA
t by
rearranging equation (2.7)
vA
t =
1
1  r
wA
t  
r
1  r
cA
t +
1
1  r
log(1  exp( b)) (2.18)
If we can measure household wealth and consumption, then we can measure value. We
then simply plug the estimates of vA
t into equation (2.5) to obtain estimates of at.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) study a cointegrating relationship between consumption
and aggregate wealth. Their method is valid in my model since consumption and wealth
are cointegrated under balanced growth. While their analysis was designed to estimate
the consumption-wealth ratio, it also delivers, as a byproduct, a measure of aggregate
wealth (since we can always add consumption to the wealth-consumption ratio to obtain
wealth). The estimate of wealth derived using their method is a combination of asset
wealth data obtained from the ﬂow of funds accounts plus an estimate of human wealth.
They treat labor income as the dividend from the stock of human wealth. Assuming the
price-dividend ratio for human wealth is stationary, we can use labor income as a proxy
for human wealth. Denoting asset wealth as at and labor income as yt, the appendix shows
73that we then have a cointegrating relationship,
ct = zwat + z (1  w)yt + x0
t (2.19)
where z and w are parameters and x0
t is a stationary error term. Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) refer to the residual x0
t as cay. This variable essentially represents an estimate of the
consumption-wealth ratio. Since I want to estimate wealth, I deﬁne
ayt  wat + (1  w)yt (2.20)
which, under the assumptions above, will be a statistically unbiased estimate of total
wealth, but will include error due to the fact that we do not assume we directly measure
human wealth.34
With our measure of wealth ayt, we estimate vA
t as
ˆ vA
t =
1
1  r
ayt  
r
1  r
ct (2.21)
where we ignore constants, and a circumﬂex indicates an estimated variable. Note that
since the parameters of the cointegrating relationship for ct, at, and yt are estimated super-
consistently we do not have to modify any standard errors in the subsequent analysis to
take into account the fact that ayt is a generated regressor (which is why it does not receive
a circumﬂex). That said, to the extent that there is measurement error in the consumption
or wealth data, ˆ vA
t will inherit that same error. When we use ˆ vA
t to forecast market returns,
this measurement error should only weaken the results. For measurement error to gener-
ate a spurious predictive relationship, it would have to be correlated with other predictors
of returns.35
34 In simulations with variable labor supply, The price/dividend ratio on human wealth does vary over
time, but the variation is relatively small: risk aversion calculated using the method here (assuming a constant
price-dividend ratio on human wealth) is over 95 percent correlated with actual risk aversion.
35 One obvious source of measurement error is that human capital is not a perfect estimator of the value
of human wealth. Suppose risk aversion rises above average and lowers the price-dividend ratio on human
wealth below average. Labor income will then be overestimating human wealth (compared to its average).
High levels of wealth drive out measure of ˆ at downward, so this measurement error should bias the results
against correctly forecasting returns (high risk aversion in the data leads to low risk aversion in our estimates).
74This deﬁnition of ˆ vA
t is similar to Lettau and Ludvigson’s cayt, except they have equal
weights on ct and ayt, whereas equation (2.21) uses a combination where the weights de-
pend on the EIS. Also, cayt is stationary by construction, whereas ˆ vA
t is growing over time
(it is cointegrated with consumption and wealth).
In equation (2.21) a high EIS (low r) raises the weight on consumption relative to asset
wealth. If the EIS is less than 1 (r > 1), the weight on wealth, ayt, is actually negative, and
the weight on consumption greater than 1. Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Kaltenbrunner
and Lochstoer (2010) both ﬁnd that an EIS of 1.5 allows their models to ﬁt asset pricing
facts, so I use the same value. This value is also consistent with the micro evidence of
Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003). The results reported below are broadly similar as
long as the EIS is greater than 1.1 (at that level and below, ˆ vA
t becomes very volatile). The
appendix reports a sensitivity analysis for various values of the EIS.
Figure 2.4 plots ˆ vA
t both in its raw levels and with a linear trend taken out. As we would
expect, ˆ vA
t follows a strong upward trend. There seem to be both low and high frequency
components to detrended ˆ vA
t . In particular, there are long-run swings with peaks in the
early 1970’s and 2000’s and a trough around 1994, generally consistent with movements in
the aggregate price-dividend ratio and variation in average output growth.36 At the same
time, there are business-cycle frequency movements, e.g. the troughs in 1973, 2001, and
2008.
I construct an estimate of at, ˆ at, using the update process for risk aversion, equation
(2.5), and the data on ˆ vA
t . In particular, we have
ˆ at+1 = fˆ at + (1  f) ¯ a + l

Dˆ vA
t+1   EtDvA
t+1

(2.22)
As above, I assume that f = 0.96. EtDvA
t+1 is estimated simply as the sample average of
Dˆ vA
t .37
In the simulations not reported here, though, this effect seems to be small.
36 Note, though, that linear detrending will tend to make the series look as if it is mean-reverting even if it
follows a random walk. The linear trend is only used to make the graph legible; none of the results involve it.
37 In principle, it is possible to forecast DvA
t+1, but the amount of predictability in DvA
t+1 is sufﬁciently small
that the results are nearly identical to assuming that vA
t+1 simply follows a random walk.
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76The parameter l governs the volatility of at, but it has only a multiplicative effect on
ˆ at. That is, two estimates of ˆ at will be perfectly correlated with each other, regardless of
what values are chosen for l. The same argument applies for ¯ a. As long as we are simply
trying to forecast stock returns using a linear regression, we can ignore any additive or
multiplicative shifts in ˆ at. Therefore, I set ¯ a = 0 and choose l so that ˆ at has unit variance,
normalizations that will have no effect on the regression-based measures of forecasting
power (and I choose a negative value of l to match the habit-formation motivation of the
model). In the ﬁrst period of the sample I assume ˆ a = ¯ a.
An important feature of this method of forecasting is that it is based only on the pref-
erence speciﬁcation. None of the assumptions we made about the production side of the
economy are required for this method to be valid. We simply take advantage of the rela-
tionship between household value and changes in risk aversion and the relationship under
Epstein–Zin preferences between household value and wealth.
2.4.2 Forecasting market returns
The next question is to what extent the model-implied variation in expected returns is
related to actual returns. Figure 2.5 plots ˆ at and 5-year excess returns on the stock market
(the value-weighted excess return from Kenneth French). The strong correlation between
the two series (0.68) is immediately apparent. There are both high and low-frequency
movements in ˆ at associated with changes in growth in value. In the periods when value is
growing quickly, e.g. the late 1990’s, risk aversion falls. At the same time, there are higher-
frequency movements, such as the temporary increases in estimated risk aversion around
the recessions in 1991 and 2001.
Figure 2.1 plots R2s from regressions of future stock returns on ˆ at, cayt, the price-
dividend ratio (P/D), and the excess consumption ratio from Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). Each line gives the R2 from a univariate regression. The x-axis gives the hori-
zon for the return in quarters. The nth point is the R2 from a regression of å
n
j=1 rt+j on
the predictor at time t. The regressions are all run on quarterly data from 1952 to 1999 (to
The appendix shows that the results are robust to different choices for f.
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78ensure we have data for the 40-quarter regression). Each regression uses the same sample
for the predictors.
At every horizon, ˆ a is dominant. At the ﬁve-year horizon, the R2 for estimated risk
aversion peaks at more than twice that of the other variables. The R2s are impressively
high for just a single variable: at the 5-year horizon, ˆ a explains 50 percent of the post-
war variation in stock returns. Furthermore, in horse-race regressions (reported in the
appendix), ˆ a dominates cay at all horizons.
Animportantconsiderationinlong-horizonforecastingregressionsisthattheresiduals
are highly persistent. Kiefer, Vogelsang and Bunzel (2000) and Kiefer and Vogelsang (2005)
show that by using Newey–West standard errors with a very long lag-window, we can
obtainteststatisticswithbettersizepropertiesthantechniquesthatuseaﬁxed(andusually
short) lag window. I choose a lag window equal to half the sample size and use the critical
values reported in Kiefer and Vogelsang (2005).38 For cay, every regression except for
those with horizons greater than 30 quarters is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. For ˆ a, the
largest p-value is 0.0008. The price-dividend ratio is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for
forecasts of 14 quarters or longer. In other words, these regressions all imply that we have
substantial ability to forecast stock returns in the post-war period, and ˆ a is the strongest of
the predictors. Out-of-sample tests with both asymptotic and bootstrapped critical values
give similar results (appendix D.3). Appendix D examines the sensitivity of the results in
this section to the various parameters we had to calibrate (e.g. the EIS and the persistence
of habits). The basic results hold across a broad range of parameter sets.
2.4.3 Forecasts from estimates of technology
The method of estimating the level of risk aversion studied above does not rely on
any assumptions about the structure of production in the economy, being derived purely
from the preference speciﬁcation. However, in the production model, changes in value are
38 Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002) note that there is a size-power tradeoff. When the lag window is increased,
the size of the test statistics gets closer to their nominal size, but there is a loss of power. I choose a lag window
of half the sample to balance these considerations. The results are basically identical when using a lag window
equal to the sample size as in Kiefer, Vogelsang, and Bunzel (2000), though the price-earnings is signiﬁcant in
more of the regressions.
79closely related to changes in productivity. If we can measure innovations to technology,
then risk aversion should follow an AR(1) process where the innovations are equal to the
shocks to the stochastic trend in technology.
There is a large literature that tries to estimate aggregate technology shocks. I consider
twomethodshere. TheﬁrstbuildsoffofSolow(1957)andusesrestrictionsfromaconstant-
returns production function:
at = yt   gkt   (1  g)lt (2.23)
at measures technology if the economy has a Cobb–Douglas production function, with
l denoting log labor supply. I also consider a simpler metric, labor productivity, lpt =
yt   lt. Labor productivity does not take into account the effects of capital accumulation
and simply models technology as the average product of labor. Capital can be difﬁcult
to measure, whereas the number of hours supplied in the economy is a fairly concrete
quantity (though the quality of those hours is difﬁcult to account for).39
To extract the stochastic trend from the two productivity series, I estimate univariate
ARMA models for each variable. The Bayesian information criterion implies that TFP
growth is best ﬁt with an MA(2), while labor productivity growth should be treated as i.i.d.
#TFP
t is deﬁned as the residual in the MA(2), while #LP
t is simply equal to labor productivity
growth. That is, #TFP
t and #LP
t are innovations to the Beveridge–Nelson (1981) trends in
productivity.
Section 2.5.1 shows that, at least in the case where log technology follows a random
walk, risk aversion follows an AR(1) process of the form,
at = (1  q) ¯ at + qat 1 + #X
t (2.24)
where #X denotes a measure of technology growth. We then have two measures of at,
39 Furthermore, labor productivity determines the tradeoff that households face between consumption and
leisure. If the capital stock rises because foreigners want to invest more in the US, household welfare will
increase even if TFP does not. Similarly, a tax increase that reduced desired saving could lower welfare and
labor productivity, without having any effect on TFP. And welfare is the relevant input in estimating ˆ at.
80which I denote ˆ aTFP, ˆ aLP, using #TFP
t and #LP
t , respectively.40 The two measures turn out to
be highly correlated (93 percent).
Figure 2.6 plots ﬁve-year excess returns against ˆ aTFP and ˆ aLP The two series are both
clearly highly correlated with future excess returns. The p-values in regressions of quar-
terly excess returns on ˆ aTFP and ˆ aLP are 0.032 and 0.026, respectively (using Kiefer, Vogel-
sang, and Bunzel, 2000, t-type-statistics to account for autocorrelation). The relationship
between the three series is most clear around the turning points. Productivity growth be-
gins slowing down around 1970, driving risk aversion upwards. Forward-looking stock
returns reach their trough at roughly the same point. Productivity growth rises again start-
ing in the mid-1990’s, which is exactly when stock returns begin falling again.
The two measures of risk aversion in ﬁgure 2.6 clearly do not have the explanatory
power of the variables studied above. The wealth and consumption data used above have
a forward-looking component that is not present in instantaneous measures of technology.
On the other hand, my measure of risk aversion is highly correlated with the consumption-
wealth ratio. In almost any model with time-varying discount rates, the consumption-
wealth ratio will forecast stock returns. It is not the case, though, that any model will
predict that measures of technology should forecast stock returns. Figure 2.6 thus provides
evidence in favor of the model presented here over other explanations of time-varying
expected returns.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Log-linearization
This section studies a log-linear version of the production economy from above. I use
the solution to build a better understanding of the basic results reported in the previous
sections. In particular, I derive analytic approximations for the consumption function,
the risk-free rate and the conditional Sharpe ratio for the wealth portfolio. I also derive
40 Note that ˆ aTFP includes some forward-looking information since its construction requires the estimation
of an MA(2) on the full sample. ˆ aLP does not suffer from this ﬂaw. It is true that in both cases we have to
estimate mean productivity growth, but shifts in the estimted mean simply correspond to shifts in the mean
of ˆ at; they have no effect on its dynamics. In regressions of returns on ˆ at, the constant will thus always absorb
shifts in ¯ a, so the estimation of the mean of productivity growth is irrelevant for forecasting returns.
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82an essentially afﬁne model of the term structure with a time-varying price of risk. This
result connects the standard production theory in the macro literature to one of the most
commonly used empirical asset-pricing frameworks.
2.5.1.1 Approximation method and solution
I derive a log-linear consumption function as the solution to a model that represents
a log-linearization of the environment derived above with permanent technology shocks
only. Speciﬁcally, if the capital accumulation equation, the return on capital, and the return
on the wealth portfolio are log-linearized, then we are able to obtain an exact formula for
the consumption function under EZ-habit utility (with canonical Epstein–Zin and power
utility as special cases). The methods build on Campbell (1994) and Lettau (2003). Un-
like the usual techniques in the macro literature, the solution is not based on certainty-
equivalent or higher-order approximations to expectations.41 Rather, I take advantage of
log-normality to calculate expectations exactly. That feature of the method is critical for
accurately capturing risk premia and precautionary saving effects.
It is straightforward to show that the approximation technique delivers policy func-
tions that are identical to those obtained from perturbation up to the ﬁrst order (depend-
ing on where the derivatives are taken). The difference is that because I take advantage
of formulas for log-normal expectations, a term involving risk aversion appears in the so-
lution, meaning that the approximation captures the time-varying precautionary saving
effect that is central to driving the difference in the consumption response between the
EZ-habit model and the RBC model with canonical Epstein–Zin preferences.42
The approximation method involves log-linear approximations to three components
of the model: the budget constraint, the return on the wealth portfolio, and the return on
41 The usual technique is the perturbation method of Judd (1999). See Woodford (2003) for a representative
application and Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) for extensions to higher order approximations
42 In perturbation, the equilibrium equations are not only approximated with respect to the endogenous and
exogenous variables, but also the volatility of the technology shock, sa. The ﬁrst-order perturbation solution
therefore does not include any terms involving interactions of state variables with sa. The approximation used
here includes a term for ats2
a. The solutions are otherwise identical.
83capital,
kt+1  l0 + lkkt + laat + lcct (2.25)
rw,t+1  Etrw,t+1 + DEt+1
¥
å
j=0
qjDct+j+1   DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
qjrw,t+j+1 (2.26)
rk,t+1  r0 + rk (kt+1   at+1) (2.27)
where fl0,lk,la,lc,q,r0,rkg are linearization coefﬁcients that I solve for in the appendix
and lower-case letters denote logs.43
Deﬁne ˜ ct  ct   at and ˜ kt  kt   at. With the the three log-linear approximations (2.25),
(2.26), and (2.27), the appendix shows that we can obtain the following result:
Proposition 2.1. Given the log-linear budget constraint, the log-linear return on the consumption
claim, and the production function, the optimal consumption plan takes the form
˜ ct = hc0 + hck˜ kt + hcaat (2.28)
and the return on the wealth portfolio can be written as
rw,t+1 = hw0 + hwaat + rEtDct+1 + kr#t+1 (2.29)
where the coefﬁcients fhc0,hck,hca,hw0,hwa,krg are solved for in the appendix. Furthermore, the
log price-dividend ratio of the consumption claim is linear in risk aversion and scaled capital.
The ﬁrst important implication of this result is that even though risk aversion is time-
varying, both consumption growth and returns on the wealth portfolio are homoskedastic.
We did not assume the existence of a log-linear policy for consumption or homoskedastic
wealth return. Variation in risk aversion induces variation in expected returns on risky
assets, but not in their volatility. This same result is obtained in the numerical solution
above.
43 (2.25) is a log-linearization of the resource constraint, Kt+1 = (1  d)Kt + A
1 g
t K
g
t   Ct; (2.26) is the
Campbell–Shiller (1988) approximation for the return on the wealth portfolio; (2.27) is a linearization of
Rk,t+1 = gK
g 1
t+1 A
1 g
t+1 + 1  d.
84Remark 2.1. hck does not depend on the level or volatility of the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion (i.e. on ¯ a or l).
The ﬁnding that hck is not affected by the time-variation in the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion helps us build intuition as to why the IRF for consumption changes when risk
aversion varies. Consumption responds to a technology shock more strongly in the EZ-
habit model than in the RBC model purely because the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
falls in response to positive technology shocks. If the economy experienced a hypothetical
shock to the size of the capital stock holding the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion ﬁxed,
the behavior of consumption and saving would be identical under EZ-habit and EZ-CRRA
preferences.
2.5.1.2 The risk-free rate and excess returns on the wealth portfolio
Denote the conditional standard deviation of a variable x as s(x). We have the follow-
ing formulas for the risk-free rate and Sharpe ratio,
Proposition 2.2. In the log-linearized model, the risk-free rate follows
rf,t+1 = hf0 + rEDct+1   hfaat (2.30)
and the Sharpe ratio of the consumption claim is
Etrw,t+1   rf,t+1 + 1
2s2 (rw)
s(rw)
= rs(Dc) + (at   r)s(Dv) (2.31)
As usual, expected consumption growth affects the risk-free rate in proportion to the
inverse of the EIS. There is an additional term hfaat reﬂecting the time-varying precau-
tionary saving motive. When risk-aversion is high, precautionary saving demand is high,
driving the risk-free rate downwards, all else equal. It is immediately clear that a simple
regression of consumption growth on interest rates will not identify the EIS, 1/r, unless
the instruments used for the interest rate are uncorrelated with current risk aversion or
risk aversion is controlled for.
Note also that the Sharpe ratio is strictly increasing in at. The terms s(Dc) and s(Dv)
85are the standard deviations of growth in household consumption and value, respectively
(both of which are constant in equilibrium). Tallarini (2000) and Lettau (2003) show that
in an RBC model with power utility, an increase in risk aversion need not increase the
Sharpe ratio because consumers can endogenously smooth consumption.44 In this setting,
though, risk aversion unambiguously increases the Sharpe ratio. The reason is that the
preference for consumption smoothing comes from the EIS. An increase in risk aversion
does not cause consumers to smooth consumption endogenously, and so the only effect is
to raise the Sharpe ratio on the wealth portfolio.
An obvious question is what the term s(Dv) actually is. The appendix derives the
following results,
Proposition 2.3. In equilibrium, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion at follows the process,
at = fat 1 + (1  f) ¯ a + saa#t (2.32)
where saa depends on the parameters l, q, f, and sa.
The standard deviation of innovations to value is
s(Dv) =
 1+
q
1+ 2 q
1 qfsaasa
q
1 qfsaa
(2.33)
s(Dv) is increasing in sa for sa > 0 and saa < 0.
Result 2.3 ﬁrst shows that the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion follows an AR(1) pro-
cess with innovations that are perfectly correlated with technology shocks. This result is a
consequence of household value being a log-linear function of the level of technology, so
that vt+1   Etvt+1 is a linear function of the technology shock.
Result 2.3 shows that the standard deviation of innovations to household value is con-
stant. Furthermore, in the benchmark case where technology shocks drive risk aversion
down, an increase in their volatility raises the volatility of innovations to value, as we
would expect.
44 LettauandUhlig(2004)andRudebuschandSwanson(2008)obtainsimilarresultsforCampbell–Cochrane
preferences.
86In the case where saa = 0, which corresponds to power utility, we obtain a surprisingly
simple formula:
Remark 2.2. For the RBC model where technology follows a random walk and consumers
have constant relative risk aversion, the Sharpe ratio on a consumption claim is approxi-
mately
SRt  asa (1  hck) + (a   r)sahck (2.34)
 asa   rsahck (2.35)
This formula is similar to the formula obtained by Bansal and Yaron (2004) for the
Sharpe ratio in the presence of long-run risks in an endowment economy. sa represents
long-run shocks to consumption growth, since consumption eventually catches up to a
technology shock. Of that total response, sa (1  hck) comes in the ﬁrst period, with sahck
in subsequent periods.45 We can thus think of the ﬁrst component of the Sharpe ratio,
asa (1  hck), as Bansal and Yaron’s short-run risk term, and (a   r)sahck as long run risks.
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) also show that production models generate long-run
risk endogenously, but this simple formula for the Sharpe ratio has not been obtained
elsewhere.
Thesecondlineshowsthatwecanisolatethe hck term. IftheEISislarge(r issmall)then
theendogenousresponseofconsumptioninthemodelisunimportantandtheSharperatio
is determined simply by the volatility of technology shocks and the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion.
2.5.2 Afﬁne bond pricing
It turns out that the log-linear solution to the model allows us to connect the standard
macro framework to the bond-pricing literature through the following result:
45 Recall that hck is the coefﬁcient on scaled capital in the consumption function. A unit increase in the tech-
nology shock #t+1 raises consumption by sa; the associated decline in scaled capital of sa lowers consumption
hcksa.
87Proposition 2.4. The log stochastic discount factor can be expressed as
mt+1 =  rf,t+1  
1
2
(w0 + w1at)
2 s2 + (w0 + w1at)#t+1 (2.36)
The SDF takes the tractable essentially afﬁne form studied in much of the recent bond-
pricing literature (see Duffee, 2002, and Piazzesi, 2010, for a recent review). We have a
production-based general-equilibrium afﬁne model of the term structure with an endoge-
nously varying price of risk. Not only is the one-period risk-free rate afﬁne in the state
variables, but so are the prices and yields for all longer-term zero-coupon bonds. The fact
that the SDF is afﬁne is convenient because it means that the model could be estimated
using the Kalman ﬁlter, either through Bayesian or frequentist methods. I am not aware of
an afﬁne model of the term structure with a time-varying price of risk being derived in a
production setting previously.
2.5.3 Labor supply
I model labor supply as in Gourio (2010) and van Binsbergen et al. (2010). The house-
hold’s value function takes the form
Vt =
(
(1  exp( b))

C1 v
t (1  Nt)
n
1 r
+ exp( b)

EtV
1 at
t+1
 1 r
1 at
) 1
1 r
(2.37)
where Nt represents market labor and at follows the same process as above. The house-
hold’s labor supply condition is
1
1  Nt
=
1  v
v
wt
Ct
(2.38)
where wt is the wage.
Note that risk aversion and habits only affect labor supply to the extent that they affect
consumption. When consumption rises, labor falls, all else equal. Since positive perma-
nent technology shocks drive consumption up farther in the EZ-habit model compared to
the EZ-CRRA case, labor supply will rise by less in the EZ-habit model. Following a tem-
porary technology shock, there is little change in risk aversion, so labor supply in that case
88will look similar in the EZ-habit and EZ-CRRA models.
This result is not speciﬁc to the Cobb-Douglas utility speciﬁcation studied here. In
general, preferences consistent with balanced growth will specify labor supply as some
function H (wt/Ct) (see King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988). Since wt/Ct is stationary with
balanced growth, labor supply will be too. If H is monotonically increasing, regardless of
its functional form, the increase in consumption induced by a decline in risk aversion will
also lower labor supply.
To see how habits affect labor supply here, ﬁgure 2.7 plots the response of employment
to a shock to technology in the EZ-habit model versus a model with constant relative risk
aversion.46 With EZ-CRRA we have the usual RBC result that the increase in technology
increases wt/Ct thus raising employment. Employment then slowly falls back down to its
steady state.
In the simple RBC model, it is possible to make labor supply fall following a shock by
varying the parameters, but it always monotonically returns to steady state. In the EZ-
habit speciﬁcation, though, the response of labor supply has a hump shape. On the impact
of the shock, employment barely increases at all, and it then rises slowly thereafter. This
behavior actually matches the response of employment to technology shocks in the liter-
ature following Gali (1999).47 In particular, all of those papers, though they use different
methods, and though they ﬁnd different initial responses of employment to technology,
ﬁnd a pronounced hump shape. Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) argue that this could
be explained by a New Keynesian model. Figure 2.7 shows that variation in risk aversion
could also explain that behavior.48
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Jaccard (2011) note that in the RBC model
with power utility and additive habits, variable labor supply undermines the ability of
the RBC model to generate a volatile SDF. Intuitively, households can use labor supply to
smooth consumption growth. Under power utility, the volatility of consumption growth
46 All of the parameters are identical to the main text, and v is set to 0.33 as in Gourio (2010).
47 See, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2004), Francis and Ramey (2005), and Basu, Fernald,
and Kimball (2006).
48 Note, though, that those papers also ﬁnd hump-shaped responses for output and consumption, which I
do not obtain.
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90is what determines the volatility of the SDF. Under Epstein–Zin utility, though, the abil-
ity to smooth consumption shocks does not reduce the volatility of the SDF since the SDF
loads almost purely on the permanent component of consumption, as we saw in the pre-
vious subsection.49 The EZ-habit model thus does not suffer from the drawback of pre-
vious habit-based models that freely variable labor supply could substantially reduce the
Hansen–Jagannathan bound.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of time-varying risk aversion. It simultaneously matches
the basic behavior of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial aggregates. The EZ-habit model gives
a framework in which consumption, output, and investment growth are all realistically
volatile in both the short and long-run, consumption growth is nearly a random walk, and
risk premia are high and volatile.
More generally, this paper provides a general framework for modeling time-varying
discount rates that can be used with other macro models. As pointed out by Cochrane
(2011), asset-pricing research has recently focused on understanding variation in the price
of risk over time. This paper gives a way of analyzing time-varying risk prices in the
standard macro framework. I show that for the RBC model, the effect of an increase in
risk aversion on consumption and investment looks similar to a decline in the household’s
rate of time preference in the sense that it temporarily increases investment and reduces
consumption.
An obvious next step is to study the EZ-habit preferences in a richer setting. Dew-
Becker (2011) estimates a standard medium-scale DSGE model with sticky prices and
wages, but with the added feature that risk aversion varies over time, as here. Comple-
menting the results in this paper on equity pricing, Dew-Becker (2011) shows that the
EZ-habit model, when augmented with a model of inﬂation, can match the behavior of
the nominal term structure well, generating a strongly upward-sloping term structure of
49 I conﬁrm this result numerically; the Hansen–Jagannathan bound is essentially identical with and without
labor supply.
91nominal interest rates and a volatile term premium.
923. BOND PRICING WITH A TIME-VARYING PRICE OF RISK IN AN ESTIMATED
MEDIUM-SCALE BAYESIAN DSGE MODEL
3.1 Introduction
Non-structural models are widely used in both macroeconomics and the study of the
term structure of interest rates. Recently, Smets and Wouters (2003) have shown that a
structural New Keynesian model can match the dynamics of the macroeconomy as well as
or better than a benchmark non-structural VAR. This paper extends that work by showing
that a suitably augmented version of their model can also match the dynamics of the term
structureofinterestratesaswellasastandardnon-structuralmodel. Inaddition, including
information from the term structure has substantial effects on the estimated sources of
variation in the real economy.
Bekaert, Cho, andMoreno(2010)showthatalog-linearizedmacromodelnaturallyalso
delivers closed-form expressions for bond prices. Their approximation method, however,
is not able to describe risk premia, and even if it could, the model assumes that risk premia
are constant. This paper builds on their work by using an approximation method that
allows for positive and time-varying risk premia. I then estimate the model using Bayesian
methods, and show that it ﬁts interest rates with errors that are similar to those generated
by a non-structural three-factor model. The errors in ﬁtting annualized yields on bonds
with maturities ranging from 1 quarter to 10 years have a standard deviation of 8 basis
points.
For the production side of the economy, I take the model described in Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, andTambalotti(JPT;2010)andcombineitwithapreferencespeciﬁcationthatendoge-
nously generates the essentially afﬁne stochastic discount factor of Duffee (2002). House-
holds are assumed to have Epstein–Zin preferences with time-varying risk aversion as in
93Melino and Yang (2003) and Dew-Becker (2011a), which induces a time-varying price of
risk. I also allow the central bank to have a time-varying inﬂation target, movements in
which shift the entire term structure, inducing a so-called level factor in interest rates.
The steady-state term spread in the model simply represents the average risk premium
on long-term bonds. The steady-state term spread is estimated to be 152 basis points,
similar in magnitude to the 207-basis-point average observed in the sample. To under-
stand why that risk premium would be large, we ﬁrst need to understand what drives
the variance of the pricing kernel. When the representative household has Epstein–Zin
preferences with a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion that is substantially larger than the
inverse of its EIS (preferring an early resolution of uncertainty), state prices are almost en-
tirely driven by innovations to the household’s lifetime utility, i.e. the value placed on its
entire future stream of consumption and leisure. With a high EIS, transitory changes in
consumption have a small effect on lifetime utility. Permanent technology shocks, though,
will have large effects. Shifts in risk aversion also affect lifetime utility because they affect
how much the household penalizes future uncertainty.
Even though there are nine shocks in the economy, only two of them turn out to be
relevant for the pricing kernel—labor-neutral technology and risk aversion. Since all of the
other shocks (e.g. monetary policy, markups, government spending) are purely transitory,
they have little effect on permanent income or welfare (because the household is estimated
to have a relatively high EIS of 1.33), and thus they do not have a strong effect on state
prices.
Following a positive innovation to the level of technology, nominal interest rates are
estimated to fall, making long-term bonds risky and inducing a positive slope in the term
structure. This result is common to a variety of New-Keynesian models, e.g. JPT, Smets
and Wouters (2004), and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011). In this paper, the
reason is that the central bank’s inﬂation target falls following positive technology shocks.
Intuitively, a positive supply shock lowers inﬂationary pressure, which the central bank
takes as an opportunity to drive inﬂation lower for an extended period. The fact that the
negative correlation between technology shocks and interest rates is obtained in numerous
other models that assume a constant inﬂation target suggests that this is in fact a well-
94identiﬁed feature of the data.
Variation in risk aversion also makes an important contribution to the model’s ability
to the term structure of interest rates, though. Standard statistical tests easily reject a model
with constant risk aversion in favor of one with time-varying risk aversion. The pricing
errors for bonds are smaller by a factor of three when risk aversion is allowed to vary over
time. Movements in risk aversion account for a large fraction of the variance of the term
spread, particularly outside of recessions.
While the variance decompositions imply that the pricing kernel is driven entirely by
the labor-neutral technology and risk aversion shocks, I ﬁnd that those two shocks have
only minor effects on the dynamics of the real economy in the short-run. Risk aversion ex-
plains less than 5 percent of the variance of output, consumption, investment, and hours
worked at business-cycle frequencies. The variable that is most responsive to the technol-
ogy shock is hours worked, and the technology shock still explains only 25 percent of its
variance. The variance decompositions also differ substantially from the results found by
JPT. Whereas JPT ﬁnd that investment technology shocks are an important driver of the
business cycle, I ﬁnd that they explain little other than investment, and monetary policy
and markup shocks play much larger roles. This ﬁnding suggests that including informa-
tion about bond prices in estimation has important effects on estimation results.
In addition to matching the behavior of the term structure, the estimated parame-
ters imply reasonable behavior for equity prices. The steady-state annualized Hansen–
Jagannathan bound is estimated to be 0.47, which is consistent with the observed Sharpe
ratio for the stock market in the data sample, even though data on equity returns is not
included in the estimation. Furthermore, the estimated degree of variation in risk aver-
sion is similar to (though somewhat higher than) the value used in Dew-Becker (2011a),
who calibrates a general-equilibrium model that can match the both the average Sharpe
ratio on equities and also empirical stock return forecasting regressions. At business-cycle
frequencies, estimated risk aversion displays similar behavior to Cochrane and Piazessi’s
(2005) tent-shaped bond return forecasting factor (and they are both strongly correlated
with the term spread).
This paper is related to a small but growing literature on bond pricing in production
95economies. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) and Doh (2011) estimate New-Keynesian
macro models, but they do not focus on the size and volatility of the term premium,
whereasthatisthefeatureofthetermstructurethatthispaperconcentrateson. Rudebusch
andSwanson(2011)generatealargeandvolatiletermpremiuminacalibratedmodel. This
paper moves beyond them by considering a substantially more complex model and show-
ing that it can be dynamically estimated through standard Bayesian methods using the
Kalman ﬁlter. Models of the business cycle have strong implications for the term structure
of interest rates, so adding that information can have strong effects on estimation results.
For example, I ﬁnd that when the model is estimated without bond price information, the
shock to investment technology is estimated to account for a large fraction of the variance
of short-term interest rates and the term spread. But when the term spread is included as
part of the information set, the effects of investment technology shocks are much smaller.
The implications of the model for wage-setting also change when interest rates are added:
I estimate a substantially larger Frisch elasticity than JPT do, coming in closer agreement
with micro evidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes household
preferences and derives the pricing kernel. Section 3.3 describes the remainder of the econ-
omy including the production process, price setting, and monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Next, section 3.4 explains how the model is solved. If we used perturbation methods,
a third-order approximation would be necessary to capture time-variation in risk premia.
The estimation of the model turns out to be sufﬁciently difﬁcult, however (due to nu-
merous local extrema in the likelihood function, a common feature of models of the term
structure), that the use of a nonlinear ﬁlter for calculating the model’s marginal likelihood
is infeasible. I therefore use the essentially afﬁne solution method described in Dew-Becker
(2011b). The method approximates the pricing kernel separately from the remainder of
the model, allowing it to take the essentially afﬁne form with a time-varying price of risk
described in Duffee (2002). The essentially afﬁne method is equivalent to a ﬁrst-order per-
turbation local to the non-stochastic steady-state, but it includes corrections for volatility
that allow it to substantially outperform perturbation in stochastic simulations. The key
feature of the essentially afﬁne method is that risk premia may vary over time and affect
96real variables, not just asset prices.
Section 3.5 describes the Bayesian methods used to estimate the model. Sections 3.6
and 3.7 examine the implications of the estimates for asset prices and the dynamics of the
real economy, respectively. Finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Household preferences
3.2.1 Objective function and budget constraint
I assume the household has recursive preferences over consumption and leisure
Vt =
(
(1  bBt)U (Ct, ¯ Ct 1, Nt,Zt) + bBt

EtV
1 at
t+1
 1 r
1 at
) 1
1 r
(3.1)
where Ct is consumption, ¯ Ct is aggregate consumption, Nt is the number of hours worked
outside the home, and Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information
available at date t. The term ¯ Ct 1 allows the period utility function to potentially include
external habit formation. The level of technology, Zt, may also affect household utility in
order to ensure balanced growth (as in Rudebusch and Swanson, 2010).
Bt is an exogenous shock to the household’s rate of time preference. The choice of
exactly how to specify this preference shock is not trivial. The goal is to generate variation
in consumption demand conditional on the level of interest rates. However, because Bt
enters the value function, it may also affect the level of Vt, and hence asset prices. The
speciﬁcation (3.1) has the feature that if period utility, U (Ct, ¯ Ct 1, Nt,Zt), is constant over
time, then a change in Bt will have no effect on Vt. So in some sense it purely affects the
relative preference for consumption today versus in the future, as opposed to also affecting
the household’s overall level of welfare.1 This speciﬁcation thus imposes the restriction
that intertemporal preference shocks are per se unpriced (in the sense that if they have no
effect on consumption or leisure, they have no effect on the pricing kernel) since they have
no direct effect on the level of welfare.
1 Variance decompositions for the estiamted model reported below conﬁrm that shocks to Bt have essen-
tially no effect on the pricing kernel.
97The household’s coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, at, is allowed to vary over time.
Dew-Becker (2011a) motivates variation in at by considering adding a time-varying bench-
mark to the standard Epstein–Zin certainty equivalent, Et (Vt+1   Ht)
1 a. When Vt+1 is
close to Ht, the household’s effective risk aversion over shocks to Vt+1 rises. The formu-
lation (3.1) has the advantage that it is log-linear and we do not have to worry about the
possibility that Vt+1 falls below Ht. In Dew-Becker (2011a), movements in at are connected
to movements in the household’s welfare. I loosen that constraint here and allow for in-
dependent shocks to risk aversion (equivalently, independent shocks to the habit). Melino
and Yang (2003) study a similar speciﬁcation, but without the emphasis on the habit. Un-
like the intertemporal preference shock, since at directly affects the level of welfare, shocks
to at will be per se priced – that is, even if they have no effect on consumption or leisure,
they will still affect the pricing kernel through their impact on the level of welfare.
The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt + PtIt + Ht + Dt = (1+ it) Ht 1 +WtNt + Pt + Rk,tut ¯ Kt 1   Pta(ut) ¯ Kt 1 + Dt 1
(3.2)
where Pt is the price of the consumption good, It is the expentiture on physical investment,
Ht is holdings of one-period nominal bonds, Dt is cash holdings, it is the nominally riskless
interest rate, Wt is the wage, and Pt represents proﬁts and other lump-sum transfers paid
to the household. Rk,t is the rental rate on capital, ¯ K the quantity of capital the household
owns, and ut the fraction it chooses to rent (with associated costs a(ut)). The dynamics
of investment and capital accumulation will be discussed in more detail below. For now
it is sufﬁcient to simply note that the household sells labor and capital and allocates the
proceeds between consumption and saving.
For the sake of simplicity, I study the so-called cashless economy described in Wood-
ford (2003). The monetary authority is able to control the interest rate because money en-
ters the household’s utility function, but the effect of money on total utility is sufﬁciently
small that we can ignore it when writing V (i.e. we take the limit where the relative impor-
tance of money goes to zero). I do not discuss money any further and from now on drop it
from the household’s budget constraint.
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In general, the stochastic discount factor under recursive preferences involves transfor-
mations of the household’s value function. It is often practically difﬁcult to directly solve
for the value function. As usual with Epstein–Zin preferences, it is possible in this setting
to obtain an expression for the stochastic discount factor (SDF) involving consumption
growth and an asset return. However, the asset whose return enters the SDF is no longer
the household’s total wealth portfolio: it is now an asset that pays a dividend depending
on the period utility function U and the marginal utility of consumption.
The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption between neighboring
dates is
Mt+1 
¶Vt/¶Ct+1
¶Vt/¶Ct
= bBt
1  bBt+1
1  bBt
UC,t+1
UC,t
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
(3.3)
where UC,t  ¶Ut/¶Ct is the marginal (period) utility of consumption. Mt+1 denotes the
SDF between dates t and t + 1.
In the case where Ut = C
1 r
t and Bt is constant, Mt+1 reduces to the usual formula for
the SDF when utility depends only on consumption (e.g. Epstein and Zin, 1991). If the
(period) marginal utility of consumption depends on labor, then the SDF will be distorted
in the usual ways through
UC,t+1
UC,t . Even if UC only depends on consumption, though (i.e.
if period utility is separable between consumption and leisure), variation in labor will
still affect the SDF through Vt+1: with recursive preferences, it is not generally possible to
separate labor supply decisions from asset prices, unlike the case where preferences are
separable between consumption and labor and over time.
3.2.2.1 Substituting in an asset return
Now consider an asset that pays UtU 1
C,t as its dividend in each period. In the usual
analysis of Epstein–Zin preferences, one substitutes the return on an asset that pays con-
sumptionasitsdividendintotheSDF.Inthepresentcase, dividingperiodutility, Ut, bythe
marginalutilityofconsumptionintuitivelyconvertsUt fromutilityunitsintoconsumption
units.
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C,t. Denote the cum-dividend price of this
asset as WU,t. The appendix conﬁrms the guess that
WU,t = V
1 r
t B 1
t U 1
C,t/(1  bBt) (3.4)
and that we can substitute the return on this asset into the SDF to obtain
Mt+1 = b
1 at
1 r

UC,t+1
UC,t
Bt
1  bBt+1
1  bBt
 1 at
1 r
R
r at
1 r
U,t+1 (3.5)
where RU,t+1 
WU,t+1
WU,t   UtU 1
C,t
(3.6)
3.2.3 Period utility
The period utility function, U (Ct, ¯ Ct 1, Nt,Zt) is motivated as a reduced form of a
model of household production as in Rudebusch and Swanson (2010). Suppose house-
holds have power utility over both market goods and goods produced at home.
Ut =

C
h
t ¯ C
1 h
t 1
1 r
1  r
+ j1
C
1 r
H,t
1  r
(3.7)
where CH,t is consumption of the home good. Households do not derive utility directly
from leisure, but rather from what they are able to produce in their non-market-work time
(as in Campbell and Ludvigson, 2001). The home production function is ZtN
aH
H,t, for hours
worked at home NH,t and a coefﬁcient 0 < aH < 1. The level of labor-neutral technology
in the economy is assumed to be equal (up to a constant of proportionality) in the home
and market production sectors.2
2 Note that in the household sector, an exogenous shift in Zt, all else equal, raises output one-for-one,
whereas below we will see that in the market sector it will raise output less than proportionally. The reason is
that in the market sector, an increase in Zt also leads to an identical increase in the size of the capital stock. So,
ultimately, the marginal product of labor in both sectors is proportional to Zt.
One way to rationalize this slight elision would be if the household accumulates durable goods at home
that aid household production. That feature of the model is left out for simplicity.
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Ut 

C
h
t ¯ C
1 h
t 1
1 r
1  r
+ Z
1 r
t j1
( ¯ H   Nt)
aH(1 r)
1  r
(3.8)
where NH,t = ¯ H   Nt. ¯ H denotes the maximum number of hours that the household can
work, either at home or in the market, and Nt is market labor. If sleep is part of home
production, then ¯ H might equal 8760 hours for annual data. More generally, though, ¯ H
might be smaller. As a practical matter, ¯ H affects both the elasticity of utility with respect
to market labor and the Frisch elasticity. The three parameters j1, ¯ H, and aH jointly de-
termine three primary features of household behavior: hours worked, the Frisch elasticity,
and the elasticity of utility with respect to market labor.
Theﬁrsttermin(3.8)givestheutilitythatcomesfromconsumption. Thehouseholdhas
power utility over a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of current and (aggregate) past consump-
tion. This formulation differs from the standard recent implementation in the macro liter-
ature in that I assume a multiplicative instead of additive habit. Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) show that an additive habit can induce time-varying risk aversion, whereas the mul-
tiplicative habit will have no affect on risk aversion; that way, variation in risk preferences
is driven purely by at. The key feature of the additive habit is simply that the marginal
utility of current consumption is increasing in last period’s consumption, which induces
consumers to try to smooth consumption growth, as observed in the data. To obtain that
result in this setting (assuming 0 < h < 1), we need r < 1.
3.3 Aggregate supply
For the supply side of the model, I follow exactly the setup in Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (JPT; 2010). JPT is a standard medium-scale New-Keynesian model. It
has 7 fundamental shocks—price and wage markups, labor-augmenting technical change,
investment-speciﬁc productivity, monetary policy, discount rates (Bt), and government
spending. In JPT’s formulation, the monetary authority’s inﬂation target is constant. I
allow it to vary to help match the movements in the long end of the yield curve. Other
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The model is also highly similar to Smets and Wouters (SW; 2003). The critical differ-
ence between the present setup and SW is that technology is difference-stationary rather
than trend-stationary, where the former is standard in the production-based asset pric-
ing literature.3 The difference-stationarity assumption helps generate large risk premia:
when technology is trend-stationary, there is very little overall risk in the economy, so
households must have an implausibly high coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion in order to
generate realistic asset prices.4
Since the model is standard and laid out in JPT and the main contribution of this paper
is the preference speciﬁcation and bond pricing, the remainder of this section gives a rel-
atively short description of the production setup. The appendix gives a full derivation of
the model, and the reader is referred to JPT for a more detailed analysis. My description
follows theirs closely.
3.3.1 Producers of physical goods
Final-good producers are competitive in both input and output markets and have a
CES production function,
Yt =
" 1
0
Yt (i)
1
1+lp,t di
#1+lp,t
(3.9)
where i indexes the types of intermediate goods, Yt is output of the ﬁnal good, which can
be used for either consumption or investment, Yt (i) is the use of intermediate of type i,
and the elasticity of substitution across the intermediates, which determines markups in
the intermediate-goods sector, varies over time.
Intermediate-good producers are monopolists for their own goods with production
function
Yt (i) = max
n
Kt (i)
g Z
1 g
t Nt (i)
1 g   Zt ¯ F,0
o
(3.10)
3 A difference-stationary process has ﬁrst-differences that follow a stationary process, so it is integrated of
order one. A trend-stationary process, on the other hand, is a process that has random stationary deviations
around a non-stochastic trend (where the trend is generally unmodeled and taken as exogenous).
4 Below, I estimate average risk aversion to be 18.7 (ignoring the correction from Swanson, 2011). Rude-
busch and Swanson (2011), who use stationary technology (with a slightly different preference speciﬁcation)
choose an analogous parameter to be 149.
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and Nt (i) are intermediate-good producer’s i purchases of capital and labor services, and
Zt is the level of labor-augmenting technology.
3.3.2 Price setting
We assume Calvo pricing. In every period, a fraction 1   xp of intermediate good pro-
ducers can change their prices, while the remainder index their prices following the rule,
Pt (i) = Pt 1 (i)p
ip
t 1p1 ip (3.11)
where Pt (i) is the price of good i in terms of the numeraire, pt  Pt/Pt 1 is aggregate
inﬂation, and
Pt =
" 1
0
Pt (i)
l 1
p,t di
#lp,t
(3.12)
is the aggregate price index (equal to the marginal cost of a unit of the ﬁnal good). p is
the steady-state inﬂation rate, and the parameter ip determines the degree of indexation to
lagged versus average inﬂation.
The ﬁrms that can choose their prices freely in a given period set them to maximize
the present discounted value of proﬁts over the period before they are allowed to choose a
new price
Et
(
¥
å
s=0
xs
pMt,t+s
"
Pt (i)
 
s
Õ
k=1
p
ip
t+k 1p1 ip
!
Yt+s (i)  Wt+sNt+s (i)   Rk,t+sKt+s
#)
(3.13)
where Mt,t+s  Õ
s
j=1 Mt+j, Wt+s is the wage rate, and Rk
t+s is the rental rate for capital.
3.3.3 Employment agencies and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of specialized labor, Nt (j). Competitive
employment agencies aggregate labor supply into a homogeneous labor input (just as the
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Nt =
" 1
0
Nt (j)
(1+lw,t)
 1
dj
#1+lw,t
(3.14)
where, as with prices, lw,t determines the elasticity of demand and hence markups in
the labor market. lw,t acts as a labor-supply shock. Since the employment agencies are
competitive, the price of a unit of the homogeneous labor input is
Wt =
" 1
0
Wt (j)
l 1
w,t dj
#lw,t
(3.15)
The labor demand function is then
Nt (j) =

Wt (j)
Wt
 
1+lw,t
lw,t
Nt (3.16)
As with prices, wages can only be changed intermittently, with probability (1  xw). If
a household cannot change its wage, it indexes according to the rule
Wt (j) = Wt 1 (j)

pt 1
Zt 1
Zt 2
iw
(p exp(g))
1 iw (3.17)
where g is the average growth rate of technology. The household will choose its wage in
a manner similar to how the intermediate-good ﬁrms set prices: it maximizes expected
utility over the period that the wage will remain unchanged.
3.3.4 Capital and investment
Intermediate-good ﬁrms rent capital from the households at rate Rk,t. Households own
a stock of capital ¯ Kt and choose a utilization rate ut. The effective quantity of capital rented
to ﬁrms in period t is
Kt = ut ¯ Kt (3.18)
104The household pays a cost of utilization a(ut) per unit of capital, with u = 1 in steady
state, a(1) = 0 and c  a00 (1)/a0 (1).5
Households accumulate capital according to the rule,
¯ Kt = (1  d) ¯ Kt 1 + mt

1  S

It
It 1

It (3.19)
where d is the depreciation rate and the function S incorporates adjustment costs in the
rate of investment. In steady state, S = S0 = 0 and S00 > 0. mt is a shock to the cost of
investment at date t.
3.3.5 Government policy
The central bank follows a Taylor rule taking the form
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
rR
"
p
t

pt
p
t
fp 
Xt
X
t
fX
#1 rR 
Xt/Xt 1
X
t /X
t 1
fdX
hmp,t (3.20)
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, R is its steady-state value, Xt is total output,
X
t is the level of output that would prevail if prices had always been ﬂexible, and p
t is
the inﬂation target at date t. The central bank is allowed to respond to both the level and
change in the output gap. This ﬂexibility helps ensure the model can match the dynamics
of short-term interest rates, which is obviously critical for capturing the dynamics of the
term structure. hmp,t is an exogenous monetary policy shock.
p
t is a time-varying inﬂation target, which can potentially help match the high inﬂa-
tion and long-term interest rates seen in the early part of the sample. More generally, p
t
induces a level factor in the term structure.
The government ﬁnances public spending by selling single-period bonds. Government
expenditures, Gt, are a time-varying fraction of total output,
Gt =

1 
1
gt

Yt (3.21)
5 As usual, in the log-linear approximation, the conditions on the ﬁrst and second derivatives in steady state
are sufﬁcient to describe the dynamics of the model.
105where gt follows an exogenous process deﬁned below. Households receive no utility from
government expenditures. As long as the share of output consumed by the government is
stationary, that assumption will have minimal effects on asset prices.
3.3.6 Market clearing
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + It + Gt + a(ut) ¯ Kt 1 = Yt (3.22)
3.3.7 Exogenous processes
The price and wage markup shocks follow ARMA(1,1) processes,
log
 
1+ lp,t

=
 
1  rp

log
 
1+ lp

+ rp log
 
1+ lp,t 1

+ #p,t   qp#p,t 1 (3.23)
log(1+ lw,t) = (1  rw)log(1+ lw) + rw log(1+ lw,t 1) + #w,t   qw#w,t 1 (3.24)
where #p,t  N

0,s2
p

and #w,t  N
 
0,s2
w

. The ARMA(1,1) form potentially helps
match both the high and low-frequency features of inﬂation.
Productivity has a unit root and its growth rate follows an AR(1) process,
Dzt = (1  rz) ¯ z + rzDzt 1 + #z,t (3.25)
where #z,t  N
 
0,s2
z

. The AR(1) setup potentially allows the model to incorporate the
long-run risks studied by Bansal and Yaron (2004).
The level of investment-speciﬁc productivity is assumed to be a stationary AR(1) pro-
cess,
logmt = rm logmt 1 + #m,t (3.26)
where #m,t  N

0,s2
m

. Note that mt simply determines the efﬁciency of the transformation
of the ﬁnal output good into the investment good, so investment still beneﬁts from the
unit-root innovations to Zt.
The government’s share of output, the monetary policy shock, and the time-preference
106shock follow AR(1) processes,
log gt =
 
1  rg

log g + rg log gt 1 + #g,t (3.27)
hmp,t = rmphmp,t 1 + #mp,t (3.28)
logBt = rb logBt 1 + #b,t (3.29)
where #g,t  N

0,s2
g

, #mp,t  N

0,s2
mp

, and #b,t  N
 
0,s2
b

.
The two exogenous processes that are added to JPT’s original model are the inﬂation
target and risk aversion. As in Dew-Becker (2011a), I allow the innovations to risk aversion
to be correlated with #z,t. Intuitively, this means that risk aversion depends on innovations
to the permanent component of consumption. There are also exogenous innovations to
risk aversion. We thus have
at = raat 1 + (1  ra) ¯ a + qa,z#z,t + #a,t (3.30)
with #a,t  N
 
0, ˆ s2
a

.
While a number of recent papers have studied models with time-varying inﬂation tar-
gets (e.g. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005; Doh, 2010), there is little understanding of
what actually drives the inﬂation target. Because the inﬂation target has a very strong im-
pact on long-term bond prices, the relationship between the inﬂation target and the other
innovations is a key determinant of the prices of long-term bonds. I therefore consider a
loose speciﬁcation where innovations to the inﬂation target may be correlated with all of
the other fundamental shocks (excluding risk aversion). We thus have
logp
t = (1  rp)logp + rp logp
t 1
+ qp,g#g,t + qp,z#z,t + qp,p#p,t + qp,w#w,t + qp,b#b,t + qp,m#m,t + qp,mp#mp,t + #p,t
(3.31)
with #p,t  N
 
0, ˆ s2
p

. All of the shocks # are also assumed to be independent.
The q parameters in equations (3.30) and (3.31) are somewhat difﬁcult to interpret and
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variance shares. Deﬁne
s2
a  q2
a,zs2
z + ˆ s2
a (3.32)
s2
p  q2
p,gs2
g + q2
p,zs2
z + q2
p,ps2
p + q2
p,ws2
w + q2
p,bs2
b + q2
p,ms2
m + q2
p,mps2
mp + ˆ s2
p (3.33)
s2
a and s2
p are the variances of the total innovations to risk aversion and the inﬂation
target, respectively. Next, deﬁne
sa,z  sign(qa,z)
q2
a,zs2
z
s2
a
(3.34)
sa,z is the share of the total variance of the innovations to risk aversion that is accounted
for by labor-neutral technology shocks. The sign of sa,z determines whether the effect of
technology shocks on risk aversion is positive or negative. Similarly, for p
t we can deﬁne
sX,z = sign(qp,X)
q2
p,Xs2
X
s2
p
(3.35)
for X 2 fg,z, p,w,b,m,mpg. The parameters sa,z, sX,z, s2
a and s2
p map uniquely into the
original parameters qa,z, qp,X, ˆ s2
a, and ˆ s2
p are are more easily interpreted as they represent
variances and signed variance shares.
3.4 Model solution
The standard method for approximating models of the form studied here is perturba-
tion. The drawback of perturbation methods for our purposes is that if we want time-
variation in risk aversion to have any effect on the dynamics of the model, we need to
take a third-order approximation to the model. Since the solution would be non-linear, we
would have to use the particle ﬁlter or some other nonlinear method in order to calculate
the marginal likelihood of the model. I have found, though, that it is in general very dif-
ﬁcult to ﬁnd the peak of the likelihood function for this model, and it would be infeasible
with a method as slow as the particle ﬁlter. This is a common problem in models of the
108term structure (e.g. Ang and Piazzesi, 2003; Hamilton and Wu, 2011).
I therefore use the essentially afﬁne approximation method described in Dew-Becker
(2011b). The essentially afﬁne method delivers an approximation to the equilibrium dy-
namics of the model that is linear in the state variables but still allows time-varying risk
aversion to affect the behavior of the endogenous variables. Dew-Becker (2011b) describes
the method in detail and show that Euler equation errors in simulated models are com-
petitive with third-order perturbations. Local to the non-stochastic steady-state, the essen-
tially afﬁne approximation is as accurate as a ﬁrst-order perturbation (in a Taylor sense),
and hence less accurate than higher-order perturbations. However, in a stochastic setting,
it performs well. This section gives a short overview of the method, and the appendix
provides further details.
Denote the vector of the variables in the model (including the exogenous processes) as
Xt and the vector of fundamental shocks as #t 

#mp,t,#z,t,#b,t,#m,t,#g,t,#p,t,#w,t,#a,t,#p,t

.
The equations determining the equilibrium of the model take the form
0 = G(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) (3.36)
where the expectation operator may appear in the function G. There is one equation for
each variable. s is a parameter controlling the variance of the shocks. We will approximate
around the point s = 0, with the non-stochastic steady-state deﬁned as the point ¯ X such
that
0 = G( ¯ X, ¯ X,0)
The equations G can be divided into two types: those that do not involve taking expec-
tations over the SDF and those that do.
G(Xt,Xt+1,#t+1) =
2
6
4
D(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)
Et [M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) F(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)]
3
7
5 (3.37)
where D and F arevector-valuedfunctionsand M isthe(scalar-valued)stochasticdiscount
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For the equations that do not involve the SDF, I use standard perturbation methods
and simply take a log-linear approximation. We approximate D as
0 = log(D(exp(xt),exp(xt+1),s#t+1) + 1) (3.38)
0  d0 + dx ˆ xt + dx0 ˆ xt+1 + d#s#t+1 (3.39)
where the terms d0, dx, dx0, and d# are coefﬁcients from a Taylor approximation and
xt  logXt
ˆ xt  logXt   log ¯ X
D will include equations such as budget constraints.
The second set of equations is dynamic and involves expectations. In many economic
models, including the present one, equations involving expectations take the form
1 = Et [M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) F(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)] (3.40)
where M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) is the stochastic discount factor induced by the household’s in-
tertemporal optimization condition. The key source of non-linearity in the model is the
time-variation in risk aversion, which induces heteroskedasticity in the SDF. It is therefore
natural to deal with M and F separately to isolate the relevant non-linearity.
I now show that if we log-linearize F, we can transform (3.40) into a linear condition
that can be solved alongside the remaining equations. M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) will not even be
log-linear in the state variables, but we will be able to state the equilibrium conditions in
as a set of linear expectational difference equations.
6 Note that this formulation does not actually restrict F. Speciﬁcally, suppose there were a set of equi-
librium conditions 1 = Eth(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1), i.e. that do not involve the SDF. We could simply say that
F(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)  h(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)/M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1).
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ˆ xt+1 = C + Fˆ xt + Y#t+1 (3.41)
We conﬁrm in the end that the solution is actually in this form.
The next step then is to take log-linear approximations to M and F separately. Log-
linearizing F is straightforward, and we obtain,
log F(xt,xt+1,s#t+1)  f0 + fxxt + fx0xt+1 + f#s#t+1 (3.42)
For M, in the case of the preferences laid out in section 3.2, the appendix shows that is it is
possible to derive a ﬁrst-order accurate expresion of the form
m
(1)
t+1 = m0 + mx ˆ xt + (k0 + atk1)s#t+1  
1
2
s2a2
tk1Sk0
1 (3.43)
where S is the variance matrix of #t. The superscript (1) indicates that m
(1)
t+1 is ﬁrst-order
accurate for the true SDF. (3.43) is the essentially afﬁne form from Duffee (2002).
Taking the expectation of the approximated Euler equation yields,
0 = logEt exp
0
B
@
m0 + mx ˆ xt + (k0 + atk1)s#t+1   1
2a2
ts2k1Sk0
1
+f0 + fxxt + fx0xt+1 + f#s#t+1
1
C
A
0 = m0 + mx ˆ xt + f0 + fxxt + fx0 (C + Fˆ xt)
+
1
2
s2 (fx0 + f#)YSY0  
f 0
x0 + f 0
#

+ ats2k1SY0  
f 0
x0 + f 0
#

Since every equation in the system is now linear in the variables of the model, we
can solve the system for the parameters F and Y from (3.41). Speciﬁcally, we solve the
111following system,
0 = d0 + dx ˆ xt + dx0 ˆ xt+1 + d#s#t+1 (3.44)
0 = m0 + mx ˆ xt + f0 + fxxt + fx0 (C + Fˆ xt)
+
1
2
s2 (fx0 + f#)YSY0  
f 0
x0 + f 0
#

+ ats2k1SY0  
f 0
x0 + f 0
#

(3.45)
atthepoint s = 1. ThereasonthattheessentiallyafﬁneSDFisusefulisthattheexpectation
in (3.45) will be linear in the state variables, so we have a simple linear system to solve.
This system can be solved through, for example, Sims’ (2001) Gensys algorithm.
Dew-Becker (2011b) shows that the transition function for the model obtained through
theessentiallyafﬁnemethodisﬁrst-orderaccurateforthetruetransitionfunctionandﬁrst-
order equivalent to a ﬁrst-order perturbation. Clearly, though, the approximation includes
higher-order terms that account for movements in risk aversion. at will affect not only
asset prices but also the dynamics of real variables. Dew-Becker (2011b) calibrates a simple
version of the RBC model with time-varying risk aversion and ﬁnds that the essentially
afﬁne approximation has accuracy between that of second and third-order perturbations.
Standard results derived in the appendix also deliver real and nominal zero-coupon
bond prices.
3.5 Empirics
I estimate the model using standard Bayesian methods. The observable data is the
same as in JPT, but with bond prices added. Both real variables and bond prices are linear
functions of the underlying state variables contained in the vector xt, so we can write the
model in state-space form and measure the likelihood using the Kalman ﬁlter. I proceed
by ﬁnding the posterior mode and running a monte carlo chain from that point to sample
from full posterior distribution. The appendix describes the details of the estimation.
1123.5.1 Data
The sample is 1983q1 to 2004q4. I do not include the ﬁnancial crisis in the sample
because the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates becomes binding, a phenomenon
that the model is not designed to capture. The sample is cut off in 1983 in order to ensure
that monetary policy is consistent over the estimation period.
The observable variables are real GDP, consumption, and investment growth, hours
worked per capita, wage and price inﬂation, and yields on three-month, 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10-
year Treasury bonds. The 1 through 5-year yields are obtained from the Fama–Bliss CRSP
ﬁles, the 10-year yield from Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006), and the three-month
yield from the Fama risk-free rate CRSP ﬁle. The bond yields and inﬂation rates are always
reported in annualized percentage points, unless otherwise noted. The real variables are
all obtained from the BEA and the BLS. Consumption is deﬁned as expenditures on non-
durables and services, while investment is the sum of residential and non-residential ﬁxed
investment and consumer durables expenditures. Real wages are calculated as nominal
compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector (from the BLS) divided by the GDP
deﬂator. The change in the log GDP deﬂator is the measure of inﬂation. Hours worked
per capita in the non-farm business sector are obtained from Francis and Ramey (2009) as
updated on Valerie Ramey’s website. None of the variables are detrended.
Figure 3.1 plots the data used in the estimation (with the exception of the intermediate-
term bond yields). Output, consumption, and investment growth all look stationary over
the sample and relatively homoskedastic. Hours worked per capita has a strong upward
trend in this sample. Interest rates decline signiﬁcantly over the sample, even though in-
ﬂation only declines marginally. The short-term interest rate is substantially more volatile
than the long-term rate, and the term spread is clearly countercyclical.
The model has 9 fundamental shocks, but we have 13 observable variables. I follow
JPT in assuming that the 6 macro variables plus the short-term interest rate are observed
without error. I also assume that the 10-year bond yield is measured without error, which
will help identify the inﬂation target. For the remaining bonds, I assume that the yields
have i.i.d. measurement errors with identical standard deviations. The standard deviation
113Figure 3.1: Data series for estimation
Note: No variables are detrended. GDP, consumption, and investment are obtained from the BEA. Compensation per hour, 
and inflation are obtained from the BLS. Hours worked is obtained from Valerie Ramey's website. The one-quarter yield is the 
Fama risk-free rate. The ten-year yield is from Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006).
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114of these measurement errors is another parameter that will be estimated. The assumption
of zero measurement error for the long and short ends of the yield curve forces the model
tofocusonmatchingthetermspread, whileleavingsomeﬂexibilityinmatchingcurvature.
3.5.2 Priors
Table 3.1 lists the parameters and priors. For all of the parameters that I share with JPT,
I choose the same priors. The remaining parameters are listed in the bottom section of the
table. Many of them have uniform priors since I do not have strong a priori views about,
for example, the fraction of the variance of the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target that is
driven by shocks to government spending.
For the volatility of risk aversion, I choose a beta distribution over the ratio of the un-
conditional standard deviation of risk aversion to its mean. This means that average risk
aversion is forced to be at least one standard deviation above zero. This prior could po-
tentially be tightened to enforce a stronger restriction. As a practical matter, the data tends
to push for a high volatility for risk aversion, and average risk aversion in the estimation
simply rises high enough to accommodate the unconditional standard deviation.
I constrain the persistence of the inﬂation target to follow nearly a random walk with
rp = 0.99, consistent with the idea that the target is highly persistent. The assumption
that rp < 1 ensures that inﬂation is stationary so that there is a steady-state around which
we can approximate. The priors over the shares of the variances of the inﬂation target and
risk aversion coming from the other shocks are uniform.
3.5.3 Posterior modes
Table 3.1 lists the posterior modes for the parameters along with the 5th and 95th per-
centiles of the posterior distribution. Many of the posterior modes are reasonably close to
the corresponding prior means. I focus mainly on those parameters that differ from the
prior or are unique to this model.
The prior for the variance of the innovations to the inﬂation target favors a reason-
ably low standard deviation, but the posterior seems to want a highly volatile target—the
115Table 3.1: Priors and posterior modes
Estimates
Description Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mode 5% 95% from JPT
1 α Capital share Normal 0.3 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.17
2 ιp Price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.39 0.21 0.56 0.24
3 ιw Wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.77 0.66 0.88 0.11
4 100γ Mean technology growth Normal 0.5 0.25 0.48 0.43 0.52 0.48
5 η Habit parameter Beta 0.5 0.1 0.52 0.32 0.71 0.78
6 λp Mean price markup Normal 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.18 0.23
7 λw Mean wage markup Normal 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.24 0.15
8 LSS Mean log hours per capita Normal 6.7 0.2 6.75 6.71 6.79 N/A
9 πSS Mean quarterly inflation Normal 0.5 0.1  0.20  0.90 0.74 0.71
10 100(β
 1 1) Discount factor Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.28 0.21 0.47 0.13
11 ν Inverse Frisch elasticity Gamma 2 0.75 1.83 1.16 2.87 3.79
12 ξp Price adjustment frequency Beta 0.66 0.1 0.67 0.60 0.71 0.84
13 ξw Wage adjustment frequency Beta 0.66 0.1 0.67 0.57 0.72 0.7
14 χ Capital utilization costs Gamma 5 1 5.08 3.23 7.19 5.3
15 S Investment adjustment costs Gamma 4 1 4.96 3.16 6.71 2.85
16 fπ Taylor rule inflation Normal 1.7 0.3 1.89 1.51 2.51 2.09
17 fy Taylor rule output gap Gamma 0.125 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.07
18 f y Taylor rule output gap growth Normal 0.125 0.05 0.25 0.21 0.30 0.24
19 ρR Interest rate smoothing Beta 0.6 0.2 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.82
20 ρz Technology shock AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.20 0.09 0.31 0.23
21 ρg Government spending AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
22 ρ  Investment technology AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.50 0.34 0.67 0.72
23 ρλp Price markup AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.95 0.92 0.97 0.94
24 ρλw Wage markup AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97
25 ρb Consumption demand shock AR Beta 0.6 0.2 0.77 0.70 0.80 0.67
26 ρmp Monetary policy AR Beta 0.4 0.2 0.19 0.09 0.30 0.14
27 θp Price markup MA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.16 0.02 0.39 0.77
28 θw Wage markup MA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.91
29 σR MP shock vol. IG(1) 0.1 1 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.22
30 σz Neutral tech. shock vol. IG(1) 0.5 1 0.80 0.69 0.97 0.88
31 σg Gov't spending vol. IG(1) 0.5 1 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.35
32 σ  Investment tech. vol. IG(1) 0.5 1 6.21 3.76 9.39 6.03
33 σλp Price markup vol. IG(1) 0.1 1 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.14
34 σλw Wage markup vol. IG(1) 0.1 1 0.35 0.30 0.43 0.2
35 σb Demand shock vol. IG(1) 1 1 0.41 0.29 0.63 0.04
36 σπ* Inflation target vol. IG(1) 0.1 0.1 0.33 0.28 0.41 N/A
37 σπ*,mp MP var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58 0.39 0.19 0.48 N/A
38 σπ*,z z var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58  0.16  0.26  0.12 N/A
39 σπ*,g g var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.01 N/A
40 σπ*,  mu var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58 0.01 0.00 0.04 N/A
41 σπ*,λp Price shock var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58  0.04  0.10  0.01 N/A
42 σπ*,λw Wage shock var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58  0.06  0.12  0.01 N/A
43 σπ*,b b var. shr. in pi* U[ 1,1] 0 0.58 0.28 0.18 0.40 N/A
44 σα/αSS RRA volatility/RRA mean Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 0.83 0.99 N/A
45 σα,z z var. shr. in RRA U[ 1,1] 0 0.58 0.00  0.03 0.05 N/A
46 ρα RRA persistence U[ 1,1] 0.5 0.29 0.77 0.72 0.83 N/A
47 ρ Inverse EIS U[ 1,1] 0.5 0.29 0.76 0.51 0.90 1
48 αSS  Mean risk aversion Normal 15 5 18.70 13.42 26.57 1
49 σyields Bond measurement errors (bp) IG(1) 13 33 8.20 7.66 8.96 N/A
Priors Posterior
Note: Priors, posterior mode, and percentiles of the posterior distribution from the benchmark model. The far right column reports the 
parameters from JPT, where applicable. 
116estimated standard deviation of the innovations to the annualized inﬂation target is 1.3
percent. This helps the model capture the observed volatility of the level factor in bond
yields, but it is implausibly high.
The shock to the level of labor-neutral technology has an important effect on the in-
ﬂation target, accounting for 16 percent of the variance of its innovations. Following a
positive innovation to technology, the central bank is estimated to lower its inﬂation tar-
get, consistent with the idea that following beneﬁcial supply shocks that drive inﬂation
downward, the central bank takes the opportunity to drive inﬂation lower persistently
(e.g. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005). This mechanism will turn out to be critical to
the main results.
The labor-neutral technology shock has a standard deviation of 0.72 and an autocorre-
lation of 0.22. The permanent component of the technology process (the Beveridge–Nelson
trend) thus has a standard deviation of 1.00, which is similar to the values often calibrated
intheproduction-basedassetpricingliterature(e.g. Gourio, 2010, andDew-Becker, 2011a).
The estimated long-run variance of technology growth is far smaller than the value cali-
brated in the long-run risks literature (e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004, and Kaltenbrunner
and Lochstoer, 2010), but it is consistent with estimates obtained in JPT and SW and with
simple univariate estimates from consumption and output data.
The standard deviation of the investment technology shock is far larger than the prior,
which is also consistent with JPT, showing that innovations that are isolated to the invest-
ment sector may play a large role in ﬂuctuations. Alternatively, it could mean that the
model simply matches investment poorly.
The estimates imply that there is essentially zero correlation between innovations to
technology and innovations to risk aversion. This runs against the theory from Dew-
Becker (2011a), and implies that the price of risk in bond markets is driven by some fac-
tor other than permanent innovations to household consumption. Intuitively, part of the
source of this result is that the price of risk is measured to be high in recessions, but over
the 1983–2004 period, productivity growth has been only weakly procyclical, and in fact
rose substantially in the 2000 recession.
As in JPT, the government spending shock is estimated to follow nearly a unit root,
117explaining the trend in the consumption-output ratio over the sample. The wage markup
shock also follows nearly a unit root, which helps capture the strong trend in hours worked
per capita seen in ﬁgure 3.1.
In general, my parameter estimates are reassuringly similar to the values from JPT re-
ported in the far-right column of table 3.1, even though I use a different sample period
(post-1983 versus post-war) and extra data on bond yields. The main place where my es-
timates seem to differ from JPT is in price and wage determination. My estimates imply
that wages are strongly indexed to inﬂation, whereas JPT estimate little indexation. The
wage-markup shock is also substantially more volatile under my estimates than JPT. In-
terestingly, when bond prices are dropped from the estimation, I obtain values for wage
indexation and the volatility of the wage markup shock that are much closer to JPT. This
suggests that wage dynamics are important for matching the term structure. I also esti-
mate a smaller inverse Frisch elasticity and a lower average price markup. In both cases,
my estimates bring the model in closer to the priors and micro estimates.
3.6 Asset pricing
This section studies the asset-pricing implications of the model. I ﬁrst analyze the ﬁt
of the model to the term structure and show that it is competitive with a non-structural
model. Next, I decompose the variance of the SDF to understand the source of the posi-
tive term premium in the model. I then analyze the prices of other assets, including the
aggregate capital stock and a claim to aggregate proﬁts.
3.6.1 Bond prices
3.6.1.1 Fitted yields
Figure 3.2 plots the deviations of the ﬁtted yields from their actual values for the ﬁve
yields that are assumed to be measured with error (reported in annualized basis points).
The estimated standard deviation of these ﬁtting errors is 8 basis points, which is econom-
ically small compared to the overall variation of the yields that is on the order of hundreds
118of basis points. The errors are all centered around zero, meaning that the model can cap-
ture the shape of the term structure on average. The volatility of the errors looks somewhat
higherforthe1and5-yearyieldsandintheearlierpartofthesample. Thereisclearlysome
autocorrelation in the errors; the ﬁtted value for the 3-year yield is consistently too high in
the ﬁrst half of the sample, and the 4-year ﬁtted yield is consistently too low in the second
half, for example. And there is also some cross-correlation in the errors; the ﬁrst principal
component explains 37 percent of the total variance of the errors (twice what it would if the
errors were orthogonal). These are thus clearly not classical (i.i.d.) measurement errors,
but their small mean and volatility shows that the model does a reasonable job of ﬁtting
the data, and they are not disturbingly far from white noise.
While there nine unobservable shock processes that can help us match the data, the
model is asked to ﬁt 13 data series, so obtaining a good ﬁt for the bond yields is not triv-
ial. Loosely, we have 6 macro variables that identify 6 shock processes, plus three extra
processes (the monetary policy shock, the inﬂation target, and risk aversion) that can be
used to ﬁt the bond yields. The degrees of freedom here are thus comparable to a non-
structural bond-pricing model with three unobservable factors, but we also have numer-
ous constraints on dynamics and risk prices. Table 3.2 lists the standard deviation of the
yield errors in basis points obtained from regressing the bond yields on their ﬁrst three
principal components. The standard deviations are all between 4 and 8 basis points. I
force the structural model to match the 1-quarter and 10-year yields exactly, and the re-
maining yields have errors with standard deviations of 8 basis points. The ﬁt of the model
to the yields is thus comparable to a non-structural model with three unobservable factors
that have completely unrestricted dynamics.
The third and fourth rows of table 3.2 report the measurement errors in constrained
models that assume constant relative risk aversion and a constant inﬂation target (the
other parameters are reesetimated). In both cases, the measurement errors have standard
deviations roughly three times larger than the benchmark model, giving a measure of the
improvement in ﬁt generated by the benchmark model.
Figure 3.2 and table 3.2 show that the model is able to provide a very close ﬁt to bond
yields in the data. The quality of the ﬁt is essentially identical to the that of a purely non-
119F
i
g
u
r
e
3
.
2
:
B
o
n
d
y
i
e
l
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
N
o
t
e
:
 
e
a
c
h
 
a
x
i
s
 
p
l
o
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
n
d
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
.
 
E
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
K
a
l
m
a
n
-
f
i
l
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
 
m
o
d
e
.
-
3
0
-
2
0
-
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
Y
i
e
l
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
(
b
a
s
i
s
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
)
1
-
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
2
-
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
3
-
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
4
-
y
e
a
r
-
3
0
-
2
0
-
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
Y
i
e
l
d
 
e
r
r
o
s
r
 
(
b
a
s
i
s
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
)
5
-
y
e
a
r
120Table 3.2: Fitting Errors
1 quarter 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 10 year
PCA 4.54 7.32 6.29 4.26 6.20 7.98 6.53
Benchmark model 0 8.12 8.12 8.12 8.12 8.12 0
Constant RRA 0 23.30 23.30 23.30 23.30 23.30 0
Constant π* 0 23.87 23.87 23.87 23.87 23.87 0
Note: Fitting errors measured in annualized basis points. The model based estimates use the posterior 
modal estimate for the standard deviation. The 1 quarter and 10 year errors are constrained to equal zero in 
the structural model. The errors from PCA are the standard deviations of the residuals from regressions on 
the bond yields on their first three principal components.
121structural model.
3.6.1.2 Steady-state yields
Another way to evaluate the ﬁt of the model is to ask whether the steady state of the
model matches the average term structure in the data. Looking at the steady state keeps
the Kalman ﬁlter from using large deviations in the unobservable state variables to ﬁt
the term structure. Figure 3.3 plots the average term structure in the sample along with its
model-impliedsteady state. The solidblack linegives thesteady-state termstructure inthe
model, renormalized so that the ten-year yield matches the empirical ten-year yield.7 To
capture the uncertainty in the empirical term structure, the grey area gives the 95-percent
conﬁdence intervals for the means of the empirical yields relative to the ten-year yield
(i.e. the conﬁdence intervals for the spreads; the intervals are calculated using the Newey–
West method with lag a 6-quarter lag window). What ﬁgure 3.3 shows is that the model
matches the spread between the 10 and 2-year yields, but it does not match the curvature
of the term structure below two years. However, all of the model-implied yields are within
the 95 conﬁdence intervals. One potential explanation at the very short end of the yield
curve is that there is a small liquidity premium that the model is not incorporating.
We will see that two features of the model are critical for generating the large steady-
state term premium: ﬁrst, following a positive shock to technology, the Fed’s inﬂation
target falls; second, variation in risk aversion raises the premia on risky assets. To see the
prima facie evidence that these two effects are key, ﬁgure 3.3 includes two lines giving the
steady-state term structure in constrained models. The ﬁrst line assumes that innovations
to the inﬂation target are uncorrelated with the permanent technology shock, while the
second line assumes that risk aversion is ﬁxed. Neither line reestimates the other parame-
ters, so they simply isolate the effects of those two features of the model.
The line exiting the top of the chart is for the model when shocks to technology are
assumed to have no impact on the inﬂation target. We then obtain the usual result that the
term structure is downward-sloping, and the steady-state term spread is -261 basis points.
7 I use this normalization because the estimated inﬂation target is above zero through most of the sample.
The unconditional varianceof the inﬂation target is sufﬁcientlyhigh that its average level isnot well identiﬁed.
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123Time-varying risk aversion also turns out to be important, though. When risk aversion is
ﬁxed, the term structure is still upward-sloping, but the spread is quantitatively small—
only 63 basis points in steady-state, compared to 207 in the data and 152 in the benchmark
model.
3.6.1.3 Term premia
The size of the steady-state term spread in the model can be interpreted as the average
term premium—it is the excess return (in logs) that an investor earns in expectation by
buying a long-term bond and holding it to maturity instead of buying short-term bonds
and rolling them over for the same amount of time. An important feature of this model is
that risk aversion varies over time, which should make the term premium also vary over
time.
The top panel of ﬁgure 3.4 plots the expected annualized excess return on holding
a ten-year nominal bond (over a one-quarter bond) from the benchmark model against
the expected excess return from a regression of bond returns on the Cochrane–Piazzesi
(CP) factor. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) argue that a tent-shaped factor in forward yields
summarizes the price of risk in the term structure, so their factor can be viewed as a simple
non-structural benchmark for return forecasting.
The structural forecast is highly correlated (34 percent) with the ﬁtted value using the
CP factor, and its standard deviation is roughly 20 percent larger. The two series rise
by similar amounts in the two recessions in the sample, but the benchmark model also
implies that the term premium rose in 1988 and 1999, whereas the CP factor is stable in
those episodes.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 3.4 plots the term premium against the term spread. The
term premium is deﬁned as the spread between the 10-year yield and the average of the
expected 1-quarter yields over the life of a 10-year bond. The variance of the term pre-
mium is non-trivial in comparison to the term spread. In the two recessions in the sample,
the increases in the term spread are substantially larger than the movements in the term
premium, but the term premium does rise in both episodes. Interestingly, the movements
124Figure 3.4: Expected returns and the term premium
Note: Top panel gives expected excess returns on a 10-year bond over the following quarter, annualized. Values for the 
Cochrane–Piazzesi are from a linear regression. The term premium in the bottom panel is defined as the gap between the 10-
year nominal yield and the mean of expected 1-quarter yields over the following 10 years.
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125in the term spread outside of the two recessions seem almost entirely driven by move-
ments in the term premium. In particular, the rises in the term spread in 1984, 1985, 1987,
1996, and 1999 are all associated with increases in the term premium of equal magnitudes.
On the other hand, the inversions of the yield curve in 1989 and 2000, both just prior to
recessions, are associated with only minor declines in risk aversion, and the subsequent
rises in the term spread with similarly small rises in risk aversion.
3.6.1.4 Variation in interest rates
To show how the bond yields respond to the various shocks, ﬁgure 3.5 plots responses
ofalevel, slope, andcurvaturefactortothe9fundamentalshocks. FollowingBekaert, Cho,
and Moreno (2010), the level factor is deﬁned as the average of the 1-quarter and 5 and 10-
year yields; the slope factor is the 10-year/1-quarter term spread; and curvature is the sum
of the 5 and 1-year yields minus twice the 3-year yield. The shocks are orthogonalized in
the sense that the interactions between the inﬂation target and risk aversion and the other
shocks are switched off. So ﬁgure 3.5 shows, for example, the effect of a pure increase in
the level of technology, holding the inﬂation target ﬁxed. The shocks are all unit standard
deviations.
For the level factor, a number of shocks, the monetary policy and time preference
shocks in particular, have important effects at high frequencies. The low-frequency move-
ments, as we would expect, are mainly driven by shifts in the inﬂation target, while risk
aversion also plays a role. Somewhat surprisingly, positive monetary policy shocks, which
raise the short-term interest rate above its Taylor-rule value, are actually associated with
declines in the level factor. The reason is that these shocks drive down expected inﬂation.
So a positive monetary policy shock drives the real interest rate up, but nominal interest
rates actually fall. The response to the time-preference shock is more intuitive: an increase
in Bt is analogous to an increase in patience, so interest rates fall.
The determinants of the slope factor are similar to those for the level factor: monetary
policy and time-preference matter at high frequencies, while risk aversion determines the
dynamics at lower frequencies. An increase in risk aversion increases the term spread,
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127which ﬁts with results on bond return forecasting (Campbell and Shiller, 1988) and the fact
that the term spread forecasts high equity returns (Fama and French, 1989).
3.6.2 Determinants of asset prices
3.6.2.1 The variance of the SDF
An asset’s expected excess return over the real riskless interest rate is determined by
its covariance with the stochastic discount factor. One of the more interesting outputs of
a model as rich as this one is the variance decomposition for the SDF. Table 3.3 reports a
variance decomposition for the SDF at the one-quarter horizon. The variance of the SDF
is essentially entirely driven by the neutral technology and risk aversion shocks. The bar
chart in the bottom panel of table 3.3 decomposes the variance of the SDF into components
coming from the neutral technology shock, the risk aversion shock, and the remaining
shocks combined. The lines at the top of each bar give the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of
the posterior distribution. The 97.5 percentile for the variance share in the SDF for non-
technology and non-risk-aversion shocks is less than 2 percent.
On ﬁrst glance this result might be somewhat surprising, but it is in fact a deep char-
acteristic of models with Epstein–Zin preferences with a high EIS and high risk aversion.
One way to see the source of this ﬁnding is to simply look at the household’s SDF,
Mt+1 = bBt
1  bBt+1
1  bBt
UC,t+1
UC,t
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
(3.46)
For a household with a large EIS, the variance of UC,t+1/UC,t is generally small (at least
with standard preferences). In the case where the household does not have a habit (h = 0),
this term is equal to (Ct+1/Ct)
 r. If the household has an EIS greater than 1, then r is less
than 1 and the variance of UC,t+1/UC,t will be less than the variance of log consumption
growth. A one-percent permanent decline in consumption will raise this term by the factor
1.01r.
The majority of the variance of the SDF is driven by the term
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
. Here, a one-
percent permanent decline in consumption will make this term (approximately) equal to
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1291.01at r. When at  r, as estimated here and in most models with Epstein–Zin prefer-
ences, it is therefore the variation in Vt+1 that determines the behavior of the SDF.
So what determines movements in Vt+1? One way to think about it is to split move-
ments in consumption into permanent and temporary components. A purely temporary
shock to consumption will have a relatively small impact on Vt+1 because the household is
not very averse to shifting consumption over time. A permanent shock to consumption, on
the other hand, will tend to shift Vt+1 by an equal amount. Risk aversion shocks also affect
Vt. The reason is simply that increases in risk aversion directly drive Vt+1 down because
households are more averse to the future uncertainty that they face. Since it is the shocks
to Vt+1 that determine the movements in Mt+1, we should thus not be surprised that it is
mainly the neutral technology and risk aversion shocks that drive the variance of the SDF.
3.6.2.2 Impulse responses
Since the technology and risk aversion shocks are the key to understanding the pricing
kernel, it is natural to ask how they affect the economy. Figure 3.6 plots impulse responses
to an increase in labor-neutral technology and a decrease in risk aversion. Dotted lines give
95-percentcredibleintervals(therangebetweenthe2.5and97.5percentilesintheposterior
distribution). These impulse responses are different from those in ﬁgure 3.5 because they
do not turn off the interactions between the inﬂation target and risk aversion and the other
shocks. The idea is that we want to see what happens on average following these two
shocks, since that behavior is what is relevant for understanding the correlations with the
SDF.
Following the technology shock, inﬂation falls, while output and real interest rates
rise: a standard positive supply shock. The declines in inﬂation and nominal interest rates
are especially pronounced and persistent. This behavior is the result of the fact that the
estimatesimplythattheinﬂationtargetfallsfollowinganincreaseintechnology. However,
note that inﬂation falls more than the inﬂation target does, so the effect is not entirely
driven by the inﬂation target.
A similar result is obtained in JPT and SW, even though they do not have time-varying
130Figure 3.6: Responses to technology and risk-aversion shocks
Note: responses in percentage points to a unit standard deviation positive shock to labor-neutral technology and a negative shock to risk aversion. Interest rate, 
inflation, and inflation target are annualized. Dotted lines give 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles from the posterior distribution
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131inﬂation targets. In all of these models, because prices are sticky, when there is a positive
supply shock, rather than cutting prices, ﬁrms simply produce the same quantity as previ-
ously, thereby reducing employment and hence demand. Positive technology shocks are
thus associated with small increases in output and large declines in the output gap (de-
ﬁned as the difference between output and the level it would take if prices were ﬂexible).
There is also a small empirical literature that provides more reduced-form evidence on
effects of this sort using direct measures of technology (e.g. Basu, Fernald, and Kimball,
2006).
The slow response of output to a technology shock is particularly notable. The impulse
response function in ﬁgure 3.6 suggests that output and perhaps also consumption growth
should be predictable and positively autocorrelated, though other shocks could obscure
those relationships. Figure 3.7 therefore plots the empirical and model-predicted autocor-
relation functions for consumption and output growth. For output, the model implies that
the 1-quarter autocorrelation should be 0.50, while it is only 0.33 in the data. But 0.50 is
well within the 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the empirical value. In fact, nearly the
entire autocorrelation function for output in the model is captured within the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval in the data.
Themodelalsoimpliesstrongone-quarterautocorrelationinconsumptiongrowth, and
the autocorrelation is in fact higher than the upper end of the 95 percent conﬁdence in-
terval. However, this autocorrelation dies out very rapidly, and at lags longer than one
quarter the autocorrelation of consumption growth in the model matches the behavior in
the data well. The model implies little or no serial correlation in consumption and output
growth at horizons longer than two quarters.
Figure 3.6 also reports impulse responses for a decline in risk aversion. Inﬂation, in-
terest rates, and the output gap all rise. This shock therefore takes the form of a classic
demand shock. The effects are far smaller than those for the technology shock. Risk aver-
sion has two main channels through which it affects the real economy. First, to the extent
that physical investment is risky, a decline in risk aversion makes households more will-
ing to purchase physical capital. Second, a decline in precautionary saving demand makes
households want to consume more for any given level of interest rates. For this model,
132Figure 3.7: Empirical and model-implied autocorrelations
Notes: Empirical and model-implied autocorrelation functions. Gray regions are 95-percent confidence intervals
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133the increase in consumption demand dominates, which is why the shock is slightly expan-
sionary.
3.6.2.3 Other asset prices
Variance decompositions After the SDF, table 3.3 reports variance decompositions for the
returns on a number of assets. The bottom panel of table 3.3 reports the fraction of the
variance of the one-quarter innovation to each return coming from the neutral technology
shock, the risk aversion shock, and all other shocks combined.
Column 2 reports the variance decomposition for the return on the utility portfolio. 87
percent of its variance comes from the time-preference shock. The reason is simply that the
utility claim has a relatively long duration, like that of a consol with a coupon that grows
at the average rate of the economy, so shifts in real interest rates have a large effect on its
price. The time-preference shock mainly affects real interest rates, so it drives the variance
of the utility claim. Row 11 shows that the correlation of the utility return with the SDF is
-0.14
More interestingly, the third and fourth columns of table 3.3 report variance decompo-
sitionsforaclaimonaggregateproﬁtsandthesameclaimleveredtwotooneonshort-term
nominal debt.8 Once again, little of the variance of the return is driven by the technology
or risk aversion shocks. While the neutral technology shock does play a role, it is relatively
small; the vast majority of the variation is driven by shifts in the rate of time preference due
to its effects on real interest rates. Assuming that equity is levered on nominal riskless debt
does not change this result because the returns on nominal bonds are generally unaffected
by the time-preference shock. However, column 5 shows that if equity claims are levered
on real debt, then they because highly correlated with the pricing kernel, and the model
can actually generate a large equity premium (though one that is still too small by half).
The reason is that when the ﬁrm is levered on real bonds, the effects of time-preference
shocks on the unlevered dividend claim and real bond prices cancel each other out.
8 The proﬁts are those earned by the intermediate-good producers, Yt  WtNt.
134Zero-coupon claims Lettau and Wachter (2007, 2011) argue that the value premium can
be explained if value stocks have relatively short durations and the term structure of
zero-coupon consumption (or dividend) claims is downward-sloping. Figure 3.8 plots the
steady-state term structures for zero-coupon nominal bonds, inﬂation indexed bonds, and
consumption claims (with the yields normalized to zero at the 1-quarter horizon). For the
zero-couponconsumptionclaims, ﬁgure3.8plotsthesteady-statevaluesof

 log

PC
j,t/EtCt+j

/j

,
where PC
j,t is the price on date t of an asset that pays one unit of consumption date t + j.

 log

PC
j,t/EtCt+j

/j

is the average per-period discount rates applied to assets that pay
a unit of consumption at date t + j.
To understand the results in ﬁgure 3.8, ﬁrst note that the real term structure is down-
ward sloping for the usual reason: a positive technology shock (which drives the majority
ofthevarianceoftheSDF)drivesthemarginalproductofcapitalupwardandraisesrealin-
terest rates. So the prices of real bonds are low in good times, which induces a downward-
sloping real term structure. This effect will also apply to the consumption claims since
they are real claims and are discounted (partly) with real interest rates. However, there is
a second effect – positive technology shocks raise the expected level of consumption in the
future, which means that the consumption claims have a high payoff in good times. In the
present setting, the latter effect is slightly stronger, inducing the small upward slope in the
term structure for consumption claims.
3.6.2.4 The Hansen–Jagannathan bound
Figure 3.9 plots the ﬁtted quarterly Hansen–Jagannathan (HJ) bound against the nomi-
nal term spread. The estimated steady-state level of the HJ bound – 0.24 – is almost identi-
caltotheobservedSharperatioontheaggregatestockmarketinthissampleof0.26. Thisis
notable given that equities were not included in the estimation and nominal bonds do not
achieve the HJ bound. Perhaps more importantly, though, the price of risk in this model
is highly volatile. The estimated standard deviation of the Hansen–Jagannathan bound
is 95 percent of its mean. The level of variability here is somewhat higher than but still
similar to that used in Dew-Becker (2011a) to match the degree of predictability observed
135F
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136for aggregate stock returns in the post-war sample.
3.7 The real economy
Up to now, the analysis has focused mainly on asset pricing. But the model gives a
rich description of the real side of the economy. While I leave a deeper analysis of New
Keynesian models to papers focused on those models for their own sake, the interaction of
the real side of the economy with asset prices is important to this paper.
Figure 3.10 gives a variance decomposition for the variables used in the estimation.
The ﬁgure decomposes the variance of each variable at frequencies of 6 to 32 quarters into
components coming from each of the structural shocks.9 Except for investment growth, for
which the investment-speciﬁc shock is completely dominant, none of the other variables
examined in ﬁgure 3.10 are dominated by any particular shock. Notably, the shock to risk
aversion has almost no effect on the variance of any of the real variables at business-cycle
frequencies. Its largest effect is on consumption growth, for which the variance share is
still only 4 percent. The far-right bar, though, shows that risk aversion has a large effect on
the term spread, as we saw in ﬁgure 3.5; it explains roughly 1/3 of the variance of the term
spread at business-cycle frequencies.
The variance decomposition reported in the top panel of ﬁgure 3.10 is rather different
from that reported by JPT. They found that the investment shock was an important deter-
minant of not only investment, but also output and consumption growth at business-cycle
frequencies. Their model differs from mine in three ways: risk aversion and the inﬂation
target are constant, the preference speciﬁcation is slightly different (log utility and additive
habits), and the data sample covers the entire post-war period and only includes the one-
quarter nominal interest rate. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 3.8 removes a number of those
differences. It drops bond yields (except the short rate) from the estimation and assumes
9 The variance decomposition is calculated using a spectral decomposition of the state-space form of the
model. Speciﬁcally, since the structural shocks are orthogonal, the spectral density of the endogenous vari-
ables is equal to the sum of the densities obtained when each shock is turned on individually. Calculating
variance shares over certain frequencies then simply requires integrating the density over those frequencies. I
numerically integrate by calculating the spectral density at 100 increments between wavelengths of 6 and 32
quarters.
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138Figure 3.10: Variance decompositions at business-cycle frequencies
Note: each section of a bar represents a fraction of the variance of one of the series at frequencies between 6 and 32 quarters. 
The top panel gives results for the benchmark model. The bottom panel report results where the inflation target and risk 
aversion are fixed and bond prices are dropped from the estimation. That latter model is identical to JPT except that it uses 
post-1983 data and uses Epstein–Zin preferences.
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139the inﬂation target and coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion are constant. The model is then
reestimated.
While I do not replicate JPT’s results exactly, I do also ﬁnd that the investment tech-
nology shock is important for more variables than just investment itself. It accounts for 30
percent of the variation in output growth and 20 percent of consumption growth. More-
over, it accounts for 41 and 48 percent of the variance of the one-quarter nominal interest
rate and the term spread, respectively. It is this latter result that explains the divergence
between the two models. Since long-term bond prices are included in the estimation of the
benchmark model, that model is forced to match the relationship between investment and
the term spread. The difference in the variance decompositions suggests that JPT gets this
relationship wrong. What is interesting, though, is that when the model is forced to match
long-term bond yields, that also changes the decomposition for other variables.
Table 3.3 gives one-quarter-ahead variance decompositions for output, consumption,
and investment growth. This decomposition is useful for understanding whether any of
these variables would be powerful asset pricing factors. Speciﬁcally, in a world where
consumption followed a random walk and households had Epstein–Zin preferences with
constant relative risk aversion, consumption growth would be perfectly correlated with
the SDF, so it would price assets in the economy.
What table 3.3 shows is that consumption, output, and investment growth are all only
weakly correlated with the SDF at the one-quarter horizon—they all have correlations less
than 16 percent. So asset pricing with only consumption growth will not work well in
this economy. Many asset-pricing studies with Epstein–Zin preferences include both con-
sumption growth and the return on the stock market as pricing factors. If we believe that
the stock market is a claim on aggregate capital, then table 3.3 shows that it will do little to
help with asset pricing as it is also only weakly correlated with the SDF.
3.7.1 Model comparison
The primary difference between the model studied here and JPT is the addition of
time-varying risk aversion and the time-varying inﬂation target. An important question,
140then, is the extent to which those two factors improve the ﬁt of the model to the data.
Clearly, allowing a time-varying inﬂation target will help increase the volatility of long-
term bond yields, and time-varying risk aversion will induce time-varying risk premia.
But it is possible that the data can be well explained with a constant risk premium, or
perhaps there is no need to have a time-varying inﬂation target.
Table 3.4 considers two alternatives to the benchmark model: a version where the in-
ﬂation target is constant, and a version where the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is
constant. It lists two statistics for each model. First, it gives the standard likelihood ratio
used in MLE, i.e. based on log f (yjq, M), the likelihood of the data conditional on the
model and parameters, where y represents the data and q the parameter vector. M denotes
the model choice, i.e. the full model or one of the two restricted versions. log f (yjq, M)
is closely related to the one-step-ahead forecast error of the model. The likelihood ratio
test favors the benchmark over each alternative by a wide margin. One way to see the
source of this rejection is to note that in table 3.2, the measurement errors for bond yields,
essentially a residual variance, are three times higher in the alternative models than the
benchmark. This difference alone is more than sufﬁcient to explain the magnitude of the
likelihood ratios.
The second statistic is the Bayes factor, which is based on the marginal likelihood
conditional only on the model, log f (yjM) (in the economics literature, see Fernandez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2004). I calculate log f (yjM) using the monte carlo chain
as in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).10
The difference in the Bayes factors listed in the bottom row of table 3.4 is similar to
the values obtained under the usual likelihood ratio test. In order to accept the model
with constant risk aversion or a constant inﬂation target, the ratio of the prior probabil-
ity of either of those models to that of the benchmark model would have to be greater
than exp(140). In a statistical sense, then, both the time-varying inﬂation target and time-
varying risk aversion substantially improve the ﬁt of the model.
The last exercise I perform is to compare forecasting power between the structural
10 See also Gelfand and Dey (1994) and Geweke (1999)
141Table 3.4: Model comparison statistics
Constant RRA Constant π*
Likelihood ratio 185.6 183.8
   p value 5.0E 41 1.6E 35
Bayes factor 141.50 142.50 Note: Row 1 gives the marginal likelihood of the data given the model and parameters. Row 
two gives the p value for the frequentist LR test. Row 3 is the Bayes factor, the marginal 
probability of the data conditional on the model (i.e. integrated over the parameter space).
142model and a VAR. Rather than include all 13 of the endogenous variables, I use the 6
macro variables and the ﬁrst three principal components of the bond yields (i.e. I estimate
a FAVAR). I estimate a VAR(2) with the restriction that the macro variables and the interest
rate factors for not interact with eachother (though their innovations may be correlated).
This assumption partly helps to limit the number of free parameters in the VAR, but it
also means that we can compare the forecasting performance of the structural model to
the benchmark models from the macro and asset-pricing literatures.
Figure 3.11 plots root mean squared errors for the forecasts from the VAR(2) and the
structural model. All of the variables are forecasted in levels, rather than differences. Be-
cause the strutural model is so difﬁcult to estimate, I only consider in-sample forecasting
performance. For the macro variables, the structural model has somewhat weaker fore-
casting power than the VAR. The place where the divergence is notable is for inﬂation. At
long horizons, the structural model essentially says that the level factor in interest rates
should equal expected inﬂation since they are both driven by the Fed’s inﬂation target.
Over this sample, however, the level factor fell slowly, while inﬂation fell rapidly in the
early 1980’s and then was low and stable. Forecasting long-term inﬂation with the level
factor in this sample was thus unsuccessful compared to a simple random-walk forecast
for inﬂation (which is basicaly what the VAR implies).
For the bond yields, the structural model forecasts well. At long horizons, the RMSE
generated by the structural model is smaller than the VAR by 10–50 percent, with the
largest improvements coming for long-term bonds.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies bond pricing in a medium-scale New-Keynesian model with a time-
varying price of risk. I show that the model can generate a large and volatile term pre-
mium. The term premium is driven by the combination of two factors—a negative re-
sponse of interest rates to positive technology shocks and variation in risk aversion. Re-
moving either of these effects eliminates the model’s ability to match the magnitude of the
term premium.
143Figure 3.11: Forecast RMSE
Note: Root mean squared error from forecasts of the endogenous variables. All variables are forecasted in levels. 
The horizontal axis gives the forecast horizon in quarters.
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144While shocks to risk aversion and technology determine average asset returns, they
have only weak effects on real variables at business-cycle frequencies. The covariance
of asset returns with real variables over the business cycle is therefore unimportant for
determining average returns. It is true that the Federal Reserve tends to cut interest rates
in recessions, but the model shows that most recessions are not high-marginal-utility states
of the world. So the usual intuition that the Taylor rule should lead to a downward-sloping
yield curve is inaccurate since it does not take into the difference between the shocks that
have high risk prices and the shocks that drive the business cycle.
Furthermore, while risk aversion is estimated to be highly volatile and to be an impor-
tant determinant of the dynamics of the term spread, it has almost no effects on the real
economy. This model thus suggests that there is a separation between the price of risk in
ﬁnancial markets and the real economy.
145APPENDIX
146A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 The approximation for average duration
Now using the investment function from the text, we have
Iit = exp(glog(h1i) + g(mt+1   rt+1) + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di)))
(A.1)
= exp(g(mt+1   rt+1))exp(glog(h1i) + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di)))
(A.2)
Using the deﬁnition of ¯ Dt and the investment function, we have
¯ Dt = å
i
exp(glogh1i + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di)))
åi exp(glogh1i + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di)))
D(di) (A.3)
Now we take a linear approximation to
exp(glogh1i + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di))) (A.4)
around the point
n
logh1,logBt, ¯ d
o
where logh1  åi logh1i, logBt  åi logBit, and ¯ d 
åi di. Also deﬁne
\ log(h1i)  log(h1i)   logh1i
\ log(Bit)  log(Bit)   logBt
ˆ di  di   ¯ d
147We have
exp(glogh1i + glogBit + log(1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)(1  di)))
 exp

glogh1i + glogBit + log
 
1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)
 
1  ¯ d


0
B
@
1+ g \ log(h1i) + g \ log(Bit)
 ˆ di
exp(mt+2 rt+2)
1+exp(mt+2 rt+2)(1 ¯ d)
1
C
A (A.5)
Simple algebra and the observation that
å
i
 
1+ g \ log(h1i) + g \ log(Bit)   ˆ di
exp(mt+2   rt+2)
1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)
 
1  ¯ d

!
= N (A.6)
yields the result
¯ Dt  N 1å
i
0
B
@
1+ g \ log(h1i) + g \ log(Bit)
 
exp(mt+2 rt+2)
1+exp(mt+2 rt+2)(1 ¯ d)
ˆ di
1
C
A Di (A.7)
= N 1å
i

1+ g \ log(h1i) + g \ log(Bit)

Di  
exp(mt+2   rt+2)
1+ exp(mt+2   rt+2)
 
1  ¯ d
N 1å
i
ˆ diDi
(A.8)
The term N 1 åi

1+ g \ log(h1i)

Di is constant over time, and we thus have the desired
result from the text.
A.2 Further robustness tests
This section describes table A.1, which has extra robustness tests for the regressions of
¯ D on the term spread and other controls. Column 1 includes up to three lags of the term
spread. The second lag enters signiﬁcantly, and with a coefﬁcient slightly larger than the
ﬁrst lag. This sort of lagged response to price changes is commonly found in the litera-
ture. It is generally interpreted as being due to planning and delivery lags. The second
column includes every one of the other controls simultaneously, instead of individually as
in tables 2 and 3. The result is that the coefﬁcients on the various other controls all become
marginally signiﬁcant at best, while the term spread is still highly signiﬁcant. There is thus
148Figure A.1: Further robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Spread(t-1) -0.23 ** -0.40 *** -0.46 *** -0.57 ***
[0.10] [0.06] [0.08] [0.09]
Term Spread(t-2) -0.24 *** -0.27 ***
[0.08] [0.08]
Term Spread(t-3) 0.11 0.12
[0.09] [0.07]
Unemployment(t-1) 0.18 0.02
[0.19] [0.20]
GDP(t) -0.05 0.02
[0.12] [0.13]
GDP(t-1) 0.36 *** 0.55 * -0.24
[0.10] [0.26] [0.22]
Investment(t) -0.08 -0.24
[0.17] [0.16]
Investment(t-1) -0.12 0.06
[0.21] [0.19]
SD_returns(t+1) -0.23 ** -0.19 ** -0.28 ***
[0.09] [0.09] [0.07]
SD_returns(t) 0.15 **
[0.07]
SD_returns(t-1) -0.08
[0.05]
N 59 47 47 45
R2 0.48 0.74 0.69 0.56
Note: See tables 2 and 3.
something different about the term spread from all of the other business cycle, volatility,
and investment controls. Column 3 is identical to column 2 except it only uses one lag of
the term spread, and the coefﬁcient is still signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Finally, column 4 includes the current and lagged values of volatility instead of just the
leading value. The leading value has a negative sign, indicating that high future volatility
lowers duration today (consistent with a model of irreversible investment). The current
value has a positive sign. One way to reconcile this is if the volatility variable should
actually enter as a ﬁrst difference: an increase in volatility lowers average duration, instead
of a high value by itself. The lagged level of volatility is uncorrelated with ¯ Dt.
149B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 The certainty equivalent
This section looks at the relationship between the certainty equivalents using Ghabit
and GTV. I ﬁrst show that the two certainty equivalents are equal up to a second order
approximation around the non-stochastic version of the model. Next, I show that in the
continuous-time limit, the preferences associated with the two certainty equivalents are
identical.
B.1.1 Second-order approximation
This section approximates the certainty equivalent G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))) where Vt+1 =
Vt  (1+ s#t+1) around the point s = 0. We assume that Et#t+1 = 0 and Et#2
t+1 = 1.
Now consider the derivative of G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))) with respect to s,
d
ds
G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))) =
d
dsEt (G(Vt+1))
G0 (G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))))
(B.1)
We have
d
ds
Et (G(Vt+1)) =

G0 (Vt (1+ s#t+1))#t+1VtdF(#t+1) (B.2)
where F is the cdf of #t+1. Evaluated at s = 0, d
dsEt (G(Vt+1)) = 0, and therefore
d
ds
G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))) = 0 (B.3)
So all certainty equivalents taking this form are identical up to the ﬁrst order in approxi-
mations around s.
150Next, consider the second derivative,
d2
ds2G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))) =

G0  
G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1)))
 d2
ds2Et (G(Vt+1))
 
h
d
dsEt (G(Vt+1))
ih
d
dsG0  
G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1)))
i
[G0 (G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))))]
2 (B.4)
Since d
dsEt (G(Vt+1)) is equal to zero at s = 0, we can ignore the second term in the nu-
merator. The second derivative of the expectation is
d2
ds2Et (G(Vt+1)) =

G00 (Vt (1+ s#t+1))#2
t+1V2
t dF(#t+1) (B.5)
At s = 0, d2
ds2Et (G(Vt+1))
 

s=0
= G00 (Vt)V2
t . We also have G0  
G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1)))
 
s=0 =
G0 (Vt), and hence d2
ds2G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1)))

 
s=0
=
G00(Vt)V2
t
G0(Vt) . So any two choices of G, say G1
and G2 are equivalent up to the second order if
G00
1(Vt)
G0
1(Vt) =
G00
2(Vt)
G0
2(Vt) for any Vt. That relationship
holds for Ghabit and GTV.
B.1.2 Continuous time
Dufﬁe and Epstein (1992) show how to extend Epstein–Zin preferences to continuous
time. They derive a utility function following the process
dVt = mt + stdBt (B.6)
=

 f (ct,Vt)  
1
2
A(Vt)sts0
t

dt + stdBt (B.7)
for a Wiener process dBt.
As in the main text, suppose the household’s certainty equivalent under discrete-time
Epstein–Zin preferences is G 1 (Et (G(Vt+1))). Dufﬁe and Epstein (1992) show that the
analogous choice of A, obtained as a limiting case as the length of time periods approaches
zero, is A(Vt) =
G00(Vt)
G0(Vt) . In the case where Gpower (Vt) = V1 a
t , we have
Apower (Vt) =
Gpower00 (Vt)
Gpower0 (Vt)
=
 a
Vt
(B.8)
151and for Ghabit = (Vt   Ht)
1 a
Ahabit (Vt) =
 a
Vt   Ht
(B.9)
For GTV = V
1 at
t ,
ATV (Vt) =
 at
Vt
(B.10)
So GTV and Ghabit are identical if at = a Vt
Vt Ht, which is what is used in the text.
For all three choices of the certainty equivalent G, we can use the standard choice for
f, f (ct,Vt) =
b
1 r
c
1 r
t  V
1 r
t
V
 r
t
. r then determines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
while A determines risk aversion.
B.2 Derivation of the SDF
We can obtain the stochastic discount factor (SDF) by calculating the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution. We calculate two derivatives. First,
¶Vt
¶Ct
= V
r
t (1  exp( b))C
 r
t (B.11)
Next, we differentiate Vt with respect to Ct+1 (w), where w denotes one state of the world,
and pw is the probability of that state,
¶Vt
¶Ct+1 (w)
= pwV
r
t exp( b) R
 r
t G
( 1)0
t
 (Et [Gt (Vt+1 (w))]) G0
t (Vt+1 (w))V
r
t+1 (w)(1  b)C
 r
t+1 (w) (B.12)
where G0
t is the derivative of Gt and G
( 1)0
t the derivative of G 1
t . Rt  G 1 (EtGt (Vt+1)).
The subscripts on Gt refer to the fact that Gt depends on the potentially-time-varying pa-
rameter at. The assumption that at is exogenous to the household is necessary for this
formula for the derivative to be correct (in the same way that external habits lead to a
more tractable formula for the SDF than do internal habits).
The SDF can be derived from a consumer’s ﬁrst order conditions for optimization as
152Mt+1 (w) = 1
pw
¶Vt/¶Ct+1(w)
¶Vt/¶Ct . We then have
Mt+1 (w) = exp( b)
G0
t (Vt+1 (w))
G0
t (Rt)
V
r
t+1 (w)
R
r
t
C
 r
t+1 (w)
C
 r
t
(B.13)
where the last line follows from the fact that G
( 1)0
t (x) = 1/G0
t (x).
In the case of Gt (V) = V1 at, the SDF becomes
Mt+1 = exp( b)
V
r at
t+1 (w)
R
r at
t
C
 r
t+1 (w)
C
 r
t
(B.14)
B.2.1 Substituting in an asset return
Consider an asset that pays Ct as its dividend. We guess that its cum-dividend price
is Wt = V
1 r
t C
r
t (1  exp( b))
 1. This guess can be conﬁrmed by simply inserting it into
the household’s Euler equation.
The return on the consumption claim is
Rw,t+1 =
Wt+1
Wt   Ct
=
V
1 r
t+1
exp( b) Rt (Vt+1)
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
r
(B.15)
Which yields
V
r at
t+1 (w)
R
r at
t
= (Rw,t+1 exp( b))
r at
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
 r
r at
1 r
(B.16)
We can then insert this into the SDF to yield
Mt+1 = exp( b)
1 at
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
 r
1 at
1 r
R
r at
1 r
w,t+1 (B.17)
B.3 The log-linear model with production
B.3.1 Steady state
In the nonstochastic steady state, the interest rate earned by all assets, r, is equal to
r = b + rm (B.18)
153Standard manipulations show that the steady-state ratio of capital to technology is then
¯ K =

exp(b + rm)   1+ d
g
1/(g 1)
(B.19)
We can obtain the steady-state consumption-output ratio by using the budget constraint,
¯ C = ¯ Y + (1  d) ¯ K   exp(m) ¯ K (B.20)
1 
¯ C
¯ Y
=  (1  d   exp(m))
¯ K
¯ Y
(B.21)
B.3.2 The budget constraint
The approximation I use for the budget constraint is identical to Campbell (1994). The
budget constraint is Kt+1 = AtK
1 g
t  Ct +(1  d)Kt. I look for a log-linear approximation
taking the form kt+1 = l0 + lkkt + laat + lcct, where the l terms are coefﬁcients from the
approximation.
The budget constraint can be rewritten as
log[exp(Dkt+1)   (1  d)] = yt   kt + log(1  exp(ct   yt)) (B.22)
Taking a log-linear approximation to the left-hand side around the point Dkt+1 = m,we
have
log[exp(Dkt+1)   (1  d)]  log[exp(m)   (1  d)] +
exp(m)
exp(m)   (1  d)
(Dkt+1   m)
(B.23)
Toapproximatetheright-handsideof(B.22), weapproximatelog(1  exp(ct   yt)) around
the steady state cy,
log(1  exp(ct   yt))  log(1  exp(cy)) +
 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)
(ct   yt   cy) (B.24)
154This implies
log[exp(m)   (1  d)] +
exp(m)
exp(m)   (1  d)
(Dkt+1   m)  log(1  C/Y) + yt   kt
+
 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)
(ct   yt   cy)
(B.25)
Now we can ﬁnd the coefﬁcients in the linear approximation to the budget constraint. The
constant term is
l0 =
exp(m)   (1  d)
exp(m)

log(1  C/Y)  

 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)

cy

(B.26)
The coefﬁcients on k, a, and c, are then
lk =
exp(m)   (1  d)
exp(m)

g   1  g

 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)

+ 1 (B.27)
la =
exp(m)   (1  d)
exp(m)
(1  g)   (1  g)
exp(m)   (1  d)
exp(m)

 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)

(B.28)
lc =
exp(m)   (1  d)
exp(m)

 exp(cy)
1  exp(cy)

(B.29)
Now note that lk + la + lc = 1, So we have
kt+1 = l0 + lkkt + laat + (1  lk   la)ct (B.30)
B.3.3 Capital return
To approximate the return on capital, we say
rk,t+1 = log(gexp((1  g)(at+1   kt+1)) + 1  d) (B.31)
 log
 
gexp
 
(g   1) ¯ k

+ 1  d

+
(g   1)gexp
 
(g   1) ¯ k
 
kt+1   at+1   ¯ k

gexp
 
(g   1) ¯ k

+ 1  d
(B.32)
rk,t+1  r + rkk
 ˜ kt+1   ¯ k

(B.33)
155where rkk  (g   1)(exp(r)   1+ d)/exp(r)
B.3.4 Risk aversion
I guess that the innovation to the value function van be written as kv#t+1, so that
at+1 = fat + (1  f) ¯ a + lkv#t+1 (B.34)
I conﬁrm this guess below.
B.3.5 Consumption dynamics
Writing ˜ kt  kt   at and ˜ ct  ct   at, we have
˜ kt+1 = l0 + lk˜ kt + lc˜ ct   sa#a,t+1   m (B.35)
Now we guess that the consumption function is ˜ ct = hc0 + hck˜ kt + hcaat (note here that I
use l terms for the budget constraint, which are terms depending only on the underlying
parameters of the model; the h terms are coefﬁcients from the optimal consumption rule).
Then we have
˜ kt+1 = l0 + lk˜ kt + lc
 
hc0 + hck˜ kt + hcaat

  sa#a,t+1   m (B.36)
= hk0 + hkk˜ kt + hkaat   sa#a,t+1 (B.37)
hk0  l0 + lchc0   m
hkk  lk + lchck hka  lchca
This equation speciﬁes the dynamics of capital conditional on the underlying parameters
of the model and the two unknown coefﬁcients determining the dynamics of consumption.
For consumption growth, we say Dct+1 = hd0 + hdk˜ kt + hdaat + kd#t+1, where
hd0  hckhk0   hca (fa   1) ¯ a + m hdk  hck (hkk   1)
kd  sa (1  hck) + hcalkv hda  hckhka + hca (fa   1)
156The remainder of the appendix conﬁrms that our guesses for the form of the consumption
and value functions are correct.
B.3.6 Wealth return
In the presence of balanced growth, the long-run response of consumption to an inno-
vation of sa#t to technology must be exactly sa#t+1. This is equivalent to saying that
DEt+1
¥
å
j=0
Dct+j+1 = sa#t+1 (B.38)
Inthecasewhere q approaches1(thesteady-statedividend/priceratioapproacheszero)or
theconsumptionresponseonlytakesoneperiod, DEt+1 å
¥
j=0 Dct+j+1 = DEt+1 å
¥
j=0 qjDct+j+1.
We therefore have the approximation,
rw,t+1 = Etrw,t+1 + sa#t+1   DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
qjrw,t+j+1 (B.39)
Thisextraapproximationisnotstrictlynecessary, andthemodelisstraightforwardtosolve
without it. However, it substantially simpliﬁes many of the formulas and makes them
more transparent. The results reported below on the accuracy of the log-linear solution
apply to the solution using this approximation.
Now note that
DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
qjrw,t+j+1 = DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
qj  
at+jhwa + rEt+jDct+j

(B.40)
= hwa
q
1  qf
saa + r(hcksa   hcasaa) (B.41)
The second term follows from the approximation
DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
qjrEt+jDct+j  DEt+1
¥
å
j=1
rEt+jDct+j
The right hand side of this equation is simply r multiplied by the total amount of con-
sumption growth expected following period t+1. Since we know that in the long run, the
157consumption-technology ratio is stationary, we just need to know how much consump-
tion declines relative to technology at period t + 1. That’s going to be exactly hcksa#t+1  
hcasaa#t+1 (since capital falls by sa and a falls by  saa).
We then have
kr = sa   hwa
q
1  qf
saa   r(hcksa   hcasaa) (B.42)
The return is thus
rt+1 = hw0 + rEtDct+1 + hwaat + sa#t+1 +

 hwa
q
1  qf
saa +
q
1  qhkk
hdksa

#t+1 (B.43)
B.3.7 The Euler equation for wealth
The asset pricing equation gives us
1 = Et
2
4exp(b)
1 at
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
 r
1 at
1 r
R
1 at
1 r
w,t+1
3
5 (B.44)
The log of the term inside the expectation is
log
2
4exp(b)
1 at
1 r

Ct+1
Ct
 r
1 at
1 r
R
1 at
1 r
w,t+1
3
5 =  
1  at
1  r
b   r
1  at
1  r
Dct+1
+
1  at
1  r
(hw0 + rEtDct+1 + hwaat + kr#t+1) (B.45)
=  
1  at
1  r
b   r
1  at
1  r
kd#t+1
+
1  at
1  r
(hw0 + hwaat + kr#t+1) (B.46)
Now taking the log of the expectation and dividing by 1 at
1 r gives
0 =  b + hw0 + hwaat +
1
2
1  at
1  r
( rkd + kr)
2 (B.47)
158which implies
hw0 = b  
1
2
( rkd + kr)
2
1  r
(B.48)
hwa =
1
2
1
1  r
( rkd + kr)
2 (B.49)
kr = sa   hwa
q
1  qf
saa   r(hcksa   hcasaa) (B.50)
B.3.8 The Euler equation for capital
The stochastic discount factor follows
mt+1 =  b   rEDct+1   r
1  at
1  r
kd#t+1 +
r   at
1  r

1
2
at   1
1  r
( rkd + kr)
2 + kr#t+1

(B.51)
For the capital return we have
1 = Et

exp
 
mt+1 + r + rkk
 
hk0 + hkk˜ kt + hkaat   sa#a,t+1   ¯ k

(B.52)
which implies
0 =  b   rEDct+1 +
1
2
(1  at)
(1  r)
( rkd + kr)
2
+ r + rkk
 
hk0 + hkk˜ kt + hkaat   ¯ k

+
1
2
(rkksa + kr)
2   (rkksa + kr)

1  at
1  r

( rkd + kr) (B.53)
Note that all of the nonlinearities disappear (i.e. the a2
t terms), and this equation is linear
in the state variables. We can thus solve through the method of undetermined coefﬁcients
as usual.
For the coefﬁcients on capital,
0 =  r
 
lkhck + lch2
ck   hck

+ rkk (lk + lchck) (B.54)
159This is quadratic in hkk, and we have
hck =
r(1  lk) + rkklc 
q
(r(1  lk) + rkklc)
2 + 4rlcrkklk
2rlc
(B.55)
Now note that lc < 0, lk > 0, and rkk < 0. This implies that
q
(r(1  lk) + rkklc)
2 + 4rlcrkklk > r(1  lk) + rkklc (B.56)
and hence hck has a positive and a negative root. The root where hck < 0 violates the
transversality condition (high capital implies low consumption), so we choose the root
with hck > 0. Note that the formula for hck does not involve ¯ a or saa, which conﬁrms
remark 1.
For the coefﬁcients on at, we have
0 =  rhda  
1
2
( rkd + kr)
2
1  r
+ rkkhka + (rkksa + kr)
( rkd + kr)
1  r
(B.57)
B.3.9 Other parameters
To solve for ( rkd + kr), simply combine the equations for hwa and kr, yielding
 rkd + kr =
 1+
q
1+ 2 q
1 qfsaasa
1
1 r
q
1 qfsaa
(B.58)
We choose the root for this equation that has the property that it approaches zero as sa
approaches zero. That is, we know that when the shocks have zero variance, all assets
have the same return, and so hwa = 0.
160B.3.10 Excess returns and the risk-free rate (result 2)
To calculate excess returns, we can simply calculate the covariance of the wealth return
with the SDF. The Sharpe ratio of the wealth portfolio is
Etrw,t+1   rf,t+1 + 1
2k2
r
kr
=
at   r
1  r
( rkd + kr) + rkd (B.59)
= (at   r)
 1+
q
1+ 2 q
1 qfsaasa
q
1 qfsaa
+ rkd (B.60)
This also immediately gives a formula for the risk-free rate
Etrw,t+1   rf,t+1 +
1
2
k2
r =
at   r
1  r
( rkd + kr)kr + rkdkr (B.61)
rf,t+1 = hw0 + rEtDct+1 + hwaat
+
1
2
k2
r  
at   r
1  r
( rkd + kr)kr   rkdkr (B.62)
B.3.11 The wealth-consumption ratio
The Campbell–Shiller approximation for the wealth-consumption ratio is
wt   ct =
z
1  q
+ Et
¥
å
j=0
qj  
Dct+j+1   rt+j+1

(B.63)
for a constant z depending on the average consumption-wealth ratio (i.e. related to q),
z   logq   (1  q)log
 1
q   1

. Now
Et
¥
å
j=0
qjDct+j+1 =  hck
 
kt   ¯ k

  hca (at   ¯ a) (B.64)
under the approximation q = 1 from above, and
Et
¥
å
j=0
qjrw,t+j+1 = Et
¥
å
j=0
qj  
at+jhwa + rEt+jDct+j+1

(B.65)
161So
wt   ct =
z
1  q
+ (1  r)
 
 hck
 
kt   ¯ k

  hca (at   ¯ a)

  hwa
q
1  qf
(at   ¯ a) (B.66)
B.3.12 The value function and risk aversion (result 4)
At any time, household value is
Wt = V
1 r
t C
r
t /(1  exp( b)) (B.67)
vt =
(wt   ct)
1  r
+ ct +
log(1  exp( b))
1  r
(B.68)
The innovation to the value function, vt+1   Etvt+1, is equal to the sum of the innovations
to
(wt+1 ct+1)
1 r and ct+1, which are
DEt+1
(wt+1   ct+1)
1  r
+ DEt+1ct+1 = sa#t+1  
hwa
1  r
q
1  qf
saa#t+1 (B.69)
kv = sa#t+1  
q
1  qf
1
2

1
1  r
2
( rkd + kr)
2 saa#t+1
(B.70)
Using the formula from above that deﬁnes ( rkd + kr), we have kv =
( rkd+kr)
1 r and
saa = lkv = l
 1+
q
1+ 2 q
1 qfsaasa
q
1 qfsaa
(B.71)
B.3.13 Afﬁne bond pricing (result 5)
mt+1 =  b   rEDct+1   r
1  at
1  r
kd#t+1 +
r   at
1  r

1
2
at   1
1  r
( rkd + kr)
2 + kr#t+1

(B.72)
162var(mt+1) =

1  at
1  r
( rkd + kr)   kr
2
s2 (B.73)
=
"
1  at
1  r
2
( rkd + kr)
2 + k2
r   2
1  at
1  r
( rkd + kr)kr
#
s2 (B.74)
And hence
rf,t+1 =  

Etmt+1 +
1
2
var(mt+1)

(B.75)
=  
0
B
@
 b   r
 
hd0 + hdk˜ kt + hdaat

+1
2
(1 at)
(1 r) ( rkd + kr)
2 + 1
2k2
r   1 at
1 r ( rkd + kr)kr
1
C
A (B.76)
It is straightforward to show that
mt+1 =  rf,t+1 +

1  at
1  r
( rkd + kr)   kr

#t+1  
1
2

1  at
1  r
( rkd + kr) + kr
2
s2
(B.77)
=  rf,t+1  
1
2
(w0 + w1at)
2 s2 + (w0 + w1at)#t+1 (B.78)
So the SDF takes the essentially afﬁne form with
w0 =
( rkd+kr)
1 r   kr w1 =
 ( rkd+kr)
1 r
B.3.14 Accuracy of the approximation
Table B.1 reports simple statistics summarizing the relationship between the projection
solution and the log-linear approximation to the model. The ﬁrst column lists the mean
difference between the solutions, the second column the standard deviation of the gap,
and the third column the standard deviation of the gap scaled by the standard deviation
of the variable in the projection solution. I report deviations for log capital, log consump-
tion growth, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, and the Sharpe ratio of the wealth
portfolio. For the simulations, both models start with the same initial levels of capital and
risk aversion and use the same technology shocks. I then simulate the models for 20,000
periods.
163Figure B.1: Comparison of results from simulations of projection and log-linear model solutions
Differences: Mean Std. dev.    Scaled std. dev.
Capital -8.72E-04 0.00073 0.020
Cons. Growth 3.16E-08 0.00013 0.028
RRA 1.11E-02 0.75344 0.116
Sharpe Ratio -2.15E-03 0.00892 0.123
Note: Comparison of the projection and log-linear solutions. The two simulations use the same shocks but different 
policy functions. The first column is the mean difference between the simulations, the second column the standard 
deviation, and the third column the standard deviation of the difference scaled by the standard of the variable in the 
projection solution. RRA is relative risk aversion.
164Table B.1 shows that for capital and consumption growth, the log-linear approximation
is nearly identical to the projection solution. The mean differences are essentially zero, and
the standard deviations of the errors are both less than 3 percent of the standard devia-
tions of the variables themselves. For risk aversion and the Sharpe ratio, the log-linear
approximation is essentially identical to the projection solution on average, but the stan-
dard deviation of the differences is now roughly 12 percent of the standard deviation of
the variables themselves.
An alternative method of checking the accuracy of the approximation is to look at
Euler equation errors. Figure A.1 plots histograms of the log10 Euler equation errors,
log10

Et
h
Mt+1

aKa 1
t+1 + 1  d
i
  1

under the projection solution and the log-linear so-
lution at each date in the simulation.
B.4 Details of return forecasting
B.4.1 The method from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
If consumption and wealth are cointegrated, then we have the relationship
ct = zwt + xt (B.79)
where z is a parameter, and xt is a mean-zero, stationary, and not necessarily i.i.d. error
term. If we observed wealth, z and xt could be directly estimated. We do not observe
wealth, though, especially the human component. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) therefore
use the approximation
wt = wat + (1  w)hut (B.80)
where at is asset wealth and hut human wealth. This equation simply says that log aggre-
gate wealth is equal to the sum of log asset and human wealth. Since the level of aggregate
wealth is equal to the sum of the levels of asset and human wealth, the approximation
is valid as long as the shares of asset and human wealth in aggregate wealth are station-
ary not not too variable. The fact that labor’s share of income has been stationary in the
post-war US data makes this assumption reasonable.
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166Finally, we assume that labor income, yt, can be viewed as the dividend from human
wealth and that the dividend/price ratio for human wealth is stationary. That is,
yt = g + hut   mt (B.81)
where g is a parameter and mt is a mean-zero stationary bz,1 term. This implies that
wt = wat + (1  w)yt + (1  w) g + mt (B.82)
ct = zwat + z (1  w)yt + z (1  w) g + zmt + xt (B.83)
since xt + zmt is mean-zero and stationary, regardless of any correlation between xt and
mt, the variables ct, at, and yt are jointly cointegrated. The parameters z, w, and g can be
estimated through standard methods for cointegrated models. As Lettau and Ludvigson
pointout, theestimationisoftheseparametersissuperconsistent, converginglinearlywith
sample size, so these parameters can be taken as known with certainty in any subsequent
analyses (in particular, stock return forecasts).
I follow Lettau and Ludvigson in referring to the cointegrating residual, zmt + xt =
ct   zwat   z (1  w)yt   z (1  w) g as cayt, and I refer to wat + (1  w)  yt as ayt. ayt
is an estimate of total wealth derived from data on consumption, asset wealth, and la-
bor income, taking advantage of an assumed cointegrating relationship between the three
variables. I estimate the parameters using standard maximum likelihood methods.
B.4.2 Sensitivity analysis for return forecasting
The results in section 2.4.2 depend on choices for two parameters – the EIS and the
persistence of risk aversion. Tables B.2 and B.3 report the ratio of the R2 for excess value
to cay for 1, 5, 10, and 20-quarter returns across a variety of choices for the EIS and the
persistence of risk aversion.
Table B.2 varies the EIS between 0.75 and 10. The numbers in bold represent points
where cay outperforms ˆ a. When the EIS is greater than 1, cay only ever outperforms at the
1-quarter horizon, and then only if the EIS is set to 10. With an EIS less than 1, though,
167cay always has an R2 substantially larger that of ˆ a. Moreover, the sign on ˆ a in the return
regressions ﬂips. Intuitively, this is because in the construction of ˆ v, when the EIS is less
than 1, the weight on aggregate wealth is negative. The theory would predict that high risk
aversion is associated with low returns, but with the EIS less than 1, ˆ a and future returns
are actually positively correlated.
Table B.3 presents R2 ratios for the same set of regressions, but now varying the persis-
tence of risk aversion. Across a fairly wide range of autocorrelations, ˆ a outperforms cay
at most horizons. The best performance is found with an annual autocorrelation of 0.9,
which corresponds to f = 0.974. Even with an autocorrelation as low as 0.65 (f = 0.9),
though, ˆ a performs nearly as well as cay. As with the EIS, the place where cay is most
likely to outperform is with 1-quarter returns. Table B4 lists R2s for cay, PE, and ˆ a for pre
and post-1980 samples.
B.4.3 Out-of-sample forecasting regressions
An alternative to the in-sample regressions studied in the main text is out-of-sample
tests of forecasting power. I consider the mean squared forecast bz,1 (MSFE) based tests
from analyzed in Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005) and Clark and West (2007).
Suppose we want to test whether a single variable, xt, forecasts stock returns, rt, against
the null that rt is i.i.d. (the methods used here apply to any null model that is nested; i.e.
they are appropriate for asking whether xt has marginal forecasting power when added
to some other model). The forecast horizon can be any length. Therefore, denote rt,t+j 
å
t+j
t=t rt.
We compare the residuals from the null model, e1t  rt,t+j   ˆ b0,t (for an estimated
constant mean ˆ b0,t using data prior to date t) to the residuals from the alternative model,
e2t,t+j  rt,t+j   ˆ b0,t   ˆ b1,txt+j 1 (where ˆ b1t is a constant regression coefﬁcient estimates on
the data from t = 0 to t = t   1). The samples for the regressions are begun after the ﬁrst
20 percent of the sample.
The measure of the difference in MSFE is
ft,t+j  e2
1t,t+j   e2
2t,t+j +
 
e1t,t+j   e2t,t+j
2 (B.84)
168Figure B.3: Relative R2s for varying EIS
Span EIS=0.1 0.25 0.75 1.25 1.5 2 10
1 quarter 0.39 0.26 0.29 1.07 1.10 1.08 0.96
5 quarters 0.44 0.28 0.29 1.16 1.21 1.21 1.09
10 quarters 0.61 0.42 0.31 1.41 1.49 1.49 1.37
20 quarters 1.28 1.02 0.21 1.92 2.08 2.15 2.09
Note: This table lists the ratio of the R2 for a univariate regression of long-horizon returns on 
estimated risk aversion to the R2 for cay. Values less than 1 are in bold. The span in quartes is listed in 
the left hand column. The top row gives the EIS. The EIS is used to calculate household value and 
risk aversion. 
169Figure B.4: Relative R2s for varying persistence of risk aversion
Span Autocorr.=0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7
1 quarter 0.86 1.27 1.10 0.90 0.75 0.64
5 quarters 1.03 1.44 1.21 0.97 0.78 0.64
10 quarters 1.17 1.73 1.49 1.20 0.99 0.82
20 quarters 1.24 2.24 2.08 1.76 1.48 1.27
Note: This table lists the ratio of the R2 for a univariate regression of long-horizon returns on estimated risk 
aversion to the R2 for cay. Values less than 1 are in bold. The span in quarters is listed in the left hand column. 
The top row gives the annual autocorrelation of risk aversion.
170Figure B.5: R2sfrom pre and post-1980 univariate return forecasting regressions
pre-1980 Estim. RRA cay P/D post-1980 Estim. RRA cay P/D
1q 0.10 0.10 0.03 1q 0.03 0.03 0.03
5q 0.28 0.22 0.25 5q 0.18 0.15 0.08
10q 0.27 0.16 0.27 10q 0.48 0.36 0.19
20q 0.38 0.13 0.39 20q 0.56 0.33 0.29
Note: R2s from univariate regressions of long-horizon stock returns on estimated risk aversion, cay, and the 
price/dividend ratio. The highest value for each horizon and sample is listed in bold.
171Under the null, the MSFE for the e1 model tends to be smaller than the MSFE for the
e2 model because the e2 model has added noise due to the extraneous predictor. Intu-
itively, model e1 correctly imposes the constraint that b1 = 0 under the null. The term
 
e1t,t+j   e2t,t+j
2 is essentially a correction for this effect.
When the forecast horizon is more than a single observation, ft,t+j is serially correlated.
To correct for this, we divide by a consistent estimate of its long-run variance (spectral den-
sity at frequency zero). Following Clark and West (2007), I use the Newey–West measure
with a lag window of 1.5j. Denote this measure of the long-run variance as S
 
ft,t+j

.
The long-run variance corrects for the fact that the forecast bz,1 from overlapping samples
will be serially correlated. Clark and McCracken tabulate the critical values of the statistic

(T   j)å
T j
t=1 ft,t+j

/S
 
ft,t+j

.
In the main text, ˆ a is calculated using full-sample information. In particular, we need to
calculate the cointegrating relationship between consumption, labor income, and ﬁnancial
wealth. We also need to know the average growth rate of value. For the out-of-sample
forecasts, all of those parameters are estimated using only backward-looking information.
The only possible source of look-ahead bias here would be data revisions.
The top panel of ﬁgure B.2 plots the values of the statistics using ˆ at as the predictor
against a null of a constant expected equity for horizons from 1 to 20 quarters. We can
easily reject the null at the 5 percent level at all horizons and at the 1% level for 2–13
quarter horizons.
B.4.3.1 Bootstrapping
A major concern with predictive regressions is that asymptotic distribution theory is
often a poor guide to small-sample behavior. A simple way to deal with that concern is to
use a bootstrap to construct conﬁdence intervals for the test statistics. I construct bootstrap
samples in the following way. I select bootstrap samples of stock returns and growth rates
of consumption, asset wealth, and labor income. I then construct level series for consump-
tion, wealth, and income, and calculate ˆ a using purely backward-looking information as
above. Finally, I construct the test statistic from above for each bootstrapped sample at
172Figure B.6: Out-of-sample test statistics
Note: Out-of-sample test statistics from Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005) based on the reduction in out-of-sample RMSE. 
Estimated risk aversion depends on the cointegrating model used to estimate cay. The top panel tests whether estimated risk 
aversion has marginal forecasting power against a null of a constant-mean model for returns. The cointegrating vector is 
reestimated in each period using only backward-looking information. The bottom panel tests adding estimated risk aversion to a 
null model including a constant and cay and vice versa. 
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173each horizon from 1 to 20 quarters. I bootstrap 10,000 samples of data. The top panel of
ﬁgure B.2 plots the 95th and 99th percentiles of the bootstrapped test statistics, and the
out-of-sample forecasting power is still signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
B.4.3.2 ˆ a versus cay
We can also use the out-of-sample test to ask whether estimated risk aversion forecasts
stock returns better than cay. The null model is now one where stock returns depend on
a constant and the lagged value of cay, and the encompassing alternative adds the lagged
value of ˆ a. The bottom panel of ﬁgure A2 plots the test statistics. At every horizon, we can
reject the null that ˆ a does not improve the forecast using cay at the 5 percent level, and we
can reject the null at the 1 percent level at every horizon longer than 1 quarter.
Figure B.2 also plots the statistic for a test of whether cay has any marginal predictive
power above that of ˆ a. At horizons shorter than 8 quarters, we cannot reject the null
that it does not. At longer horizons, though, there is evidence that both variables contain
important information for forecasting stock returns.
174C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Results from the text
C.1.1 Price of a utility claim and the SDF
The utility claim pays UtU 1
C,t as its dividend. We conﬁrm that its cum-dividend price
is WU,t = V
1 r
t B 1
t U 1
C,t/(1  b) by simply inserting this guess into the Euler equation,
WU,t = UtU 1
C,t + Et [WU,t+1Mt+1] (C.1)
V
1 r
t B 1
t U 1
C,t/(1  b) = UtU 1
C,t + Et
2
6 6
4
V
1 r
t+1 B 1
t+1U 1
C,t+1
(1  b)
b
Bt+1
Bt
UC,t+1
UC,t
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
3
7 7
5
(C.2)
V
1 r
t = (1  b) BtUt + bEt
2
6
6
4V
1 r
t+1
V
r at
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 r at
1 at
3
7
7
5 (C.3)
V
1 r
t = (1  b) BtUt + bEt
h
V
1 at
t+1
i 1 r
1 at (C.4)
The last line shows that the guess for the price of the utility claim was in fact correct, since
the Euler equation is guaranteed to hold.
175Next, we consider the return on the utility claim. We have
RU,t+1 =
V
1 r
t+1 B 1
t+1U 1
C,t+1/(1  b)
V
1 r
t B 1
t U 1
C,t/(1  b)   UtU 1
C,t
(C.5)
=
V
1 r
t 1
V
1 r
t   (1  b) BtUt

Bt+1UC,t+1
BtUC,t
 1
(C.6)
=
V
1 r
t+1
b

EtV
1 at
t+1
 1 r
1 a

Bt+1UC,t+1
BtUC,t
 1
(C.7)
0
B
B
@
V
1 r
t+1

EtV
1 at
t+1
 1 r
1 at
1
C
C
A
r at
1 r
= R
r at
1 r
U,t+1b
r at
1 r

UC,t+1
UC,t
 r at
1 r 
Bt+1
Bt
 r at
1 r
(C.8)
Now substitute the return into the SDF:
Mt+1 = b
Bt+1
Bt
UC,t+1
UC,t
R
r at
1 r
U,t+1b
r at
1 r

UC,t+1
UC,t
 r at
1 r 
Bt+1
Bt
 r at
1 r
(C.9)
= b
1 at
1 r

UC,t+1Bt+1
UC,tBt
 1 at
1 r
R
r at
1 r
U,t+1 (C.10)
This is the formula from the text.
C.1.2 First-order condition for wage setting
0 = E
t
¥
å
k=0
xk
w
"
yt+k
1+ qw
qw

Wt+k (j)
Wt+k
  1+qw
qw Nt+k
Wt+j (j)
  lt+kNt+k (j)
#
(C.11)
= E
t
¥
å
k=0
xk
w

dVt
dNt+k (j)
+
dVt
dCt+k
Wt+k (j)
Pt

(1+ qw)   qw
dVt
dCt+k
Wt+k (j)
Pt

Nt+k (j)
(C.12)
= E
t
¥
å
k=0
xk
w

dVt
dNt+k (j)
(1+ qw) +
dVt
dCt+k
Wt+k (j)
Pt

Nt+k (j) (C.13)
= E
t
¥
å
k=0
xk
w
dVt/dCt+k
dVt/dCt

dVt/dNt+k (j)
dVt/dCt+k
(1+ qw) +
Wt+k (j)
Pt

Nt+k (j) (C.14)
176C.2 Approximation method
This section proceeds as follows. First, I ﬁx notation for a general set of equilibrium
conditions. Next, I describe the speciﬁcs of how to solve for the model’s equilibrium dy-
namics. Third, I show that the essentially afﬁne approximation method delivers bond-
pricing formulas in the essentially afﬁne class of Duffee (2002).
C.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
Denote the vector of the variables in the model (including the exogenous processes) as
Xt. In addition to the various variables described above that track the state of the economy
and the shocks, Xt will include the price/dividend ratio of the utility portfolio, the return
on the utility portfolio, and the marginal utility of consumption. The vector of fundamen-
tal shocks in the model is denoted #t 

#mp,t,#z,t,#b,t,#m,t,#g,t,#p,t,#w,t,#a,t,#p,t

.
The equations determining the equilibrium of the model take the form
0 = G(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) (C.15)
where the expectation operator may appear in the function G.There is one equation for
each variable in the model. The new parameter s is the usual parameter used in perturba-
tion approximations that controls the variance of the shocks. In the true model, s = 1, but
we will consider an approximation around the point s = 0.
The equations G can be divided into two types: those that do not involve taking expec-
tations over the SDF and those that do.
G(Xt,Xt+1,#t+1) =
2
6
4
D(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)
Et [M(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1) F(Xt,Xt+1,s#t+1)]
3
7
5 (C.16)
where D and F arevector-valuedfunctionsand M isthe(scalar-valued)stochasticdiscount
factor. Note that this formulation does not actually restrict F. Speciﬁcally, suppose there
were a set of equilibrium conditions 1 = Eth(xt,xt+1,s#t+1), i.e. that do not involve the
SDF. We could simply say that F(xt,xt+1,s#t+1)  h(xt,xt+1,s#t+1)/M(xt,xt+1,s#t+1).
177Note, though, that in this model, all expectational equations involve the SDF.
For the equations that do not involve the SDF, I use standard perturbation methods
and simply take a log-linear approximation. We approximate D as
0 = log(D(exp(xt),exp(xt+1),s#t+1) + 1) (C.17)
0  d0 + dx ˆ xt + dx0 ˆ xt+1 + d#s#t+1 (C.18)
where the terms d0, dx, dx0, and d# are coefﬁcients from a Taylor-series approximation and
xt  logXt
ˆ xt  logXt   log ¯ X
C.2.2 Linearizing the Euler equations
I now show that if we log-linearize the function F, we can transform (3.40) into a linear
condition that can be solved alongside the remaining equations. Mt+1 will not even be
log-linear in the state variables, but we will be able to state the equilibrium conditions as a
set of linear expectational difference equations.
First, guess that the approximated equilibrium dynamics of the model take the form
ˆ xt+1 = C + Fˆ xt + Ys#t+1 (C.19)
where ˆ xt  log(Xt) log( ¯ X). We conﬁrm in the end that the solution to the approximated
equilibrium conditions actually takes this form. Next, deﬁne the matrices GUC, Gb, and Gr
as matrices that select individual elements of xt such that
ˆ uC,t = GUC ˆ xt, ˆ bt = Gb ˆ xt, ˆ rU,t = Gr ˆ xt (C.20)
wherelower-caseletterswithcircumﬂexesdenotelogdeviationsfromnon-stochasticsteady-
state values. That is, ˆ uC,t  logUC,t   log ¯ UC, etc.For the sake of arithmetical convenience,
also deﬁne an auxiliary variable zt  1 at
1 r .
178C.2.2.1 The essentially afﬁne SDF
U =

C
h
t ¯ C
1 h
t 1
1 r
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Mt+1 is completely log-linear in the endogenous variables UC,t and RU,t+1, but it is not
log-linear in Bt and Bt+1. If not for these terms, we could use the exact formula for Mt+1 in
what follows. Since those terms are non-linear, I use the approximations,
log
1  bexp(bt+1)
exp( bt)   b

1
1  b
bt  
b
1  b
bt+1 (C.22)
m
(1)
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1
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b
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
+ (zt   1) ˆ rU,t+1 (C.23)
m
(1)
t+1 is ﬁrst-order accurate for mt+1, hence the superscript. In the continuous time limit,
this formula becomes exact.
The Euler equation for the return on the utility portfolio is
1 = Et exp

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
D ˆ uC,t+1 +
1
1  b
bt  
b
1  b
bt+1

+ ztˆ rU,t+1
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(C.24)
Taking logs of both sides and taking advantage of log-normality gives
0 = Et ˆ uC,t+1   ˆ uC,t +
1
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which is the essentially afﬁne form from the text. The reason that this form is useful is that
any time the SDF is essentially afﬁne, we can obtain an exact expression for
Et exp(mt+1 + f0 + fxxt + fx0xt+1). It also means that we can price any asset whose payoffs
are linear in the endogenous variables, including real and nominal bonds.
C.2.2.2 Approximation to F
Next, wetakeaﬁrst-orderTaylorapproximationtolog F suchthatlog F(xt,xt+1,#t+1) 
f0 + fxxt + fx0xt+1, giving
1 = Et exp

ˆ m
(1)
t+1 + fxxt + fx0xt+1

(C.27)
Taking logs and evaluating the expectation yields
0 =  Etˆ rU,t+1 + fxxt + fx0Etxt+1 +
1
2
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0
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(C.28) is the equation that we ultimately place into the system to be solved. It is completely
linear in both xt and zt (equivalently, at).
C.2.2.3 Solution
Since every equation in the system is now linear in the variables of the model, we
can solve the system for the parameters F and Y from (C.19). Speciﬁcally, we solve the
180following system,
0 =  Etˆ rU,t+1 + fxxt + fx0Etxt+1 +
1
2
s2 ( Gr + fx0)YY0 ( Gr + fx0)
0
+ zts2

GUC  
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YY0 ( Gr + fx0)
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0 = d0 + dxxt + dx0xt+1 + d#s#t+1 (C.30)
where s = 1 in the stochastic equilibrium that we approximate. This system can be solved
using, for example, Sims’ (2001) Gensys algorithm.
The last wrinkle here is that we cannot simply insert (C.28) into the set of equations to
be solved since it involves the matrix Y, which is one of the unknown structures we are
solving for. I deal with this with a simple ﬁxed-point iteration: I begin with the equations
that we obtain from perturbation,
0 =  GrEtxt+1 + fxxt + fx0Etxt+1
0 = d0 + dx ˆ xt + dx0 ˆ xt+1 + d#s#t+1
which will deliver an initial value of Y, denoted Y(1). We then use Y(1) to change the
equilibrium condition to take the form
0 =  GrFxt   ¯ r + fxxt + fx0Fxt +
1
2
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0
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0 (C.31)
0 = d0 + dx ˆ xt + dx0 ˆ xt+1 + d#s#t+1 (C.32)
which delivers a value Y(2). Then simply iterate to convergence. I treat parameter sets for
which the iteration diverges as inadmissible, setting the marginal likelihood to zero.
181C.2.3 Bond pricing
To solve for bond prices, we guess that bond prices are log-linear in the vector of state
variables, so that
pn,t = An + Bnxt (C.33)
where pn,t is the price of a zero-coupon bond that matures on date t + n and pays 1 unit of
consumption. We can also write the price of a nominal bond as p$
n,t. Using the formula for
the SDF from above, we have
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Matching coefﬁcients gives
An =  ¯ r + An 1 +
1
2
s2 (Bn 1   Gp   Gr)YY0 (Bn 1   Gp   Gr)
0 (C.37)
Bn =  GrF + (Bn 1   Gp)F +

GUC  
b
1  b
Gb + Gr

YY0 (Bn 1   Gp   Gr)
0 Gz (C.38)
C.3 Estimation
Much of the analysis discusses the behavior of the model around the posterior mode
(i.e. the peak of the posterior distribution; it is also a maximum-likelihood estimate penal-
ized by the prior distribution). I also start the Metropolis–Hastings chain from that point.
To search for the posterior mode, I begin by running a genetic algorithm on a population of
60 points drawn from the prior distribution. The genetic algorithm searches the parameter
space by mixing parameter sets in the population and also allowing random mutations.
After 30 iterations of the genetic algorithm, I take the point in the population with the
182highest posterior density and use it as the starting point for Chris Sims’ CSMINWEL al-
gorithm, which is a derivative-based hill-climbing algorithm that is designed for DSGE
models. When CSMINWEL gets stuck, I also try the standard simplex algorithm.
I ran this combined search 2500 times (each search takes roughly an hour, so access to
a large computing cluster was essential). The point that I am calling the posterior mode
was found to be the peak in fewer than 100 of the searches. In other words, it is extremely
difﬁcult to ﬁnd the peak of the posterior likelihood. In general, I found that it was far
easier to ﬁnd the posterior mode when risk aversion or the inﬂation target was held ﬁxed,
and easier still when bond prices were also dropped from the estimation. Even though
the priors help to add curvature to the posterior likelihood surface, I still ﬁnd many local
maxima, a problem that plagues the bond-pricing literature. Furthermore, since the model
is so highly constrained there is no straightforward way to use the more recent estimation
algorithms for afﬁne term structure models proposed by, for example, Hamilton and Wu
(2012) and Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2010).
I simulate the posterior distribution using the adaptive random-walk Metropolis–
Hastings algorithm of Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen (2001). I initialize the chain at the
posterior mode. For the proposal distribution, I begin with a normal distribution whose
variance matrix is equal to that of the prior, multiplied by (2.382)/d, where d is the dimen-
sion of the parameter vector (49), which is the optimal scaling factor of Gelman, Roberts,
and Gilks (1996). After 10,000 iterations of the algorithm, I update the variance matrix of
the proposal distribution to be equal to the observed variance matrix for the ﬁrst 10,000
iterations of the chain. Subsequently, the variance is updated each on each iteration using
the sample variance of the chain up to the current iteration.1 I achieve relatively rapid
mixing this way. The full chain has 1,000,000 draws, but it mixes well even by 100,000
draws.
1 A more common method in the DSGE literature is to use the hessian of the posterior around the posterior
mode to determine the variance of the proposal distribution. I have difﬁculty calculating the hessian due to
numerical instability.
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